1989 OPINION NO. 64 FILED MAY 2, 1989, IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN AND THIS OPINION SUBSTITUTED THEREFOR
ON REHEARING
BOYLE, Justice.This is an appeal from an order denying defendant Allstate Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant, Allstate Insurance, asserted below and here that our decision in Sullivan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 111 Idaho 304, 723 P.2d 848 (1986) (Sullivan I) is res judicata as to all claims arising out of the September 22, 1982 accident in which Julie Sullivan was injured. Allstate’s motion for summary judgment in this action was denied on grounds that the question of Allstate’s alleged bad faith settlement practice had not been previously litigated, and was not ripe for consideration in the earlier proceedings. We reverse.
Claimant, Julie Sullivan, was a pedestrian at the time she was struck by a uninsured motorcyclist on September 22, 1982. As a minor, Julie was covered by her parent’s automobile insurance policy with Allstate which provided medical and uninsured motorist coverage. After the accident, the Sullivans filed a claim with Allstate for medical expenses in the amount of $2,000.00 and claimed entitlement to uninsured motorist benefits under the policy. Allstate paid the policy limits for medical bills, but denied responsibility under Sullivan's uninsured motorist coverage, asserting that Julie was the proximate cause of her own injuries.
The Allstate insurance policy, defining the parties’ rights and responsibilities, contained a mandatory arbitration clause which provided that submission to arbitration was mandatory whenever the parties could not amicably settle a claim. Sullivan did not file for arbitration until April 1984, a time lapse of more than eighteen months after the accident. While the arbitration proceeding was pending, and notwithstanding the policy provisions requiring mandatory arbitration, Sullivans filed their civil action which was appealed in Sullivan I, asserting negligent investigation, the tort of outrage, willful breach of contract, and bad faith in refusing to settle the claim. Allstate moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, for stay pending the outcome of arbitration. The district court (Judge Magnuson) granted Allstate’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Sullivans’ complaint with prejudice. Sullivan objected to the dismissal with prejudice and the case was brought before the court for hearing on motion for reconsideration. At the hearing, the arbitration award was presented to the court and the district court reaffirmed his intent to dismiss the action with prejudice. Thereafter the action was dismissed by written order which clearly provides that the complaint, and thus all actions pled, was dismissed with prejudice. The concluding paragraph of the order of the trial court which was appealed in Sullivan I provides:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and Plaintiffs’ Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice and without costs or attorneys’ fees to either party. (Emphasis added.)
In Sullivan I, 111 Idaho 304, 306, 723 P.2d 848, 850 (1986), this Court, in a unanimous opinion, affirmed Judge Magnuson’s dismissal with prejudice, stating:
*882Under the circumstances of today’s case we need not decide the legal relationship which exists between an insured and an insurance carrier when the injured makes a claim under an uninsured motorist clause of an insurance policy, i.e., whether that relationship is adversarial or fiduciary____ In the instant case we deem it clear that Allstate’s denial of liability upon the grounds that Julie Sullivan’s own negligence was the proximate cause of her damages, was not taken in bad faith. The uncontested finding of the arbitrators of thirty-five percent negligence on the part of Julie Sullivan speaks loudly in defense of the position of Allstate.
111 Idaho at 306, 723 P.2d at 850.
Following the appeal in Sullivan I, Sullivans filed the instant action (Sullivan II), asserting claims arising from the identical events alleged in Sullivan I. Each of those claims for relief in Sullivan II have as their predicate Allstate’s denial of the initial claim for uninsured motorist benefits. The only additional matter alleged in Sullivan II is the existence of the award of the arbitrators, which as above-noted, was before the district court prior to its order of dismissal in Sullivan I. Allstate moved for summary judgment in Sullivan II on the basis that our decision in Sullivan I was res judicata. That motion was heard before Judge Cogswell and denied. This appeal followed.
However, certain uncontroverted facts and events in the record require reversal. The accident in question occurred on September 22, 1982. In April 1984, Julie Sullivan, having obtained her majority, sought and obtained an arbitration award from Allstate. A hearing was held before three arbitrators who found total damages, found Julie to be thirty-five percent comparatively negligent, and found Allstate should pay Julie its policy limit. The complaint in Sullivan I was filed September 4, 1984, while arbitration was pending and before the arbitration process was completed. In May 1985 the award of the arbitrators was rendered. The Sullivans moved for reconsideration of the court’s order of summary judgment and all matters, including the award of the arbitrators, were then before the district court. Judge Magnuson denied the motion for reconsideration of his order granting dismissal with prejudice and affirmed his motion granting summary judgment to Allstate.
The record clearly establishes that before Judge Magnuson issued his final opinion granting summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, the final award of the arbitrators was presented and argued to him. The record is uncontroverted that Judge Magnuson reviewed and considered the award of the arbitrators before he entered his final order on summary judgment, and only then did he order dismissal with prejudice.
■Res judicata, or claim preclusion as it is sometimes called, “denotes that a valid final judgment by a prior court, between the same parties or their privies, concludes the litigation as to all matters that were or should have been litigated in the first action.” Puckett v. City of Emmett, 113 Idaho 639, 641, 747 P.2d 48, 50 (1987). See also Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 554, 569 P.2d 358 (1977). Sullivans’ claims against Allstate presented in the complaint filed in Sullivan II are identical to those presented in the complaint filed in Sullivan I. The dismissal of the complaint with prejudice in Sullivan I, which was affirmed on appeal, results in these claims between the identical parties being barred by res judicata.
For the above reasons we reverse the order of the district court denying summary judgment and remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of appellant Allstate.
BAKES, C.J., and JOHNSON and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.