with whom ALMA WILSON, Justice, joins, dissenting.
¶ 1 The court holds today that when the Governor uses a publicly funded state vehicle to travel to a partisan political fund raiser, he does not violate Ethics Commission [Commission] Rule 10-l-8(a), which proscribes the use of public funds, property, and time to participate in fund raising events for political campaigns or in races of candidates for state office.1 The opinion’s rationale rests upon the authority conferred by 47 O.S.1991 § 2-101(b).2 In my view, the pronouncement clearly is contrary to the explicit mandate of Rule 10-1-3 and to the constitutional under*1266pinnings on which it rests. What is worse and most tragic, today’s declaration of the norms that affect the Governor’s conduct places him above the law of the State.
¶2 Rule 10-1-3 narrows the range of activity that may seem permissible under the provisions of 47 O.S.1991 § 2-101 (with respect to the Governor’s use of transportation), and fills the interstices left by that section’s seemingly open-ended texture. When § 2-101 is viewed together with both the fundamental laws’ requirement that public funds be used solely for public benefit— which is prescribed by Art. 10 §§ 14, 15, 17 & 19, Okl. Const.3 — and with the language of 47 O.S.Supp.1996 § 156.14 that restricts the personal use of state transportation by state employees, the command of Rule 10-1-3 is crystal-clear. I would hence construe § 2-101 and § 156.1 together with Art. 10 §§ 14, 15, 17 & 19, Okl. Const., and also with Rule 10-1-3, as one harmonious whole that (1) confines the Governor’s use of state transportation to official duties and (2) excludes from that use travel to partisan political fund raisers. I would treat the restrictive text of Rule 10-1-3 and the nearly open-ended authorization in § 2-101(b) as legal norms in pari materia and would hold that § 2-101 authorizes publicly provided transportation only for the Governor’s official duties. I would then direct that, on this cause’s termination, the Commission hold hearings to decide if the Rule 10-1-3 restrictions, when viewed together with other pertinent legislative and constitutional norms in pari materia to be considered, gave the Governor adequate advance notice that the Rule’s commands were efficacious. Advance notice is sufficient when it fully advises a reasonable person in intelligible terms of what conduct is legally interdicted. If, at the conclusion of these proceedings, the Commission should determine the Governor did not have adequate advance notice that the Rule 10-1-3 standards were in force, I would exonerate him of their breach.
¶ 3 Should the Commission determine that the Governor did have adequate advance notice to conform his conduct to the Rule 10-1-3 requirements, he should be ordered to pay the penalty set by the parties’ agreement. I would apply my pronouncement to this case, to all like controversies now pending before judicial or administrative tribunals, to those presently in the appellate litigation process, and prospectively to all controversies over like or identical ethics issues to arise from acts, conduct, or omissions *1267occurring after the court’s opinion will have become final.
I.
TAKING ORIGINAL COGNIZANCE OF THIS DISPUTE IS APPROPRIATE
¶4 The Governor and the Commission request that this court assume original jurisdiction to resolve the pending controversy between them. Its early settlement is urgently needed. Art. 7 § 4, Okl. Const., confers on this court the power to invoke its original cognizance5 to resolve conflicts between coordinate branches of government.6 I hence join the court only insofar as it concludes that this matter is properly before us.
II.
THE COMMISSION’S RULE 10-1-3 CON-CRETIZES THE RANGE OF PERMISSIBLE STATUTORY NORMS PRESCRIBED IN THE TERMS OF 47 O.S.1991 § 2-101 BY RESTRICTING THE USE OF STATE TRANSPORTATION TO THAT WHICH IS AUTHORIZED BY THE PROVISIONS OF 47 O.S.SUPP.1996 § 156.1 AND OF ART. 10 §§ 14, 15, 17 & 19, OKLA. CONST.
¶ 5 The pertinent portions of the United States Constitution, Oklahoma’s Constitution, state legislative enactments, and of the effectively promulgated agency rules must be invoked to provide the foundational legal sources for today’s decision. By the terms of § 2-101 the Governor is given the use of state transportation without restriction. In 1995 and 1996 the Governor used state vehicles to attend partisan political fund raisers. The Commission initiated a district court action7 to enforce (against the Governor) its Rule 10-1-3 which forbids the use of public funds, property or time to further a fund raiser or solicitation of funds for political candidates.8 For an analysis of the Commission’s position I would begin by reconciling the text of § 2-101 with the terms of § 156.1 and those of Art. 10 §§ 14, 15, 17 & 19, Okl. Const. Section 156.1 restricts the use of public transportation by all state officials and employees, while the constitutional provisions require that public funds not be spent for private use. I would utilize the pertinent constitutional provisions cited above, those of § 2-101, and lastly the terms of § 156.1 as the critical foundational bricks and would then concretize9 these basic building blocks by filling whatever open texture is present between them with the mortar provided by the Commission’s Rule 10-1-3 restriction. Because the cited Commission rule is anchored on state and federal constitutional underpinnings, it will pass any fundamental-*1268law muster; its 'provisions here in contest will trump all nonconformable norms in pari materia.10
A.
The Law’s Concretizing Mortar: Commission Rule 10-1-3
¶ 6 Although Oklahoma’s Constitution creates the Commission and authorizes it to promulgate rules governing ethical norms, the rules themselves do not have the force of fundamental law. This is so because they are subject to the filtering force of legislative approval.11 While promulgated Commission rules do not ipso facto rise to a constitutional dimension, Rule 10-1-3 clearly rests on and implements the fundamental law’s commands in Art. 10 §§ 14, 15, 17 & 19, Okl. Const. It hence speaks to us with the voice of the Constitution. Moreover, this court, which is required to take judicial notice of agency rules promulgated in conformity to the Administrative Procedures Act, may not overlook the Commission rales’ impact upon the symmetry of our legal system.12 As valid expressions of the agency’s lawmaking power, the rules have the full force and effect of law.13 New Commission rules must be presented to the Governor and to both Houses of the Legislature. If they do not draw objections, the rules are then to be printed in the official statutes.14 The Legislature must affirmatively act to disapprove the rules; if a rale is to be modified or repealed, its change must be accomplished by a legislative enactment.15 If, after promulgation of an agency rale, successive sessions of the Legislature are convened but no action is taken to accomplish a rale’s rejection, silence may be regarded as proof of the lawmakers’ consent.16 Because the Governor and the Legislature failed timely to object to Rule 10-1-3 when it was initially adopted, that rule has never been disapproved, modified, or repealed.17 Its text must be treated as fully effective law.
¶ 7 Brushing aside the force of law that Rule 10-1-3 represents, today’s pronouncement ignores the Commission’s constitutional status as an agency entrusted with primary *1269responsibility for fashioning and enforcing ethics norms for political campaigns, candidates, and state employees. Were I writing for the court, I would hold that a Commission rule which concretizes open-ended statutory norms must — at a minimum — be accorded the same force and effect as any in pari materia expression of legislative will.
¶ 8 This court is powerless to repeal either statutory enactments or agency rules. Its task is to vitalize these sources, so far as possible, for their meaningful application. Different statutes on the same subject (or rules having the force of legislative enactments) are to be construed as a consistent whole in harmony with common sense and reason. If possible, every norm should be given effect. All provisions in pari materia are to be interpreted together as forming one law that will fit into a coherent symmetry of legislation.18 I would hence hold that because the Oklahoma Constitution does not free the Governor from the restraint of the Commission’s ethical commands nor otherwise arm him with immunity from accountability for ethics breaches, the Chief Executive, like all other state officials, stands subject to the Commission’s constitutional authority.
The Court’s Assault on Rule 10-1-3 is Unfounded
¶ 9 Rule 10-1-3 does not reach dehors the Commission’s constitutional powers to affect conduct by elected officials. It is not unrelated to ethics in election campaigns. Subsection (b) of Art. 29 § 3, Okl. Const., states, “[ajfter public hearing, the Ethics Commission shall promulgate rules of ethical conduct for state officers and employees, including civil penalties for violation of these rules.” No text could convey a clearer expression of the Commission’s authority to regulate the Governor’s ethical conduct. Despite this unmistakable language, today’s pronouncement gives primacy to the provisions of § 2-101 as well as to its own and plainly erroneous exegesis of § 156.1 over the clear, authoritative and constitutionally dictated provisions of Rule 10-1-3.
¶ 10 Rule 10-l-3(a) states that “[a] person shall not use or authorize the use of public funds, property, or time, to participate or assist in the organization of or preparation for a fund raiser for a campaign or in any solicitation of funds for or against a candidate for state office or a ballot measure.”19 The court dilutes the force of Rule 10-1-3 and waters down its meaning by shifting the focus of inquiry from the Governor’s unauthorized use of state transportation for travel to attend partisan political fund raisers to the duty owed by the Commissioner of Public Safety to provide the Governor with statutorily authorized transportation. Subsection (a) of Rule 10-1-3 commands that persons should not use public property (or money) to solicit funds for or against candidates for state offices, and subsection (h) frees from penalty for the breach those persons (or governmental entities) whose activity in question is part of that individual’s ordinary conduct. Neither the Department of Public Safety nor its Commissioner is a party to this original action. The sole governmental entity proceeded against is the Governor. The court’s focus on activities rather than persons (or officials) and entities (agencies) extracts the teeth from this Rule’s bite in an effort to give the Governor unrestricted rein over publicly funded transportation, contrary to the unequivocal proscription in subsection (a).
Today’s Pronouncement Directly Contradicts Both the Spirit and the Language of this Court’s 1993 Pronouncement in Ethics Commission v. Cullison20
¶ 11 Placing its focus on activities rather than on persons and governmental entities, *1270the court today declares that Rule 10-1-3 attempts to override the Legislature’s power over the manner and method of providing the Governor with security. In Ethics Commission v. Cullison this court held that the Legislature cannot usurp the Commission’s rule-making authority by controlling the ethical conduct of state officials through legislative enactments. Indifferent to the stench of hypocrisy pervading today’s contrary expressions, the court now permits its construction of § 2-101 and of § 156.1 to control the ethical conduct of state officials and to circumvent the Commission’s effectively promulgated and constitutionally conformable Rule 10-1-3 commands. Without a scintilla of legal warrant the court gives the Legislature a double whammy (or a second bite of the apple, as it were) in the form of two chances to disapprove Commission rules: one when the new rule has been initially adopted; and another whenever a dispute arises over the efficacy of a rule that concre-tizes the statute. The Cullison-crafted primary authority of the Commission over ethics is today reduced to an inferior rank and its rules are placed in a status subordinate to legislation.
¶ 12 I would hold that by filling with its own concretizing mortar the interstices that lie in spaces left open between the provisions of § 156.1 and § 2-101 on the one hand, and those prescribed by Art. 10 §§ 14, 15, 17 & 19, Okl. Const., on the other hand, Rule 10-1-3 covers — in a manner conformable to the Constitution — the wide spaces of open texture left unaddressed by the language o/§ 2-101. No legislative enactment has been contravened. The Rule merely serves to refine the text of § 2-101 and to restrict public funds to publicly beneficial uses in obedience to the commands of Art. 10 §§ 14, 15, 17 & 19, Okl. Const., and to the conforming language in § 156.1.
B.
The Law’s Basic Bricks: 1st & XIVth Amendments, U.S. Const., Art. 10 §§ 14, 17 & 19, Okl. Const., § 2-101 and § 156.1 of Oklahoma’s Statutory Law.
The United States Constitution Does Not Allow a State to Restrict the Full Sway of Free Speech Guaranteed by the First Amendment by Forcibly Exacted Contributions of Public Funds to Beneñt Partisan Political Fund Raisers
¶ 13 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees freedom of expression. When the Governor uses any state property to endorse partisan political speech, he coerces all state taxpayers to “participate in the dissemination of an ideological message” in a manner contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Wooley v. Maynard.21 Citizens of Oklahoma may not be compelled to endorse any political platform by contributions made to a political party’s campaign through the veil of publicly subsidized transportation. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,22 the Court held that employers cannot force their employees to contribute to political campaigns. Just as it was done in Abood, so also here I would declare that all persons must be afforded the liberty to develop and nurse their own beliefs. No one may be coerced, through forcibly exacted contributions, to give financial support to anyone’s political campaign.23 The Chief Executive’s conduct under today’s scrutiny has much broader implication than that condemned by Abood. In the case at bar, it affects every Oklahoma taxpayer while in the cited case the High Court dealt merely with an appreciably smaller group of *1271union members.24
The Oklahoma Constitution does not Permit the Governor’s use of Public Funds for Travel to Partisan Political Fund Raisers
¶ 14 The Oklahoma Constitution, which requires that tax funds be used only for public benefit, imposes several restrictions upon political campaigns. The provisions of Art. 10 §§ 14, 15, 17, & 19, Okl. Const., mandate that taxes be levied and collected only for public purposes.25 This plainly contemplates a use that is not only impressed with a public interest, but one that is to be connected with the exercise of the state’s governmental functions.26 Similarly, agencies authorized to raise money through taxation must expend it for a public purpose.27
¶ 15 A 1982 opinion by the Attorney General appears instructive in explaining my analysis. Considering the question there posed — whether the Oklahoma Wheat Commission could either pay Oklahoma’s share of the National Association of Wheat Growers’ budget or help the Oklahoma Wheat Grower’s Association obtain seats on the Board of the National Association of Wheat Growers— the Attorney General reasoned that a payment would amount to an impermissible aid to a private organization. It would be a use of public funds to help a private association conduct its private function in violation of Art. 10 § 14, Okl. Const.28 Using public funds to finance the Governor’s travel to partisan political events is no less offensive to the clear mandate of Art. 10 §§ 14 and 15, Okl. Const.,29 than the conduct disapproved of by the analysis used in the Attorney General’s letter of response. An association is “[a] body of persons who have combined to execute a common purpose or advance a common cause.”30 Within the meaning of our Constitution, partisan political gatherings are “associations” that may not be assisted by public transportation used to subsidize the Governor’s supportive participation. A political party clearly is an association whose activities may not be aided by tax revenue.
¶ 16 Acting in the exercise of its constitutional authority,31 the Commission promulgated Rule 10-l-3(a) to make it consistent with the public-use-for-public-funds mandate of Art. 10 §§ 14, 15, 17 & 19, Okl. Const. When the Governor and both Houses of the Legislature failed to disapprove Rule 10-1-3, they clothed it with the attributes equal in vigor to any validly enacted legislation,32 The legislators were doubtless cognizant of the Commission’s constitutional source of authority to enforce its rule.33
¶ 17 Although today’s pronouncement appears to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the Commission rules, it accords them less weight than that which is due a legislative enactment. . In fact, the court subordinates the Rule 10-1-3 text to the statutory language in § 2-101 rather than allowing the cited section’s open texture to become concretized by this rule.34
The Governor’s Nearly Open-Ended Statutory Freedom to Use State Vehicles, Conferred on him by the Provisions of § 2-101, is Counterbalanced and Concretized by Rule 10-1-3’s Restrictions.
¶ 18 The court today finds a conflict be*1272tween the language in § 2-10135 on the one hand, and the Rule 10-1-3 commands on the other. Were a conflict truly present I might accede to today’s pronouncement.36 As I view the problem, the rule and the legislative enactments complement each other. The former spells out in greater detail than the latter (and conformably to the commands of the Constitution) the permissible range of public transportation that may be provided. Whenever diverse statutes relate to the same subject, this court will treat them as a harmonious whole and, to the fullest extent possible, will allow each enactment’s meaning to stand.37 It would reconcile and harmonize all rules, legislative enactments and constitutional provisions on the same subject to give each the force that is due.38 The common subject of § 2-101(a) and Rule 10-1-3 is the permissible conduct of the Governor when using public transportation. Section 2-101 authorizes the Governor’s use of public transportation, while Rule 10-1-3 restricts state officials and employees in the use of public funds, property, or time for an election campaign. Although by its enactment the Legislature may give the Governor unlimited security and transportation, it is the Commission that has explicit constitutional responsibility to shape the parameters for ethical demeanor in political campaigns.39 Given that Rule 10-1-3 and § 2-101 may indeed be susceptible of more than one meaning, this court’s task is to harmonize and reconcile them by placing that construction upon their language which would free both sections from constitutional doubt.40 Unlike that drawn in the court’s pronouncement, my conclusion would accomplish this very end.
¶ 19 Today’s opinion declares that legislative failure to include in the text of § 2-101 language that limits the Governor’s claim on transportation gives the Commissioner of Public Safety [Commissioner] authority to convey the Chief Executive, at public expense, to political fund raisers and to partisan political campaign meetings. The court’s interpretation plainly violates Rule 10-1-3(a)’s explicit restriction against “public fund” financing of campaigns and serves to inject rather than eliminate serious constitutional doubt. I would find that Rule 10-1-8 is clear and unambiguous. It forbids the Governor from using state transportation to attend unofficial commitments and activities. Treating the provisions of § 2-101 and Rule 10-1-3 as norms in pari materia, I would hold that the latter restrict the former. This conclusion also is compelled by the rule of construction which teaches that specific legislative enactments control over those that are general.41
The Language of 47 O.S.Supp.1996 § 156.1 does not Allow the Governor’s use of State Vehicles to Attend Partisan Political Fund Raisers and Like Unofficial Commitments.
¶ 20 Both the court and the Chief Executive rely on the provisions in 47 O.S. Supp. 1996 § 156.142 to exempt the Governor from any restrictions on his use of state transportation. Section 156.1 declares it unlawful for state officials or employees (except some se-*1273leet law enforcement personnel and essential employees) to use state transportation for travel to their home or for other personal or private matters.43 Because § 156.1 does not list the Governor eo nomine as a restricted party, the court views the textual silence as giving the Chief Executive an unfettered claim on public transportation. I reject this view as legally unsound. The Governor is not to be presumed excluded by a statute plainly intended to govern all state officials and employees. Unlike the British Crown when it was enjoying unrestricted sovereignty status, the Chief Executive of this State is not constitutionally elevated to a status above the law. Moreover, today’s construction of the § 156.1 language is a two-edged sword. If the Governor is not mentioned in that section’s text as a party authorized to use State transportation for emergencies, he cannot fulfill his obligation to respond to them44 unless he uses private transportation. That conclusion would plainly contravene Oklahoma law. The Chief Executive is entitled to use public transportation to respond to an emergency even when he attends partisan political functions. Rule 10-1-3 restricts only the purpose of the Governor’s travel, not his destination. When he is en route to a partisan political function, his purpose is to serve his party and its elected representatives, not the citizens of Oklahoma.
¶ 21 The court’s resolution of today’s controversy gives the Governor unrestricted use of state transportation, in violation of Art. 10 §§ 14, 17 & 19, Okl. Const., which plainly restrict to public purposes alone the benefit which one may derive from expenditures of public funds.45 The Governor’s travel does not always implicate a public purpose. If the Chief Executive flies to Japan for a vacation, he does not go there for the benefit of Oklahoma citizens and hence may not benefit from state-funded transportation. Section 2-101(b) requires the Commissioner to ensure that the Governor, his immediate family and the Lieutenant Governor' all have communications equipment when not on state premises. With the aid of this equipment the Governor may respond to any emergency that may occur during a partisan political fund raiser or while he is present at any other unofficial activity. Once an emergency should arise and the Chief Executive begins to respond while in travel dehors the range of his public mission, the private-purpose travel becomes public, thus entitling him to state-funded transportation. Although the Governor’s duty is to respond to emergencies within Oklahoma,46 his travel is not cloaked with a public purpose until he begins to respond to a call of that character. He may use neither his duty to respond .to state emergencies nor his claim on full-time security as a subterfuge for exacting from the State free transportation for unauthorized travel.
III.
PARTICIPATION IN PARTISAN POLITICAL FUND RAISING ACTIVITY IS NOT THE GOVERNOR’S OFFICIAL DUTY
¶ 22 Today’s pronouncement holds that Rule 10-l-3(h) exempts from scrutiny the ordinary conduct of the Commissioner.47 The court’s conclusion is ludicrous. The Commissioner is not before this court requesting relief from threatened imposition of penalty for improper use of public funds, property, time and personnel to influence elections. Although the Commissioner’s ordinary conduct includes providing transportation to the Governor, the Commissioner’s infractions, if any, are not in controversy here. In dispute before us is solely the Governor’s conduct. The Chief Executive’s *1274ordinary duties do not include travel to partisan political fund raisers.48 Subsection (h) of Rule 10-1-3 exempts from subsection (a)’s restriction only those activities in which the Governor engages during the discharge of official duties which may incidentally also give support to the Governor’s own (or of another state official’s) political campaign. These exempt activities may include a State of the State Address at which the positive aspects of the Governor’s administration may be stressed, or an address at the unveiling of a stamp honoring Jim Thorpe.
¶ 23 Another vice in today’s decision is its gratuitous reference to Art. 6 § 8, Okl. Const, That section states that the Governor shall (1) cause all laws to be faithfully executed, (2) conduct all business for Oklahoma in person or in a manner prescribed by law, and (3) “he the conservator of peace throughout the State.”49 The court appears to invoke Art. 6 § 8, Okl. Const., to support its conclusion that the Chief Executive does not violate the Constitution when he uses state transportation to attend a political event. What the court’s § 8 reference aims to anoint with its imprimatur is a mystery wrapped in an enigma. One could easily comprehend the court’s comment as its declaration that the Governor must attend partisan political events to maintain peace throughout Oklahoma. Although this notion is indeed interesting ánd even ingenuous, I find it devoid of legal acumen. The text of Art. 6 § 8, Okl. Const., adds absolutely nothing to today’s discourse but sheer obfuscation.
IY.
THE GOVERNOR’S STATUTORY CLAIM ON RECEIVING TWENTY-FOUR-HOUR-A-DAY SECURITY IS NOT WEDDED TO THE COMMISSIONER’S DUTY TO PROVIDE STATE-FUNDED TRANSPORTATION
¶ 24 By the provisions of § 2-101 the Governor is entitled to transportation, communications equipment and security. The cited section authorizes the Commissioner to provide the Chief Executive with necessary communications equipment even when he is not in a state vehicle or on state property.50 The Commission does not usurp the power of the Legislature when it restricts the Governor’s statutory claim on publicly subsidized travel. The Chief Executive is both free and required to decline the use of state-funded transportation when attending such unofficial duties as partisan political events. Public officials must refrain from exploiting their office for private gain.51
¶25 The Governor’s statutory claim on twenty-four-hour-a-day security is neither inextricably tied to the Commissioner’s duty to provide a publicly-owned vehicle nor in contest here. I would uphold the former as a legitimate perquisite conferring clear benefits on the State, but would narrowly construe the latter. When attending events or meetings that are not included in his official duties52 — such as partisan political functions and fund raisers — the Chief Executive should either arrange for private transportation, to which the Commissioner must attach all necessary communications equipment and personal security, or reimburse the state for excessive use of its property. The Chief Executive’s security personnel can travel in his personal ear or in a marked patrol unit without incurring greater expense than that which would follow if the Governor were transported on official duties.
V.
THE COMMISSION MUST DETERMINE WHETHER THE GOVERNOR HAD ADEQUATE ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE CONCRETIZING RULE 10-1-3 NORMS’ EFFICACY TO AVOID BREACHING ITS RESTRICTIONS
¶ 26 Rule 10-1-3 is penal in nature. Offenders against its proscriptions are subject *1275to civil penalties that include a fine, possible censure, suspension, or removal from office.53 The parties stipulated that if he is found to have breached Rule 10-1-3, the Governor ■will pay a $10,000 penalty for his unauthorized travel. Penal regulations are subject to a judicial review which will ensure that they clearly and without doubt apply to the facts constituting the alleged breach.54
¶ 27 Whether the Governor is subject to the Rule 10-1-3 commands when he travels to a partisan political function and on unofficial duties is a question of first impression. One may not be penalized for utilizing a resource that appeared to be legally available.55 A fair warning — in common, understandable language — that intelligibly communicates the parameters of conduct to be proscribed is a sine qua non of due process incident to imposition of penalty, civil or criminal.56 If one engages in conduct charged as included within the interdiction of an overbroad statute, lack of proper notice of what was actually and intelligibly prohibited would avail as a constitution-based defense.57 If a statute or rule is “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,”58 due process is offended by that law’s use for imposition of punishment. No one may be forced to speculate as to the meaning and application of a penal regulation.59
¶28 Art. 29 § 5, Okl. Const., grants the Commission the authority to interpret its rules and regulations. Because this court must not (1) usurp the Commission’s constitutional power initially to interpret its own rules and (2) apply to a penal regulation a construction neither intelligibly communicated by the pertinent text of the law nor firmly settled by'precedent,60 I would direct that, after this cause’s termination, the Commission conduct an inquiry into whether the Governor had adequate advance notice of the efficacious character of Rule 10-1-3, to be analyzed against the backdrop of the Commission’s constitutional stature and the then-extant constitutional and legislative provisions in pari materia. Advance notice should fully advise a reasonable person of the restricted conduct’s outer perimeter. The uniquely appropriate objective-standard test I propose for the Commission’s use in this probe would call for an assessment of the ' pervasive legal culture which dominated the key affected agencies during the critical period in question.61 The appraisal should aid in determining if the centrality of the law’s controlling norms that govern the conduct in controversy — the Commission rules together with their explicit constitutional underpin*1276nings — -was indeed appreciably dimmed, if not verily eclipsed, by the mistaken notion that the legality of the Governor’s actions under review here was to be assayed solely by the parameters of § 2-101 (the nearly open-ended legislative license).
¶ 29 An affirmative answer to this question would militate against finding the advance notice adequate.62 No one can be held to know about the fine-levying provisions of a regulatory law that lies obscured from the actor’s sight by a maze of seemingly eclipsing norms.63 Fair doubt as to the existence of legal prohibition is resolved in favor of the person against whom enforcement is sought.64 If the Commission should find that the Governor did not have adequate advance notice that his use of publicly-funded travel to attend partisan political fund raisers was interdicted, the doubt should be resolved in his favor.
¶ 30 On the other hand, breach of an unambiguously worded and reasonably discoverable regulation would subject the offender to the textually prescribed sanctions. If the Commission were to find that extant law did intelligibly advise the Governor — that the use of public transportation for private purposes was prohibited — in time to avoid file law’s breach, I would require him to pay the agreed-upon penalty.
VI.
SUMMARY
¶ 31 I can neither concur in today’s pronouncement nor join the court in caponizing the Oklahoma Ethics Commission — a constitutional agency of Oklahoma’s government.
¶ 32 As an elected official, the Chief Executive must abide by the Commission rules that govern other elected officials and their campaigns. Rule 10-1-3 (of the Commission) prohibits elected state officials (and hence the Governor) from using public funds, property, or time to influence elections. The Commission requests that this court endorse a sanction against the Governor for using state-funded transportation to attend partisan political fund raisers. Under today’s pronouncement, the Governor is free to use state property for unofficial duties (such as attending partisan political fund raisers, enjoying an afternoon swim at the lake, or playing a round of golf at the Oklahoma City Golf and Country Club).
¶ 33 Contrary to today’s pronouncement, I would: (a) declare that Rule 10-1-3 concre-*1277tizes the language used in § 2-101 and fills the interstices that he between the provisions of that section and the personal-use restriction of state transportation prescribed by § 156.1, as well as between the requirements for publicly beneficial use of public funds which are explicitly mandated by Art. 10 §§ 14, 15, 17 & 19, Old. Const; (b) with the aid of Rule 10-1-3,1 would construe § 2-101, § 156.1 and Art. 10 §§ 14, 15, 17 & 19, Okl. Const., as a single harmonious whole, and would restrict the Governor’s authorized use of state transportation to his official duties and state emergencies, excluding partisan political fund raisers and purely private travel; (c) hold that to permit the Governor to use state funds for transportation to partisan political events offends every Oklahoma taxpayer’s constitutional right to freedom of speech, conferred by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; (d) ‘pronounce that all jurisprudence in contravention of the Commission’s fundamental-law authority as weh as of its primary responsibility to concretize any open-ended legislative norms of ethics contravenes the State’s Constitution; (e) view the language of Rule 10-1-3 and § 2-101 as in pari materia and construe their text together with Art. 10 §§ 14, 15, 17, and 19, Okl. Const., to restrict the Chief Executive’s use of state-funded transportation to official duties only, requiring him to provide his own transportation or reimburse the State when traveling in a state vehicle on unofficial and personal business; and (f) direct that before any penalty may be assessed for the Governor’s breach, the Commission must, on termination of this cause, hold an inquiry to determine whether Rule 10-1-3’s restriction against the use of state transportation to attend partisan political fund raisers, viewed together with the seemingly disharmonious statutory material, gave the Governor adequate advance notice of the prohibited conduct to be eschewed.
¶ 34 If the Commission should find that its pertinent rules (and their fundamental-law underpinnings) appeared so eclipsed by the seemingly discordant legislative norms as to be easily misperceived as having been supplanted, the Governor should be exonerated of any breach. If the Commission were to find that the extant law’s scattered norms timely and intelligibly advised the Governor that his indiscriminate use of public transportation was a proscribed activity, the Chief Executive should be required to pay the agreed-upon penalty. My pronouncement would serve as notice that Rule 10-1-3 does prohibit the Governor’s use of state vehicles for transportation to partisan political events. I would apply the declared law to this case, to all like controversies now pending before judicial or administrative tribunals, to all cases presently in the appellate litigation process, and prospectively to all disputes over similar or like issues to arise after the court’s pronouncement will have become final.
. The text of 74 O.S.Supp.1996, Ch. 62, App., § 257:10-l-3(a) states:
A person shall not use or authorize the use of public funds, property, or time, to participate or assist in the organization of or preparation for a fundraiser for a campaign or in any solicitation of funds for or against a candidate for state office or a ballot measure.
. The pertinent provisions of 47 O.S.1991 § 2-101 are:
(b) The Governor shall be the chief officer of the Department of Public Safety and the Commissioner of Public Safety shall execute the lawful orders of the Governor and shall be responsible to him for the operation and administration of said Department. The Commissioner of Public Safety shall provide personal security and protection, transportation, and communications capabilities for the Governor, the Governor’s immediate family, and the Lieutenant Governor. The Commissioner is authorized to provide necessary communications equipment to said persons even if said persons are not on state property or in state vehicles.
. Art. 10 § 14, Okl. Const., states in part: "Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws, and for public purposes only....”
Art. 10 § 15, Okl. Const., states in part: "the credit of the State shall not be given, pledged, or loaned to any individual, company, corporation, or association....”
Art. 10 § 17, Okl. Const., states: "The Legislature shall not authorize any county or subdivision thereof, city, town, or incorporated district, to become a stockholder in any company, association, or corporation, or to obtain or appropriate money for, or levy any tax for, or to loan its credit to any corporation, association, or individual.”
Art. 10 § 19, Okl. Const., states: "Every act enacted by the Legislature, and every ordinance and resolution passed by any county, city, town, or municipal board or local legislative body, levying a tax shall specify distinctly the purpose for which said tax is levied, and no tax levied and collected for one purpose shall ever be devoted to another purpose.”
. The pertinent language of 47 O.S.Supp.1996, § 156.1 provides:
A. It shall be unlawful for any state official, officer, or employee, except any essential employees approved by the Governor and those officers or employees authorized in subsection B of this section to ride to or from the employee’s place of residence in a state-owned automobile, truck, or pickup, except in the performance of the employee's official duty, or to use any such automobile, truck, ambulance, or pickup for other personal or private purposes. B. 1. Any state employee, other than the law enforcement officers provided for in paragraph 2 of this subsection, who receives emergency telephone calls regularly at the employee’s residence when the employee is not on duty and is regularly called upon to use a vehicle after normal working hours in response to such emergency calls, may be permitted to use a vehicle belonging to the State of Oklahoma to provide transportation between the employee's residence and the assigned place of employment, provided such distance does not exceed seventy-five (75) miles in any round trip or is within the county where the assigned place of employment is located, (emphasis added).
. See Art. 7 § 4, Okl. Const., which provides in part, "The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general superintending control over all inferior courts and all agencies, commissions and boards created by law.”
. See Ethics Commission v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, ¶¶ 2-4, 850 P.2d 1069, 1081-83 (Opala, J„ concurring).
. Ethics Commission v. Keating, No. CJ-97-4573-67 filed June 30, 1997. Proceedings in this suit are currently stayed to await this court’s decision in this cause.
. 74 O.S.Supp.1996, Ch. 62, App., § 257:10-1-3(a), supra note 1.
. I use the term "concretize” because I view the process of administrative rule-making that sharpens the line between acceptable and nonaccepta-ble conduct as akin to what jurisprudence does in concretizing the norms of a statute by judicial decision-making that addresses itself to specific case scenarios. The term is derived from Hans Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State 119, 135, 397 (1945) (reprinted 1961). Kelsen explained the concept of concretization in the following passage:
"From a dynamic standpoint, the individual norm created by the judicial decision is a stage in a process beginning with the establishment of the first constitution, continued by legislation and custom, and leading to the judicial decisions. The process is completed by the execution of the individual sanction. Statutes and customary laws are, so to speak, only semi-manufactured products which are finished only through the judicial decision and its execution. The process through which law constantly creates itself anew goes from the general and abstract to the individual and concrete. It is a process of steadily increasing individualization and concretization." [emphasis supplied]. Id. at 134-35.
For other authority referencing and defining con-cretization see State v. Martin, 532 P.2d 316, 323 (Alaska 1975) (holding that "[a]bsent judicial *1268concretization, the ordinary citizen desiring to comply with the law would be forced to speculate” about the laws impact on him). See also In re Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 321 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir.1963) (holding that concretization uses the specific facts of a particular situation to give appropriate meaning to judicial decisions); United States v. Articles of Drug Labeled Colchicine, 442 F.Supp. 1236, 1241 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (construing the Federal Food and Drug Act [FFDA] to protect the lives and health of the public, the court held that the Secretary's interpretive regulations, as binding law, eliminate vagueness within the act, and serve to clarify and concretize the provisions of the FFDA.).
. The State Constitution holds the highest rank in the hierarchy of norms in Oklahoma's three-source legal system. All other sources must conform to its commands. Brock v. Thompson, 1997 OK 127, 948 P.2d 279, 288-291; see also Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 1992 OK 72, 833 P.2d 1218, 1225-1226.
. Art. 29 § 3(C), Okl. Const., provides in part: Newly promulgated rules [of the Commission] shall be presented to each House of the Legislature and to the Governor on the second day of each session of the Legislature. If these rules are not disapproved by joint resolution, subject to veto by the Governor, during the same legislative session, they shall be effective.
. Cox v. Dawson, 1996 OK 11, ¶¶ 8-10, 911 P.2d 272, 279. See also Toxic Waste Impact Group, Inc. v. Leavitt, 1988 OK 20, ¶ 12, 755 P.2d 626, 630; Tulsa Area Hospital Council Inc. v. Oral Roberts University, 1981 OK 29, ¶ 10, 626 P.2d 316, 320.
. See Art. 29 § 3(B), Okl. Const., which provides, "After public hearing, the Ethics Commission shall promulgate rules of ethical conduct for state officers and employees, including civil penalties for violation of these rules.” See also 75 O.S.1991 § 308.2(C) (giving agency rules promulgated in compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act the full force and effect of law).
. See Art. 29 § 3(C), Okl. Const., supra note 10.
. See Art. 29 § 3(D), Okl. Const.
. Peterson v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1964 OK 78, ¶ 16, 395 P.2d 388, 391. See also Branch Trucking Co. v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1990 OK 41, ¶ 6, 801 P.2d 686, 689-90.
. The Legislature had an opportunity to disapprove of, modify or repeal Rule 10-1-3 in 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.
.See Prettyman v. Halliburton Co., 1992 OK 63, ¶ 20, 841 P.2d 573, 580; Sharp v. Tulsa County Election Bd., 1994 OK 104, 890 P.2d 836, 840.
. 74 O.S.Supp.1996, Ch. 62, App., § 257:10-1-3(a), supra note 1.
. See supra note 6, at 1076.
. 430 U.S. 705, 713, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1434, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977).
. 431 U.S. 209, 234-35, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1799, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977).
. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35, 97 S.Ct. 1782. "For- at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State." Id.
. As cited in the Abood decision, Thomas Jefferson believed that " 'to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.”' Abood, 431 U.S. at 235 n. 31, 97 S.Ct. 1782 (quoting I. Brant, James Madison: The Nationalist 354 (1948)). See generally, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976).
. See supra note 3.
. See Vette v. Childers, 102 Okla. 140, 228 P. 145 (1924).
. Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Childers, 197 Okla. 331, 171 P.2d 618, 622 (1946).
. Op.Atty.Gen. No. 82-71 (Feb. 23, 1982).
. See supra note 3.
. 1 Oxford English Dictionary 718 (2nd ed. 1989).
. See Art. 29 § 3(B), Okl. Const., supra note 12.
. See Art. 29 § 3(C), Okl. Const., supra note 10.
. See Art. 29 § 5, Old. Const.
. See State ex rel. Turpen v. Oklahoma State Board For Property and Casualty Rates, 1986 OK 54, ¶ 7, 731 P.2d 394, 398-99; Ricks Exploration Company v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, 1984 OK 73, ¶ 14, 695 P.2d 498, 504; Cowart v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 1983 OK 66, ¶¶ 4-5, 665 P.2d 315, 317.
. See 47 O.S.1991, § 2 — 101 (b), supra note 2.
. Even if the language of 47 O.S.1991 § 2-101 does conflict with Rule 10-1-3, this court should construe two conflicting statutes by giving force and effect to each, yet allow both to stand. See Shimonek v. Tillman, 150 Okla. 177, 1 P.2d 154, 157 (1931); Prettyman, supra note 18; Shaip, supra note 18. This standard also applies to administrative regulations which conflict with legislative enactments. See Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439, 55 S.Ct. 440, 442, 79 L.Ed. 977 (1935).
. See United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. 556, 564, 3 How. 556, 11 L.Ed. 724 (1845).
.See Inexco Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission, 1981 OK 44, ¶ 10, 628 P.2d 362, 365; Abbott v. Board of Trustees of Oscar Rose Junior College, 1978 OK 129, 586 P.2d 1098, 1101.
. See Art. 29 § 3(A), Okl. Const.
. See Turpén, supra note 34; Ricks Exploration Company, supra note 34; Cowart, supra note 34.
. See Duncan v. City of Nichols Hills, 1996 OK 16, 913 P.2d 1303; Taylor v. Special Indemnity Fund, 1990 OK 106, 804 P.2d 431, 432.
. See supra note 4.
. See 47 O.S.Supp.1996 § 156.1(A)-(B)(3).
. See 63 O.S.1991 § 683.8(a) which provides:
The Governor shall have general direction and control of the Civil Defense Agency and shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this act and, in the event of disaster beyond local control, may assume direct operational control over all or any part of the civil defense or emergency functions in this state.
. See supra note 3.
. See 63 O.S.1991 § 683.8(a), supra note 42.
. 74 O.S.Supp.1996, Ch. 62, App., § 257:10-1-3(h).
. See Art. 6 §§ 1-14, Okl. Const.; 74 O.S. §§ 1 et seq.
. See Art. 6 § 8, Okl. Const, (emphasis added).
. See 47 O.S.1991 § 2-101(b), supra note 2.
. 51 O.S.1991 § 302(1).
. Id.
. See 74 O.S.Supp.1996, Ch. 62, App., § 257:1-1-11.
. See So-Lo Oil Co., Inc. v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 1992 OK 71, ¶ 8, 832 P.2d 14, 18 n. 24; Samson Resources Co. v. Cloud, 1991 OK CIV APP 55, ¶ 8, 812 P.2d 1378, 1381 (penal regulations are subject to that review which will ensure that their application is clear and without doubt.); Quinn v. City of Tulsa, 1989 OK 112, ¶ 44, 777 P.2d 1331, 1339 (decision to apply penal law to activity must be clear and without doubt.).
. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 1266, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959). See also, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571, 85 S.Ct. 476, 484, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (declaring "indefensible” the State’s imposition of penalty upon one who exercised a state-sanctioned privilege).
. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 341, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931).
. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940).
. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1225, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). See also generally, authority cited infra note 60.
. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176, 73 S.Ct. 189, 190, 97 L.Ed. 200 (1952); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926).
. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1225, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92, 97 S.Ct. 990, 992, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977)).
. The offices of the Governor, the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Public Safety, and the Commission.
. Thomas v. United States, 696 F.Supp. 702, 706 (D.C.D.C.1988) (holding that criminal statutes and administrative regulations which carry penal sanctions are unconstitutional if ordinary people cannot understand the conduct that is sanctioned. "No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.”) (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964)). See also, United States v. Cook, 445 F.2d 883, 890 (8th Cir.1971) (requiring that, before prosecuting violations, the selective service system must adopt well-defined administrative rules and regulations that give adequate notice to registrants of penal sanctions for proscribed conduct).
. Penal regulations which are couched in language insufficient to provide the offender adequate advance notice of the conduct to which his actions are required to be conformed violate the standards of due process, making prosecution constitutionally invalid. See United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 577, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (applying to a properly promulgated administrative regulation's proscription of federal employee participation in partisan political fund raisers the standard, pronounced in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 811, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954), that a criminal statute's definiteness be determined by whether the statutes’s language gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden.); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (holding that vagrancy ordinance was void for vagueness because it failed to give persons of ordinary intelligence notice of the forbidden conduct) (citing Harriss, supra). See also Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201-02, 68 S.Ct. 514, 517, 92 L.Ed. 644 (1948) (declaring that due process requires notice of the specific charge and of the right to be heard during a criminal proceeding).
.See generally Quinn, supra note 54; Samson, supra note 54, at page 1378; State v. District Court of Cleveland County, 1991 OK CR 68, ¶ 6, 816 P.2d 552 (all holding that penal statutes should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.).