I concur in the determination that defendant’s juvenile adjudication for residential burglary is not a strike as defined by Penal Code section 667, subdivision (d)(3) (section 667(d)(3); all unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code). I cannot, however, subscribe to an interpretation of the statute that runs afoul of so many fundamental principles of statutory construction.
Resolving the internal inconsistencies in section 667(d)(3) has evoked considerable interpretive creativity. The Attorney General has urged the court to find “drafter’s error” and to rewrite section 667(d)(3) so as to bring subdivision (d)(3)(D) in parallel with subdivision (d)(3)(B) because this best effectuates the intent of the Legislature “to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment” for recidivists. (§ 667, subd. (b); see People v. Griggs (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 557 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 174].) Defendant advocates a more modest reformation, arguing that a substitution of “and” for “or” in section 667(d)(3)(B) renders the statute intelligible while preserving its constitutionality. Maintaining a hands-off approach, the majority opts for a construction that harmonizes paragraphs (B) and (D) as written on the basis that each provision refers to a different “offense” in establishing a juvenile adjudication as a qualifying prior.
*23Granted, the latter construction does reconcile language that otherwise appears inherently conflicting. But that is its only virtue. The majority candidly acknowledges that in all probability neither the Legislature nor the electorate “subjectively contemplated this interpretation of paragraph (D).” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.) While commendable, this candor cannot absolve a blatant transgression of the cardinal tenet that courts are to construe statutes so as “to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent” (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713]), irrespective of the literal language. (See, e.g., Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].)
Several reasons suggest the majority is correct in perceiving its construction to be at odds with the likely intent of section 667(d)(3)(D). First, it admittedly “depends upon a close reading of the statutory language exactly as written.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.) In fact, it depends upon a significant amount of legal parsing and even then results in an incredibly awkward “harmonization” of the statute’s various provisions. If the Legislature and electorate had actually meant to accomplish such an end, they undoubtedly would have expressed their intent more plainly and directly.
Second, the majority’s construction of paragraph (3) of section 667(d) is not consistent with the terms of paragraphs (1) and (2) defining which adult convictions will constitute a “prior conviction of a felony” for purposes of the three strikes law. Under paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 667(d), the qualifying offenses are identified by reference to established external standards. A prior conviction for “[a]ny offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 as a violent felony or any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state” will always be a strike, whether committed in California or elsewhere. (§ 667, subd. (d)(1), (2).) Thus, any adult convicted of residential burglary will have a qualifying prior independent of any other consideration. For juveniles, however, a residential burglary may or may not constitute a strike depending upon a wardship adjudication for a separate Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b), offense.
Given the definitional structure of section 667, subdivision (d)(1) and (2), no reason appears to interject this multiadjudication criterion into section 667(d)(3). It does not assure that only the most serious juvenile adjudications are rendered strikes or that recidivists necessarily receive greater punishment. For example, a residential burglary committed by a juvenile who broke into someone’s house to take food because he was hungry after escaping from juvenile hall would be a strike. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b)(22).) However, a juvenile who entered and took stereo *24equipment, jewelry, and guns but who was not on the lam would not have a strike. The disparity in culpability is evident; the disparity in consequences is anything but.
Finally, in a related vein, the majority’s interpretation complicates pleading and proof whenever the prior is serious or violent but not listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b). The prosecution cannot simply allege a juvenile adjudication by reference to a set list of qualifying offenses, as it could under defendant’s proffered construction. Thus, for voluntary manslaughter (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(1), 667.5, subd. (c)(1)), rape committed by means other than force, violence, or threat of great bodily harm (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(3)), simple kidnapping committed other than in the course of a carjacking and without infliction of bodily harm (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(20)), a felony in which the defendant was alleged and found to have inflicted great bodily injury (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(8)), and residential burglary (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(18)), further allegation of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b), wardship finding is essential.
Although defendant’s construction would eliminate these latter offenses as strikes for juveniles, that result is not irrational. Historically, an order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the court has not been treated as a criminal conviction “for any purpose.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203; see also In re Joseph B. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 952 [196 Cal.Rptr. 348, 671 P.2d 852] [no certificate of probable cause required for juvenile to contest adjudication based on admission]; In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522 [159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549] [juveniles adjudged wards of the court not similarly situated with adults in criminal justice system]; People v. West (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 100, 106, 110 [201 Cal.Rptr. 63] [juvenile adjudication not prior conviction under section 667, subdivision (a)]; In re Anthony R. (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 772 [201 Cal.Rptr. 299] (juvenile adjudication not prior conviction for petty theft with prior].) The Legislature and electorate may well have considered that a sharp break in this practice should be limited to those offenses that are both serious or violent and so serious as to raise a presumption of unfitness for treatment in the juvenile court system. Moreover, for those crimes not meeting this convergence, a juvenile 16 years old or older could be tried as an adult—and thus acquire a strike upon conviction—if the circumstances, including the gravity of the offense, make that appropriate. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a).)
Nor does this limit on qualifying offenses conflict with legislative intent. Both the Legislature and the electorate sought to ensure longer sentences for recidivists, but that goal in and of itself provides little guidance in determining which juvenile adjudications should be treated as prior convictions. (See *25People v. Davis (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1096, 1113 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 879, 938 P.2d 938] (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.); cf. People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 528 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628] [“But to say the intent of a law was to restrict judicial discretion begs the question of how judicial discretion was to be restricted.”].) Under any construction, section 667(d)(3) ensures that some defendants with juvenile adjudications will suffer increased punishment, marking a significant departure from previous law.
The gaps in correlating the majority’s interpretation with likely legislative intent alone should have sent the majority back to the drawing board, but these are not the only shortcomings. Its construction also violates the rule that “[a] statute should be construed whenever possible so as to preserve its constitutionality. [Citations.]” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323].) This principle cannot be sidestepped on the theory that “we are not faced here with any assertedly unconstitutional application of the statute,” and therefore defendant lacks standing to raise an equal protection concern. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.) This evasion misses the point: the court’s task is to interpret a statute rife with uncertainty. “ ‘[E]very statute must be construed in the light of the constitutional restrictions upon the power of the legislature so that it is necessary to consider those constitutional provisions in arriving at the proper interpretation of the statute.’ ” (County of Los Angeles v. Riley (1936) 6 Cal.2d 625, 628-629 [59 P.2d 139, 106 A.L.R. 903].) “The Constitution and the statute are to be read together. If the terms of a statute are by fair and reasonable interpretation capable of a meaning consistent with the requirements of the Constitution, the statute will be given that meaning, rather than another in conflict with the Constitution.” (County of Los Angeles v. Legg (1936) 5 Cal.2d 349, 353 [55 P.2d 206].) Authorities cited by the majority raised questions of proper statutory application, not statutory construction.
Although incipient, the constitutional flaw in the majority’s construction is nonetheless fatal. (Cf. People v. Leng (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-14 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 433] [rewriting section 667(d)(3) on basis of drafter’s error results in equal protection violation as to certain defendants].) Section 667(d)(3)(B) provides that a juvenile adjudication will constitute a strike if it is listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b), or is a “serious” or “violent” felony as defined elsewhere in the three strikes law. Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b), contains several offenses that are neither “serious” nor “violent” as so defined, including discharging a firearm into an inhabited dwelling (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (b)(15)), dissuading a witness or suborning perjury (id., subd. (b)(19)), *26manufacturing controlled substances (id., subd. (b)(20)), and escaping from a juvenile hall (id., subd. (b)(22)). Thus, a defendant convicted of such a crime as a juvenile is subject to the three strikes law for a broader class of prior offenses and is treated more harshly than a similarly situated defendant who suffered the conviction as an adult. No reasonable justification supports such a disparity, particularly in light of the historical resistance to treating juvenile adjudications as prior convictions.
Substituting “and” for “or” in section 667(d)(3)(B) overcomes this constitutional defect and harmonizes the remaining provisions of section 667(d)(3) with minimal judicial interference. Nor is this type of reformation without precedent. (See, e.g., People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752].) Although the Legislature articulated an overarching intent “to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment” for recidivists (§ 667, subd. (b)), that intent must accommodate constitutional imperatives. Courts must “presume that the Legislature intended to enact a valid statute” and “adopt an interpretation that, consistent with the statutory language and purpose, eliminates doubts as to the provision’s constitutionality. [Citations.]” (In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 942 [83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142].) I see neither logic nor sense in rejecting such an interpretation in favor of one that will eventually give rise to an equal protection violation.
Finally, despite its disclaimer (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 10-11), the majority interprets section 667(d)(3) contrary to the rule of lenity by which “ambiguous penal statutes are construed to favor the defendant. [Citations.]” (People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) For more than a century, this court has enforced the rule as an analogue to the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute . . . .” (Ex parte Rosenheim (1890) 83 Cal. 388, 391 [23 P. 372].) Additionally, “[s]trict construction of penal statutes protects the individual against arbitrary discretion by officials and judges and guards against usurpation of the legislative function which would result from enforcement of penalties when the legislative branch did not clearly prescribe them.” (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288]; People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 848 [218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380].)
Replacing “or” with “and” in paragraph (B) of section 667(d)(3) resolves the statute’s uncertainty and harmonizes its remaining provisions in a manner that preserves its constitutionality. Thus, despite the need for a minor *27reformation, this construction is eminently “reasonable” for purposes of invoking the rule of lenity. (People v. Overstreet, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 896.) Moreover, “the degree of strictness in construing penal statutes should vary in direct relation to the severity of the penalty. [Citation.]” (People v. Weidert, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 848.) This court’s determination of which juvenile adjudications constitute prior convictions under the three strikes law will have .substantial and severe consequences for those it affects, in some cases resulting in lifetime imprisonment. Following the principle of favorable construction is thus all the more compelling.