I dissent.
I cannot agree with the majority that the contract involved here is illegal on the ground that it violates section 406, title 17, of the California Administrative Code, inasmuch as the provisions of section 5537 of the Business and Professions Code expressly permit a contract between an unlicensed architect and client upon the former’s disclosure that he is unlicensed.
We are dealing here with a code section (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 5537) enacted by the Legislature and a regulation adopted by an administrative agency pursuant to enabling legislation. The fact that this regulation appears within the California Administrative Code does not raise the regulation to the comparable status of a code section passed by the Legislature since the “Administrative Code” is not a code as such but only the conglomeration of all the rules and regulations adopted by state agencies and filed with the secretary of state (Gov. Code, § 11370 et seq.). Where on one hand there is a law passed by the Legislature under its general police power, and on the other hand a regulation adopted by a state agency, laws enacted by the Legislature will prevail over regulations made by the administrative agency with regard to matters which are not exclusively that agency’s affairs (see Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712 [249 P.2d 280]; Wilson v. *762Beville, 47 Cal.2d 852, 859 [306 P.2d 789]; La Societe Francaise v. California Emp. Com., 56 Cal.App.2d 534, 554 [133 P.2d 47]; Hamblin v. State Personnel Board, 148 Cal.App.2d 53, 55 [306 P.2d 118]; cf., Hirschman v. County of Los Angeles, 39 Cal.2d 698, 703 [249 P.2d 287, 250 P.2d 145]).
To determine whether or not the Legislature has undertaken to occupy exclusively a given field of legislation depends on an analysis of the statute and a consideration of the facts and circumstances on which it was intended to operate (see Tolman v. Underhill, supra, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712). Moreover where the Legislature has enacted statutes governing a particular subject matter, its intent to occupy the field preempting other regulations is not to be measured by the language alone but by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme (see Tolman v. Underhill, supra, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712).
It is clear that the Legislature of California has attempted to regulate the practice of architecture in this state. It has seen fit to require an architect desiring to practice here to obtain a license and his failure to do so is a misdemeanor (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 5536). However, it has also written an exemption into this licensing requirement in section 5537, by which an architect may practice even though unlicensed, if he makes a written disclosure to his client of the fact he is unlicensed. The determinative question before us is whether this exemption is intended by the Legislature to occupy exclusively the matters of architectural licensing. The majority answers this question by stating that “It [Bus. & Prof. Code, § 5537] does not confer upon all persons for all purposes the right to design buildings in this state.” This answer would appear to beg the question, but in addition it is inadequate for the reason that there is no attempt to explore the situations and conditions upon which section 5537 is intended to operate, as is required by the principles heretofore stated.
Section 5537 of the Business and Professions Code permits an unlicensed person to perform services constituting the practice of architecture if he gives written notice that he is not an architect. The policy underlying this section has been stated to be the prevention of unlicensed persons from preparing plans and specifications unless the client knows and is informed that such person is unlicensed. (W. M. Ballard Corp. v. Dougherty, 106 Cal.App.2d 35, 41 [234 P.2d 745].) In more concrete terms the statutory notice is provided for the benefit of the owner merely to place him on his guard as to whether or not he wishes to employ an uncertified person *763(see Van Doren v. Burns, 106 Cal.App. 224, 226 [288 P. 1107]).
It is clear from the cases that the exemption provisions of section 5537 are intended to operate for the benefit of all owners. There is no attempt to restrict the exemption to certain owners and exclude others; the statute by its terms appears all encompassing.
However this statement of legislative policy is too uncertain and not conclusive on the question of intent to occupy the field of architecture licensing, and further analysis is necessary.
The key to the ascertainment of the legislative intent is found in the reason for creating such an exemption. The most obvious reason, and the one I believe makes sense, is to enable the citizens of California to have access to architects licensed in other states but who are unlicensed in this state. This exemption, when so interpreted, recognizes the individualistic disposition of an architect and the attempts architects make to preserve the integrity of their individual expression. In other words if a citizen of California admires the work of a New York architect and wishes to employ him he may do so, and the architect in turn would be able to work unfettered by any association with California architects, preserving the individuality of his work. It is clear that without such exemption a California citizen could only employ a nonresident unlicensed architect where the latter would be required to work with a certified California architect, and this could well be an unacceptable condition to an architect who places the individual nature of his work in a paramount position. The exemption appears to be realistic in that the Legislature recognized the desirability of permitting architects from other states, and indeed other countries, to practice in California in a manner by which they can express their individual ideas unimpeded by others. Therefore, in its broader aspects the exemption is an attempt by the Legislature to eliminate provincialism in architecture.
To be successful this attempt must be exclusive and not subject to exceptions. If the Department of Public Health is permitted to deal with the licensing of architects, then logically other administrative agencies may likewise carve out exceptions subject only to constitutional limitations. But if this were permitted the reason for allowing unlicensed architects to practice in California would be defeated. Thus, *764in order to effectuate the reasons behind section 5537, its application must be deemed exclusive, and any regulation that abridges this application must fail. (See Tolman v. Underhill, supra, 39 Cal.2d 708.)
This conclusion does not undermine the Department of Public Health in their supervision over hospitals since all plans for hospitals must be submitted to them and disapproved if they are defective (17 Cal. Admin. Code 406). Moreover, the department may disapprove plans even though the architect submitting them is licensed in California. So, in fact, whether or not a person is licensed is immaterial to the approval or disapproval. It is further evident that there is no more assurance that an architect licensed by the State of California will be any more able to submit qualified plans for a hospital than a licensed architect from any other state. Any assumption to the contrary appears to suggest the provincialism that section 5537 was designed to avoid.
For the reasons above stated it would appear that the contract here involved is valid under section 5537 of the Business and Professions Code, and plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover damages for its breach.
I would therefore affirm the judgment.