concurring:
I concur in the result. There is much in the majority opinion with which I agree, as to matters both central and peripheral to its decision. In the latter category, I find very helpful, for instance, the majority’s treatment of Latifi and Hoxhallari. Latifi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam); Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 179 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam); see maj. op. at 271-72.
More centrally, like the majority, I believe that the question of whether we have inherent equitable power to remand for additional fact-finding, given the removal of our statutory authority to do so, is not yet fully resolved. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). There are clearly strong feelings on that question. See Tian Ming Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 473 F.3d 48 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam); maj. op. at 266-70. And, as the majority opinion says, one should be hesitant to assume the nonexistence or the casual statutory abrogation of any such inherent equitable powers. Maj. op. at 266-67. I fully concur with the majority, however, that such inherent equitable powers, if they exist, should be exercised only very sparingly, for example, where there is no other way to correct manifest injustice. Moreover, in the case before us, I think it obvious that, at least at this time, no manifest injustice will result from our decision not to remand to the BIA.
Broadly speaking, the petitioner may have two alternative avenues for relief.
First, she has the option of asking the BIA to reopen the original proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. Normally, a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the Board’s decision, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), but this time limit does not apply to petitioners relying on new evidence of changed country conditions, where that evidence could not have been discovered or presented at the original hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii).1 The documents proffered by the petitioner in Chen — if valid — may very well establish changed country conditions. Jin Xiu *273Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 468 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). And even if the Chen documents themselves describe conditions which predate Ni’s petition, they may represent the “equivalent of changed country conditions notwithstanding the date of their issuancef ] ... because they might vary the perception of the State Department, upon which the immigration courts rely, which would warrant reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).” Fong Chen v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 180, 183 (2d Cir.2007).
Second, the regulations seem to permit the petitioner to make a new request for asylum. The statute allows a repeat application based on changes that have occurred since the original application was denied, if these changed circumstances “materially affect [her] eligibility for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). This provision apparently includes changed personal conditions as well as changed country conditions. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i); Jian Huan Guan v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47, 49 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam); Ai Ming Dong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 218 Fed.Appx. 48, 49 (2d Cir.2007). The subsequent discovery of the Chen documents may well constitute such changed circumstances.
A petitioner, like Ni, must file her new request within a “reasonable period,” but in deciding whether she has done so, the authorities are obliged to consider the fact that the changed circumstances were only discovered long after her original request was denied. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(h). It seems more than plausible, then, that Ni, even if she could not reopen before the BIA, could present a new asylum petition. Her claim of persecution would, as a result, be heard on its merits.
Given these possibilities, it seems to me quite clear that — in this case, at this time — no exercise of inherent equitable powers is called for to prevent manifest injustice. Since that is all that is needed to decide the case, I fully agree that the petition must be denied without determining whether or not we have such inherent equitable powers to remand.
As to most of the interesting, learned and often useful dicta in the majority opinion, I express no ultimate view. There is, however, one implication in the opinion which is dicta and with which I expressly disagree. The opinion states that “fw]here ... existing statutes and regulations provide an ‘alternative means of protecting the [petitioner’s] interests,’ ... there is ‘a lack of necessity’ for the resort to inherent powers.” Maj. op. at 271 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). The opinion then adds that “[t]he ability of a particular petitioner to successfully reopen proceedings does not bear on the question.” Id. This language could be taken to mean that the mere existence of a procedure which permits some petitioners to have their cases heard by the BIA, but excludes others, would be sufficient to bar the exercise of any inherent equitable powers we have, even when the excluded applicants would suffer manifest injustice.
If that is what the majority means to say,2 this dictum strikes me as wrong and, indeed, self-contradictory. If the reason we have inherent equitable powers at all is that courts are not readily deprived of the *274power to remand to correct manifest injustice, then those powers must be available, whether the injustice is due to the total absence of procedures, or instead results from the presence of procedures so circumscribed that they would lead to manifest injustice to a particular petitioner who comes to our court. In any event, since adequate procedures do seem to be available to Ni, none of this is determinative of the case before us.
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Because I agree that if we have inherent powers, they must be used very sparingly, essentially only in cases of manifest injustice; and because in the instant ease procedures are seemingly available to avoid any such injustice at this time, I agree with the majority that we should not remand, and I concur in the result.
. While the decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen remains within the BIA’s discretion, 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(a), as the majority points out, this court can review that decision for abuse of discretion. See maj. op. at 270; Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d. Cir.2001).
. I am not sure that the majority intends to go this far. There is language in the opinion that suggests no more than that inherent equitable powers ought not to be used when an alternative procedure is seemingly available, until it turns out that the procedure was not in fact available to the particular petitioner. I read footnote 9 of the majority opinion to suggest that an exercise of inherent powers — if we have them — might be justified when and if the agency has closed all other doors to hearing a potentially meritorious claim. But there is other language that could be read as more absolute.
In any event, while the majority is correct in footnote 9 when it says that whether vari*274ous doors that are plausibly open to petitioner are in fact open can only be "speculation,” that does not end the matter. The presence of those possibilities is enough to justify us in not exercising inherent powers at this time. At this moment, no manifest injustice would result from our abstention. It is only if alternative routes turn out in fact not to be available that the issue of exercise of inherent powers would become ripe for decision.