The opinion of the court was delivered by
Davis, J.:In this petition for writ of mandamus, the State seeks a declaration from this court that K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 22-3428(1)(a) mandates that a criminal defendant who has been acquitted on the basis of a mental defect or disease under K.S.A. 22-3221 be com*805mitted to the Lamed State Security Hospital for safekeeping and treatment. The State asks this court to direct the Honorable Steven R. Becker to commit the defendant, David Proctor, under the provisions of 22-3428(l)(a).
The facts are not in dispute. David Proctor had been diagnosed as suffering from unipolar depression and had been on medication for this condition for approximately 10 years prior to the incident in this case. He had been hospitalized for the same condition on six prior occasions.
In August 1996, the defendant told his wife that something was wrong. He admitted himself to the Hutchinson Hospital psychiatric unit. His psychiatrist, Dr. Eve Hohly, conferred with him dúring his stay. On the morning of August 9, 1996, she testified that the defendant was preoccupied with some religious delusions. He was not in a security room at the time and did not appear to be imminently dangerous to the staff or himself.
Later that same day, Dr. Hohly received a report that the defendant had ran or jumped into a window. She directed that the defendant be placed in a security room. Donald Ahrens, an orderly in the psychiatric unit, helped the defendant to the security room. Once in the security room, the defendant became agitated. Ahrens went into the room to try to calm him, but the defendant put his fingers in his ears and refused to listen. The defendant then stated, “Go ye and halt the nation and preach the word.”
Ahrens testified that the defendant jumped up and announced that he was going to kill the nurse on duty. The nurse pushed the “panic button” to summon additional help, and Ahrens backed out of the room. The defendant came out of the room and began throwing punches at Ahrens. The defendant then ran to the fire door, ripped off a stainless steel bar that had been welded to the door, and severely beat Ahrens.
The defendant was charged with aggravated battery. He waived his right to a jury trial and gave notice of an insanity defense. The case proceeded to trial, with the defendant stipulating to the complaint and the State stipulating to the admission of a letter from Dr. Hohly stating that when the incident occurred, the defendant *806was under a delusional belief that he was fighting Satan and should not be held responsible for his actions.
Based upon the stipulated evidence, the district court found that while the defendant had committed the aggravated battery, he was not guilty by reason of insanity. The case then proceeded with disposition.
Without objection from the State, the defendant presented the testimony of Dr. Hohly as well as the testimony of Karen Brown Soden, a nurse practitioner at the Lamed State Hospital. Dr. Hohly testified that after the incident, the police transported the defendant to the Lamed State Hospital. Brown Soden testified that the defendant was brought into die hospital in protective custody and was evaluated. During the time the defendant had been hospitalized, it was discovered that he was suffering from a bipolar disorder rather than unipolar depression. Brown Soden testified that the treatment for unipolar disorder is different from that for bipolar disorder.
Dr. Hohly testified that the defendant had previously been placed on an antidepressant for unipolar disorder but not on antipsychotic medication. She stated that placing someone with bipolar disorder on an antidepressant alone can increase that person’s manic behavior. She testified that with the new antipsychotic medication, the defendant is well stabilized and has been able to return to work. She testified that the defendant was asymptomatic and that a return to Lamed would be of little help. Further, it could be counterproductive in that it would take away his job, which is a stabilizing influence in his life.
Brown Soden testified that the defendant responded to his new medication quickly and his condition stabilized. He was released from the hospital on an outpatient basis 17 days after the incident. A court order was filed in Reno County District Court mandating that the defendant receive outpatient treatment. Brown Soden also testified that a return to Lamed would be detrimental to the defendant’s stability because it would impair his employment. In her opinion, the defendant was not a danger to himself or others at the time of his release. According to Brown Soden, if the defendant were sent back to Lamed, he would undergo an evaluation similar *807to one he had previously undergone, and his reports would be sent to and approved by the same person who approved his earlier release from Lamed.
At the close of testimony, Judge Becker recognized that under K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 22-3428, he was required to commit the defendant. However, the judge determined that the defendant’s case was unique in that he had already been committed to Lamed, Lamed had determined that he was no longer a danger to himself or others, and there had been a judicial determination that the defendant did not need to be hospitalized. Judge Becker, therefore, determined that the purpose of 22-3428 had been satisfied and that the defendant was eligible for conditional release under 22-3428(4). Judge Becker placed the defendant on conditional release.
The State initially filed this appeal as a question reserved. However, it dismissed the appeal and instead brought a petition for writ of mandamus.
K.S.A. 60-801 defines mandamus as “a proceeding to compel some inferior court, tribunal, board, or some corporation or person to perform a specified duty, which duty results from the office, trust, or official state of the party to whom the order is directed, or from operation of law.” Article 3, § 3 of the Kansas Constitution provides original jurisdiction in this court for proceedings in mandamus. However, relief in mandamus is discretionary. State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 251 Kan. 559, 567, 836 P.2d 1169 (1992). Mandamus is an appropriate proceeding for the purpose of compelling a public officer to perform a clearly defined duty, one imposed by law and not involving the exercise of discretion. 251 Kan. at 567. However, “[mandamus[ is not a common means of obtaining redress, but is available only in rare cases, and as a last resort, for causes which are really extraordinary.” State ex rel. Stephan v. O’Keefe, 235 Kan. 1022, 1024, 686 P.2d 171 (1984). This court will entertain a mandamus action if the issue is a matter of great public interest and concern. See Sedlak v. Dick, 256 Kan. 779, 786, 887 P.2d 1119 (1995).
K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 22-3428(1)(a) provides:
*808“When a defendant is acquitted and the jury answers in the affirmative to the special question asked pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3221, the defendant shall he committed to the state security hospital for safekeeping and treatment. A finding of not guilty and the jury answering in the affirmative to the special question asked pursuant to K.S .A. 22-3221 and amendments thereto, shall he prima facie evidence that the acquitted defendant is presently likely to cause harm to self or others.” (Emphasis added.)
The above-emphasized phrases crystalize the issue in this case and call for an answer to the question of whether, under the facts of this case, we ought to grant a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Becker to commit the defendant to the Lamed State Security Hospital under 22-3428(l)(a). '
The State argues that we must grant the writ because 22-3428(1) (a) establishes a clear duly to commit once a criminal defendant has been acquitted on the basis of a mental defect or disease under K.S.A. 22-3221. Under these circumstances, 22-3428(l)(a) provides that a defendant shall be committed to the state security hospital for safekeeping and treatment. The defendant argues that the same statute in its second sentence provides that an acquittal under the conditions set forth is prima facie evidence that he is likely to cause harm to self or others. Thus, he argues that 22-3428(l)(a) provides him an opportunity to rebut the prima facie evidence and if based upon such evidence the court determines that he is no longer likely to harm himself or others, the court may release him.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this court’s review is unlimited. See State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. 865, 874, 934 P.2d 38 (1997). Under the fundamental rule of statutory construction, the intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute. State v. Roderick, 259 Kan. 107, 110, 911 P.2d 159 (1996). In construing statutes and determining legislative intent, several provisions of an act, in pari materia, must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony, if possible. State v. Le, 260 Kan. 845, 847-48, 926 P.2d 638 (1996).
The language used in 22-3428(l)(a) is mandatory, and its import seems clear. A defendant who is acquitted under the conditions set *809forth “shall” be committed for safekeeping and treatment. However, the second sentence added to the statute in 1980 raises the question whether use of the term “prima facie evidence” contemplates a hearing to determine if the defendant is presently likely to cause harm to self or others. A hearing was held in this case, and based upon such evidence, the trial court determined that the defendant was no longer likely to cause harm to himself or others.
The defendant argues that the evidence of Dr. Hohly and Brown Soden rebutted the prima facie evidence that arose because of his acquittal and that the trial court properly released him. He contends that continued confinement under this circumstance would violate his due process rights under Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 118 L. Ed. 2d 437, 112 S. Ct. 1780. (1992). In Foucha, the United States Supreme Court determined that an insanity acquit-tee may be held only as long as he or she is both mentally ill and dangerous, but ho longer. 504 U.S. at 77.
We have had a prior opportunity to consider the argument of whether the mandatory commitment of insanity acquittees, pursuant to K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 22-3428, denied a defendant equal protection of law or due process or constituted cruel and unusual punishment. In In re Jones, 228 Kan. 90, 110, 612 P.2d 1211 (1980), we held that such mandatory commitment did not violate the constitutional rights of a defendant. In re Jones was decided based upon the provisions of 22-3428 prior to its amendment in 1980, and 12 years before the Foucha decision.
Prior to the 1980 amendment to 22-3428, commitment upon acquittal was mandatory. 228 Kan. at 109-10. Moreover, the commitment was of indefinite duration, although the defendant had the right to request a hearing annually, at which time he or she had the right to attempt to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was not a danger to self or others and, thus, win a discharge. See K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 22-3428a. The defendant could also be discharged after a hearing if the chief medical officer felt that such a discharge was warranted and the defendant could prove to the court that he or she was not a danger to self or others. See K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 22-3428(2); 22-3428a(3).
*810At the time In re Jones was decided by this court, the 1980 amendment to 22-3428(1) had taken effect, although Jones was decided on the 1979 version of 22-3428(1). The uncertainty interjected into 22-3428 by the 1980 amendment was noted by Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion:
“It is interesting to note, however, that the amendment provides in part: ‘A finding of not guilty because of insanity shall be prima facie evidence that the acquitted person is presently dangerous to the person’s self or others or property of others.’ (Emphasis added.) Query: As ‘prima facie evidence’ merely creates a presumption which may be overcome by evidence from the other party (in this statute, the insanity acquittee), does not the new amendment imply or contemplate a prior hearing to allow the ‘prima facie evidence’ to be rebutted or contradicted? Black’s Law Dictionary 1353-1354 (4th ed. rev. 1968). This is a determination which will probably be before this court at some later date.” 228 Kan. at 114.
The defendant argues in this case that the 1980 amendment was added to the statute in order to provide for a due process hearing before commitment, at which time a defendant could rebut the prima facie case established by the conviction. The defendant is correct in his contention that “prima facie evidence” is defined as evidence which, if uncontroverted, is sufficient to sustain a judgment. See State v Haremza, 213 Kan. 201, 206, 515 P.2d 1217 (1973).
The defendant also argues that the legislative history of the 1980 amendment supports his position. His argument has merit. A memorandum by Art Griggs of the Revisor of Statutes office to the Special Committee on Judiciary, which recommended the changes to the bill (22-3428), noted the recent trend in federal and state courts of requiring a due process hearing prior to commitment. See Memorandum to 1979 Special Committee on Judiciary regarding Proposal No. 28, p. 4. Following the presentation of Griggs’ memorandum, (now Justice) Senator Donald Allegrucci moved that a bill draft be created which would statutorily recognize the plea of insanity and that such a finding of insanity would create a rebuttable presumption that the person is presently dangerous. See Minutes of Special Committee on Judiciary, September 20, 1979. This draft provided the present language in the statute that “[a] finding of not guilty and the jury answering in the affirmative to *811the special question asked pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3221 and amendments thereto, shall be prima facie evidence that the acquitted defendant is presently likely to cause harm to self or others.” This language arguably created a right to a precommitment hearing at which time the defendant could attempt to show that he or she was not presently likely to cause harm to self or others.
In 1993, the legislature modified the entire procedure under 22-3428. S.B. 10 sought to correct what was perceived as a constitutional deficiency by allowing for a hearing to be held after the verdict to determine the defendant’s present mental state. See Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, January 26, 1993. According to the legislative history, there was grave concern that the system then in effect, with its automatic commitment and presumption of mental illness, was unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71. See Testimony of Brenda West Hagerman, Legal Services, Lamed State Hospital, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, January 26, 1993.
As a result, in 1993, the procedure was changed to the present one, which provides that while a defendant, upon being acquitted by reason of a mental disease or defect, must be mandatorily committed to the state security hospital, such commitment is only for such a time as to allow the state security hospital to evaluate the defendant’s current mental state. Such an evaluation must be made and a report issued to the court within 90 days of the defendant’s admission. Thereafter, a hearing must be held within 30 days of the receipt of the report, at which time the defendant may present evidence that he or she is not currently mentally ill. If the court finds that the defendant is not currently mentally ill, he or she must be released. If the court finds that the defendant is still mentally ill, he or she may be committed or conditionally released. See K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 22-3428(l)(b), (c), (d). Thus, 22-3428 provides for a precommitment hearing following a limited commitment for evaluation purposes.
The purpose of the 1993 amendment to 22-3428 was to provide a uniform procedure to deal with a defendant who has been acquitted by reason of insanity, including the defendant’s right to due *812process within such procedure. Yet, the 1980 amendment language that “[a] finding of not guilty and the jury answering in the affirmative to the special question asked pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3221 and amendments thereto, shall be prima facie evidence that the acquitted defendant is presently likely to cause harm to self or others” remains.
Arguably, the language of the 1980 amendment which remains today provides a defendant a remedy in addition to the specific procedure set forth in the 1993 amendment to 22-3428. If the legislature intended, by the 1993 amendment, to provide a procedure whereby the defendant is mandatorily committed for evaluation purposes without a hearing, it is puzzling that it left the language intact in the 1980 amendment.
However, it is not necessary that we resolve this issue in order to decide the instant case, for it is clear that the trial court recognized that 22-3428(l)(a) required a defendant to be committed. The trial court then noted that this was a unique case, in that the purpose to be served by the mandatory commitment, that of allowing the state security hospital to evaluate and the chief medical officer to render an opinion on the defendant’s present mental health, had already been completed. The court, therefore, saw little benefit in forcing the hospital and the defendant to jump through these hoops again and, instead, converted the sentencing proceeding to a hearing on the defendant’s mental state under 22-3428(l)(b), (d). There was no objection by the State to the hearing. Substantial evidence, including the opinion of the chief medical officer at Lamed State Hospital, demonstrated that the defendant was not a danger to himself or others. Based on this evidence, the court placed the defendant on conditional release as authorized by 22-3428(1)(d) and 22-3428(4).
Our reading of the record supports the trial court’s characterization of the facts in this case as unique. Immediately following the incident giving rise to the charge of aggravated battery, the defendant was taken to Lamed State Hospital by the police. He was involuntarily committed for his safety and for the safety of others. His medication was changed to fit his condition. After his evaluation and treatment at Lamed, the chief medical officer de*813termined that the defendant was no longer a danger to himself or others and discharged him. Within a short time, he was tried and acquitted of aggravated battery based upon his plea of insanity. Based upon the uncontroverted evidence before the trial court that the defendant was no longer a danger to himself or others, the court placed him on conditional probation as authorized by 21-3428(l)(d) and 21-3428(4).
Under these unique facts, there is a serious question whether continued confinement in the Lamed State Security Hospital would have violated the defendant’s due process rights as outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Foucha. However, we need not resolve this question because we believe mandamus is unwarranted.
As we stated at the beginning of our discussion, relief in mandamus is discretionary. State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 251 Kan. at 567. “[Mandamus[ is not a common means of obtaining redress, but is available only in rare cases, and as a last resort, for causes which are really extraordinary.” State ex rel. Stephan v. O’Keefe, 235 Kan. at 1024. The unique facts before us militate against a writ of mandamus.
Writ denied.
McFarland, C.J., dissenting.