Clearly, on the facts of this case, one might disagree with the juvenile court that these minors were fit subjects for treatment in the juvenile justice system. Had I been the juvenile court judge, I might certainly have reached a different conclusion regarding their amenability to treatment and their fitness to remain in juvenile court. That, *687however, is not the question before this court. Instead, the question posed in this case is simply this: Where does the primary responsibility for a juvenile fitness determination lie? Is it in the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion based on substantial evidence, with deferential review by the appellate courts? Or is it in the trial court subject to independent review by the appellate courts?
Although the majority purports to follow the former, deferential standard of review, its actual resolution of the case cannot be reconciled with a deferential review standard. In holding the juvenile court’s factual findings were unsupported by substantial evidence, the majority ignores contrary evidence in the record, fails to construe the record in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed below, and thereby deprives our trial judges of their traditional discretion to make a determination of suitability based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case, a determination trial judges, as experienced firsthand observers of the parties and all the circumstances, are best equipped to make.
The crime perpetrated by the two minors in this case was of the utmost seriousness. Were the perpetrators adults, society would rightly demand they be severely punished, possibly incarcerated for life. Because, however, they are juveniles, 15 years of age, society tempers its justifiable demand for punishment with a recognition that youthful characters are not always fully formed and that young people might make choices that are ill-considered, dangerous and sometimes even fatal. Our Legislature has created a statutory scheme that permits some, but not all, minors to be tried and punished as adults. In so doing, the Legislature has recognized that other of these young offenders—including even those who commit murder—can possibly be rehabilitated and eventually become law-abiding members of the community.
The decision whether a youthful criminal offender can likely be rehabilitated, or should instead be treated as an adult and subject to adult punishment, is often a difficult one. Although the Legislature has created a framework to guide the decisionmaking process, no set of rules in the abstract can appropriately resolve every individual case. Accordingly, the Legislature has entrusted our juvenile courts with the responsibility to make the initial decision, based on the facts laid out before them, whether a youthful offender is likely to be rehabilitated within the confines of the juvenile justice system. The law then requires appellate courts to defer to that decision, overturning it only when it determines the juvenile court has abused its discretion.
Because the majority, implicitly if not expressly, applies an improper standard of review, I dissent.
*688I.
The facts are undisputed. Fifteen-year-old cousins Melvin and Marcus Jones performed acceptably in school and the community and were active in church. Short of cash for the school prom, they decided to obtain the necessary money by robbing a local store. They borrowed a gun from a friend and obtained masks and a pair of gloves from the high school lost-and-found. Seeking to increase their courage, they shared two quarts of Thunderbird wine and some vodka. They also smoked some marijuana. Finding a bullet in the firing chamber of the gun, they attempted, without success, to remove it so the weapon would not discharge accidentally. They cocked the hammer of the weapon, but could not figure out how to uncock it, leaving the hammer in the more dangerous, cocked position. As they headed to the store, they had to stop once or twice to vomit. They stood outside the store without their masks on and were recognized by passersby. Nevertheless, they proceeded to don their masks and enter the store, whereupon the gun, held by Melvin, immediately discharged in the face of the victim, Won Hee Lee, killing him. The minors fled, dropping most of the cash. They discarded the gun, gloves and masks as they ran to the safety of Melvin’s apartment. Upon arrival, they found Melvin had lost the key to the apartment.
The police arrived and arrested the minors, placing them in the back of a police car, where they surreptitiously tape-recorded the minors’ conversation. On the tape, the minors acknowledged they were drunk; Melvin asserted he did not try to kill the victim and that he did not mean to shoot. They expressed worry for what their parents would think of their arrest.
II.
As the majority explains, the applicable law is set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (e) (all further statutory references are to this code). It provides that for those minors, charged with murder, who have “attained the age of 14 years but [have] not attained the age of 16 years,” “the minor shall be presumed to be not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law unless the juvenile court concludes, based upon evidence, . . . that the minor would be amenable to the care, treatment, and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court . . . .” (§ 707, subd. (e).) The minor then bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of unfitness under five statutory criteria, and the juvenile court must find the minor fit under each one of the five criteria. These criteria are:
“(A) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.
*689“(B) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
“(C) The minor’s previous delinquent history.
“(D) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor.
“(E) The circumstances and gravity of the offenses alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.” (Ibid.)
The juvenile court below found the minors were fit under criteria (B) through (D), as neither youth had had any previous contacts with the juvenile court. The People concede the minors are fit under those three criteria. The People argue, however, that the juvenile court’s further ruling the minors were fit subjects for juvenile court treatment under criteria (A) and (E) was not supported by substantial evidence. The majority agrees. As I explain, the majority is incorrect.
As the majority acknowledges (maj. opn., ante, at p. 680), juvenile fitness determinations are subject to the abuse of discretion standard on appeal. (See People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.33d 698, 718 [135 Cal.Rptr. 392, 557 P.2d 976] [fitness determination committed to “ ‘the sound exercise of the juvenile court judge’s discretion’ ”], disapproved on another point, People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 34-35 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468]; Jimmy H. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 709, 715 [91 Cal.Rptr. 600, 478 P.2d 32] [same]; People v. Allgood (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 434, 447 [126 Cal.Rptr. 666] [same]; People v. Joe T. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 114, 119 [121 Cal.Rptr. 329] [same], overruled on another point, People v. Chi Ko Wong, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 713; People v. Browning (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 125, 140 [119 Cal.Rptr. 420] [same], overruled on another point, People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 669 [128 Cal.Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d 1000]; see also People v. Superior Court (Rodrigo O.) (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1302 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 796] [noting cases have described the standard of review as either an abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction]; People v. Superior Court (Robert L.) (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 54, 61, fn. 5 [261 Cal.Rptr. 303] [assuming without deciding abuse of discretion standard applied].)1
To the extent a trial court is required to find facts in support of a legal ruling, such findings will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence *690to support them. “Evidence, to be ‘substantial’ must be ‘of ponderable legal significance[,] . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.’ ” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255], quoting Estate of Teed (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644 [247 P.2d 54].) Because the trial court is present for testimony and the presentation of evidence, we defer to that court’s determinations of fact, reversing them on appeal only where such findings are not supported by substantial evidence. This is so because “the appellate court has no opportunity to observe the appearance and general bearing of the witnesses, and is thus deprived of an important aid in the determination of the value and weight to be given the testimony.” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 360, p. 411, italics omitted.)2
I agree with the majority that a juvenile court abuses its discretion if it finds a minor has rebutted the statutory presumption of unfitness when no substantial evidence supports that finding. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 681; see People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316 [228 Cal.Rptr. 197, 721 P.2d 79] [Where the trial court possesses discretion to choose between alternative legal outcomes, “exercise of that wide discretion must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Italics omitted.)]; People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 928 P.2d 1171], quoting People v. Russel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 187, 195 [70 Cal.Rptr. 210, 443 P.2d 794] [“ ‘[A]ll exercises of legal discretion must be grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.’ ”]; see also People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429], quoting People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210] [discretionary decision must not “ ‘fall[] outside the bounds of reason’ ”].)
*691I part company with the majority, however, in its conclusion that in this case the juvenile court’s factual findings lack the support of substantial evidence. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 683-686.) In evaluating the juvenile court’s ruling for substantial evidence, we are required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the minors, as the prevailing parties below. (Gooch v. Hendrix (1993) 5 Cal.4th 266, 279 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 712, 851 P.2d 1321]; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 640 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80]; In re Tonis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1227 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 380].) “When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479 [243 Cal.Rptr. 902, 749 P.2d 339], italics added.) We must assume the trial court resolved conflicts in the evidence in the minors’ favor and accord the minors the benefit of all reasonable inferences raised by the evidence. (See generally, 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 359, pp. 408-409.)
The Court of Appeal in In re Brittany H. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 533 [243 Cal.Rptr. 763], a parental termination case, correctly summarized the applicable review standard: “ ‘A reviewing court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the findings of the trial judge. All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the respondents and all legitimate and reasonable inferences must be indulged in to uphold the judgment. It is well settled that whenever a finding or judgment of the trial court is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the reviewing court begins and ends with the determination of whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted[,] which will support the conclusions reached by the trial court [citation]. All evidence most favorable to respondents must be accepted as true and that which is unfavorable discarded as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact. If the evidence so viewed is sufficient as a matter of law, the judgment must be affirmed [citation].’ ” (Id. at p. 549, quoting In re Gano (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 700, 705 [325 P.2d 485].)
With these principles in mind, I turn to the merits of this case.
III.
The critical inquiry concerns the first and fifth statutory criteria: “(A) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor” and “(E) The circumstances and gravity of the offenses alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (e).)
*692A. Criminal Sophistication
The juvenile court assessed the minors’ criminal sophistication, concluding their relative lack of criminal sophistication indicated they were amenable to the care and treatment of the juvenile court. The court explained this was a first offense for both minors and their lives showed no pattern of criminality. Although the crime was planned, the number of blunders the minors made in its execution indicated they did not really know what they were doing. The court observed the minors, for example, did not even know how. to uncock the hammer of the gun they used, a “[vjery simple [procedure] if you know guns.” In addition, the minors stood outside the store without their masks on, permitting them to be recognized by passersby. Even though the minors apparently knew they had been seen, they nevertheless continued into the store to commit the crime. Of critical importance, the court found the minors did not intend to kill the victim. The court found that, after the minors were arrested, they were very frightened of the situation in which they found themselves.
In conclusion, the juvenile court explained: “Everybody thinks they are going to go get away with it, and they don’t. This [crime] did not take a rocket scientist ... a highly intellectual individual. What it did is it took, you know, thinking young men who for some reason or another thought that they could . . . fl[] . . . make some money and not get caught, without the slightest intent, I believe, according to the evidence that I heard, to hurt or kill anyone. ft[] Taking into consideration all of those factors, there is a degree of sophistication. There is a degree of sophistication, but neither of the minors is at the point where they are criminally sophisticated sufficiently to be unamenable. And the court, therefore, as to Melvin and as to Marcus, taking into consideration the things that I have just discussed, both would be amenable under criteria number one.” (Italics added.)
The majority concludes the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding the minors’ lack of criminal sophistication was sufficient to rebut the presumption of unfitness, because its factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence. I cannot agree, for it cannot be said the juvenile court’s decision was unsupported by evidence that was “ ‘reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.’ ” (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 576, quoting Estate of Teed, supra, 112 Cal.App.2d at p. 644.)
Undeniably, one reasonable view of the evidence is that the minors’ blunders in effectuating the crime do not indicate a lack of sophistication, given their advance planning, use of a firearm, and earlier planning activity in obtaining gloves and masks, and, further, that in view of their brandishing *693of the cocked gun, the minors intended to kill. This, indeed, is the interpretation of the evidence the majority adopts; it contends “[t]he fact that [the minors] were ‘inept’ and did not elude arrest . . . does not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding that their conduct was ‘unsophisticated.’ The juvenile court’s conclusion that the minors lacked ‘the slightest intent... to hurt or kill anyone’ is belied by the highly dangerous manner in which they carried out the robbery.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 684.) This view is also consistent with the probation report prepared for both minors.
Where the majority goes astray is in its refusal to recognize that this is not the only reasonable interpretation of the facts. The juvenile court below concluded the minors’ lack of any criminal record, blunders in the commission of the crime and evident lack of intent to kill indicated their relative degree of criminal sophistication was insufficient to indicate an unfitness to remain in juvenile court. In reaching that conclusion, the juvenile court did not, as the majority finds, rely on evidence so ephemeral or insubstantial that an appellate court should decline to accord the conclusion the traditional deference given to factual findings made by the trier of fact.
On the question of whether the blunders committed by the minors in the commission of the crime reasonably could be construed as failing to demonstrate a sufficiently high level of criminal sophistication so as to preclude retention in the juvenile justice system, I quote the psychological report of Dr. Clive Kennedy, prepared after his examination of Melvin:
“[Melvin’s] behavior and recent past do not meet the criteria for a moderate or severe conduct disorder. This suggests that the minor’s behavior is not consistent with that of sophisticated juvenile delinquents. He does not affiliate with an organized gang or criminal group. He does not engage in firesetting, routinely initiate fights using weapons, or violate the rights of others with confrontation, fl[] The present crime[,] however, does have sophisticated elements. He used a handgun and mask. However, his choice of a target near his home (where he was identified), decision to become intoxicated prior to participating in the crime, and his mode of escape (no vehicle was used) shows poor planning, were less sophisticated, and may have contributed to his capture. The mask was not effective as the minor was identified as he left the store. And the gun appeared to be ‘borrowed’ from a classmate, another potential source of capture. Therefore, the facts of this case alone, are not sufficiently compelling to indicate^ a lack of amenability. Again, the fact that these behaviors appear to be inconsistent with his customary lifestyle does argue for amenability. He is considered fit under this criteria.” (Italics added.)
The court considered the minors’ lack of any prior contacts with the juvenile justice system and that their crime was inconsistent with their *694character.3 The court also read and considered the behavioral studies, including the one quoted above from Dr. Kennedy, which concluded specifically that Melvin’s lack of criminal sophistication rendered him amenable to treatment. (A different study of Marcus, prepared by Dr. Jack Rothberg, was not so specific, but did conclude overall that he was amenable to treatment.)
By no stretch of the imagination can one legitimately characterize this evidence as “insubstantial” and therefore deserving of no deference. That I, like the majority, might disagree with the trial court and draw different inferences from the evidence, is of no consequence. Our role is not to try the case de novo, nor do we exercise independent review. When, as here, two reasonable views of the evidence are possible, proper appellate procedure requires that we view the evidence in a light favorable to the minors, as the parties who prevailed below, and defer to the juvenile court’s interpretation of the significance of the blunders they committed in execution of their planned robbery.
The proper inference to be drawn from the blunders aside, the juvenile court found the minors did not intend to kill; this fact alone, if supported by substantial evidence, supports the juvenile court’s conclusion the minors were insufficiently sophisticated to be unamenable to rehabilitation. Indeed, both common law and statutory law recognize that a lack of intent to kill is the single most powerful circumstance that can mitigate a homicide. On this point, the juvenile court considered carefully the minors’ recorded statements in the back of the police car. At one point, Marcus states: “Man how the fuck you pull the trigger on that nigger man? He didn’t do nothing man.” Melvin replied: “/ didn’t even try to man, I don’t mean it.” (Italics added.) Although the juvenile court could reasonably have disbelieved these statements as self-serving, the court instead decided the statements were credible. Speaking of Melvin, who apparently was holding the weapon when it discharged, the court stated: “There was [an] indication that he did not know how to work the gun, did not know how to uncock it. The sole purpose of the weapon was to rob the store, but there was no intent to kill.” (Italics added.) Later: “The court didn’t find in any of the material or evidence that was presented to it that the minors contemplated killing anyone. There was not an attempt to do so.”
*695Considering that the minors did not know they were being recorded in the police car and, thus, were more likely to be speaking the truth, the juvenile court’s conclusion the minors lacked the intent to kill was not unreasonable. Faced with disputed facts, the juvenile court simply made a commonplace credibility determination. The juvenile court personally heard the witnesses testify, personally observed the minors and was able personally to evaluate their demeanor, all factfinding advantages not shared by myself or my colleagues in the majority. To the extent the majority chooses to disregard or disbelieve this evidence, they simply are substituting their own credibility determination for that of the juvenile court. To do so, of course, is improper.
In addition to the minors’ statements, support for the juvenile court’s conclusion they did not intend to kill is found in the minors’ behavioral studies. Dr. Kennedy’s study of Melvin notes “information from [the minor’s] interview and police reports indicates that the shooting was not planned.” Dr. Rothberg’s study of Marcus notes Marcus “insists that he had no intention of ever hurting anyone.” The majority apparently disregards this evidence as well.
In short, not just substantial, but ample, evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings of fact concerning “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor[s].” Hence, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the minors had rebutted the presumption of unfitness under section 707, subdivision (e), criteria (A).
B. Circumstances and Gravity of the Offense
The juvenile court also found the minors had rebutted the presumption of unfitness regarding the fifth statutory criteria: “The circumstances and gravity of the offense[] . . . .” (§ 707, subd. (e), criteria (E).) The charged crime—murder—is, of course, extremely serious. The statutory presumption of unfitness, however, presupposes the crime will be at least this serious, for a 15-year-old cannot be tried as an adult unless at the threshold he or she is charged with murder. By requiring that a minor rebut the presumption of unfitness by showing amenability, after an evaluation of the circumstances and gravity of the offense, the Legislature must have intended something over and above the mere fact the People allege the minor committed a murder.
I have already explained that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination the minors lacked the intent to kill. Their lack of intent alone constitutes sufficient mitigation of the “circumstances and gravity of the offense[]” (§ 707, subd. (e), criteria (E)) to uphold the juvenile court’s *696decision concerning mitigation. There was, however, more. The juvenile court found intoxication played a large part in the crime. This conclusion is supported by the statements of the minors themselves (they regarded themselves as “faded”) as well as by the behavioral studies. Dr. Kennedy’s study reported “both minors repeatedly ingested large quantities of [alcohol and marijuana] prior to the incident” and concluded Melvin was a fit subject for the juvenile court under section 707, subdivision (e), criteria (E). Dr. Roth-berg also concluded Marcus “drank a substantial quantity of the alcohol, and [was] intoxicated.” There was no real factual dispute the minors were intoxicated at the time of the crime. .
The majority misconstrues the import of this evidence, reasoning the evidence suggests the minors were not so intoxicated that they were unable to form the intent to plan the robbery and that their intoxication was merely to fortify themselves for the difficult task ahead. Perhaps so. These circumstances, however, cast no serious doubt on the juvenile court’s finding that the minors’ state of intoxication diminished to some extent their impulse control and sense of right and wrong. Stated differently, the minors’ state of intoxication at the time of the crime mitigated the “circumstances and gravity of the offense[].” (§ 707, subd. (e), criteria (E).)4
To the extent, moreover, that the majority simply emphasizes inferences regarding the minors’ intoxication different from those drawn by the juvenile court, the majority might do well to heed its own cited authority: “When a trial court’s factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination . . . .” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874 [197 Cal.Rptr. 925], original italics, underscoring added, also quoted at maj. opn., ante, at p. 681.) In other words, mere contradictions in the evidence are insufficient to overturn a factual finding by the trier of fact.
There being substantial evidence supporting the juvenile.court’s findings that the minors’ lack of intent to kill and intoxication at the time of the crime mitigated the “circumstances and gravity of the offense []” so as to render them amenable to the care and treatment of the juvenile justice system, the juvenile court did not abuse its broad discretion in finding the minors had rebutted the presumption of unfitness under section 707, subdivision (e), criteria (E).
*697IV.
Although the majority purports to apply the substantial evidence test, which is a deferential standard of appellate review, it instead merely substitutes its own view of the evidence. The danger of this approach is greater than any potential harm to these two adolescents. Although ample evidence supports the juvenile court’s exercise of discretion, the majority fails to show appropriate deference to that court’s decision. This sends to our lower appellate courts the unfortunate message that, although we say appellate courts should show deference to a trial court’s decision on a minor’s fitness to remain in juvenile court, what we apparently mean is that appellate courts should reweigh the evidence, decline to construe the juvenile court’s findings of fact in a light favorable to the party who prevailed below, make de noyo credibility determinations based on the appellate record and reach an ultimate decision preferred by the appellate court. The majority’s ad hoc approach is not only a departure from past practice, it also has the unfortunate by-product of encouraging unnecessary litigation, for without appellate deference to the trial court’s factual decisions, a losing party has a much greater incentive to seek appellate review, seeking a second bite of the apple. Such a scheme ignores the basic function of our trial courts and the historic role of the appellate courts and threatens to add to an already overburdened appellate caseload.
I dissent.
To be sure, none of the cited cases are directly on point, if for no other reason than the statutory scheme permitting children as young as 14 years old to be tried as adults in superior court has been in existence only since January 1, 1995. (Stats. 1994, ch. 453, § 9.5; see generally, Hicks v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1649 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 269] [discussing history of the law].) Although the primary authority for the abuse of discretion standard (Jimmy H. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 709) was decided before the present *690“presumption of unfitness” scheme was first enacted in 1976 to apply to 16- and 17-year-old offenders (Stats. 1976, ch. 1071, § 28.5, pp. 4825-4827), its holding has been since reiterated. (People v. Chi Ko Wong, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 718.) As the majority indicates, there is no serious doubt the proper standard of appellate review of juvenile fitness determinations is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion.
The principle that appellate courts defer to credibility determinations made by the trier of fact is employed by appellate courts in a wide variety of settings. (See, e.g., In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 109 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466], quoting In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 603 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 727, 822 P.2d 435] [appellate court must give deference to factual findings of referee in habeas corpus reference proceeding because “ ‘referee had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their manner of testifying’ ”]; see also People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 205 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521] [trial court did not abuse discretion in excusing juror because “trial court was in the best position to observe his demeanor and assess his credibility”]; cf. People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 608 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635] [hearsay evidence generally excluded because, among other reasons, “the jury (or other trier of fact) is unable to observe the declarant’s demeanor”].)
The majority’s attempt to diminish these factors by stating “the minors apparently had no history of prior delinquency, and the offense was apparently ‘out of character’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 684, italics added) fails. As even the majority admits, “[t]he probation reports indicated that neither minor had a prior record and that their behavior was ‘out of character.’ ” (Id. at p. 673; see also id. at p. 673 [“psychiatric reports concluded that the minors were fit . . . pointing ... to their lack of previous criminal conduct”].) That the crime was out of character is underscored by the numerous letters in the record in support of the minors written by family and friends.
Of course, intoxication can constitute a circumstance in mitigation relevant to a juvenile fitness determination even if it does not rise to the level of an actual defense to the charged crime.