I concur only because upon the record, and remaining obedient to the established law of this state, no alternative judgment appears tenable. In the interests of *729justice, however, I am impelled to declare that that same record leaves with me a grave doubt as to whether Lindley is guilty of the crime of which he stands convicted. The seeming anomaly in the foregoing statements arises from the fact that in this proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus and by way of error coram, vobis the grounds upon which we may act are strictly limited. (For a statement of those limitations see People v. Gilbert (1944), 25 Cal.2d 422, 442 [154 P.2d 657] ; In re De La Roi (1946), 28 Cal.2d 264, 269 [169 P.2d 363].)
No serious contention is or can be made that the showing warrants the writ coram vobis. The bulk of petitioner’s contention is directed to the application for the writ of habeas corpus and the only recognized ground (lack of due process of law) upon which that writ is, sought depends on showing that the conviction was obtained upon perjured testimony produced by the prosecution with knowledge of its falsity. “Proof of both elements, perjury and knowledge, by a preponderance of credible evidence, is indispensable” to discharge of the convicted person on habeas corpus based on that theory. (In re Mooney (1937), 10 Cal.2d 1,15 [73 P.2d 554] ; In re De La Roi (1946), supra, 28 Cal.2d 264, 269.) Thus a showing by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant had been convicted upon mistaken or false testimony and that he was in fact innocent would not justify sustaining the writ and releasing the convicted person because, in the absence of proof that perjured testimony had been introduced with knowledge of its falsity on the part of a responsible representative of the state, there would be no lack of due process. The remedy in such cases is committed by our law exclusively to the governor of the state.
The record in this proceeding discloses apparently substantial evidence, relevant to Lindley’s guilt or innocence, which was not introduced at his trial. It also discloses that evidence given at the trial which substantially tended to support the verdict apparently was, in truth, either false or mistaken. It does not appear that any responsible prosecuting officer deliberately produced false and material evidence with knowledge of its falsity. Hence we may not discharge the defendant.
Carter, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.