dissenting:
I must respectfully part company from my friends in the majority. As we have said “[i]t does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude. More than that: it is a violation of any known principle of human dignity.” Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thirteen-year-old Savana Redding, an honor roll student with no prior disciplinary problems, was required to strip, exposing her breasts and pubic area, in a fruitless search for — at worst — prescription strength ibuprofen.1 Savana had no histo*837ry of drug involvement of any type, nor was she alleged to have any connection to illegal drug distribution. Rather, school officials based their actions entirely on uncorroborated statement by a student that Savana had given her a few ibuprofen tablets. The school officials did not suspect that the pills were something other than ibuprofen. The nurse recognized the pill immediately as an ibuprofen tablet. At no point did the school officials ask Savana’s mother to be present for the search, nor did they permit Savana to call her mother or any other relative during her two and a half hour detention. School officials discovered nothing in the search. Given these circumstances, I would hold that the unwarranted intrusion on Savana’s privacy violated the Fourth Amendment.
The majority and I agree that the proper standard for evaluating the constitutionality of the search is dictated by New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). In applying this standard, the majority holds that the strip search of Savana was (1) “justified at its inception” and (2) “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). I disagree on both counts.
School officials may have had sufficient information to perform some kind of search of Savana for prescription-strength ibuprofen. There is little question that a search of Savana’s backpack and her pockets would be constitutionally permissible, given that Savana’s friend and classmate Marissa had reported that Savana had provided her with the ibuprofen. But the appropriate inquiry is whether a strip search was justified at its inception. See, e.g., Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 597-600 (2d Cir.2006); Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist., 991 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir.1993).
The only credible connection between Savana and an impending distribution of prescription-strength ibuprofen was Marissa’s statement that Savana had provided her with the pills found on her person. However, our sister circuits have concluded — properly in my view — that student tips alone are insufficient to support a constitutionally permissible strip search. See Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 598-99 (“While the uncorroborated tip no doubt justified additional inquiry and investigation by school officials, we are not convinced that it justified a step as intrusive as a strip search.”); Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 888 (6th Cir.1991). To overcome this legal difficulty, the school attempts to additionally justify the search on the basis that (1) Jordan falsely reported that Sava-na, several months prior, had a party at her home at which alcohol was served; (2) Savana admitted to owning a planner-later discovered to contain cigarettes, lighters, and a knife — that she had given to her friend Marissa.2 The school does *838not explain how this information sufficiently corroborates and supports a strip search for pills. Indeed, the Second Circuit recently held that violation of a school’s tobacco policy cannot be the basis of a strip search for another drug. Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 599-600; see also Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321 (“ ‘Justified at its inception’ in the present context does not mean that a school administrator has the right to search a student who merely acts in a way that creates a reasonable suspicion that the student has violated some regulation or law.” (emphasis in original)). Under the school’s reasoning, it is difficult to see how any student who was identified by Marissa would be safe from a strip search by school officials.
In order to justify such an invasive procedure, school officials must be required to show more than the circumstances presented in this case. See Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321 (“As the intrusiveness of the search of a student intensifies, so too does the standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.”). Strip searches are among the most intrusive searches. The Seventh Circuit has described strip searches as “demeaning,” “dehumanizing,” and “terrifying.” Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir.1983). The Tenth Circuit has called them “terrifying.” Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir.1993). The Eighth Circuit has called them “humiliating.” Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668, 674 (8th Cir.1982). Strip searches of children pose special concerns. Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321 (“no one would seriously dispute that a nude search of a child is traumatic”); Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 604 (6th Cir.2005) (“Students of course have a significant privacy interest in their unclothed bodies.”). In addition, we must be aware of the fact that the potential for humiliation is particularly acute for a thirteen-year-old girl. See Calabretta, 189 F.3d at 819; Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321 n. 1 (“As children go through puberty, they become more conscious of their bodies and selfconscious about them. Consequently, the potential for a search to cause embarrassment and humiliation increases as children grow older.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (“youth ... is a ... condition of life when a person may be most susceptible ... to psychological damage”).
Even assuming that the search was justified at its inception, it is clear that the search performed by school officials was not reasonable in scope as secondarily required by T.L.O. I again agree with majority that the correct standard is whether “the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 341-42, 105 S.Ct. 733. I disagree, however, with the assertion that the search of Savana’s person was reasonable in scope. It was unreasonable to force Savana, a thirteen-year-old girl, to expose her breasts and pubic area to school officials. It was unreasonable not to call Savana’s mother during the two and a half hours she was detained. It was unreasonable, given that officials had no evidence that alternative methods of concealment were employed, to probe further than her backpack and outer pockets.
*839The school makes much of the fact that Savana was not asked to remove her bra and underwear. School officials asked Sa-vana to pull out her bra band to the side and shake it, which exposed her breasts. They also asked Savana to pull her underwear elastic and shake it and pull out and shake the crotch of her underwear, which exposed her pubic area. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the fact that school officials did not completely undress her is of any constitutional significance. Indeed, perhaps the most alarming aspect of the school’s position is that the school officials seem to believe that strip searching of students should be considered a routine matter. Marissa was strip searched for ibuprofen (and nothing was found) prior to the strip search of Savana. When Savana’s mother complained about the search the next day, she was told by the principal that there was no problem “because we didn’t find anything.”
The school also relies on the significant interest school officials have in safeguarding the health of their students and enforcing their anti-drug policy. No one doubts the value of protecting young students from the dangers of illicit drug use. But ibuprofen, aspirin, and acetaminophen do not, shall we say, usually spring immediately to mind when we consider illegal drug trafficking operations in our schools. In any case, the societal interest in discouraging illegal drug use does not obviate our duty to find some meaningful connection to these dangers and the student who is to be deprived of her dignity. To the contrary, T.L.O. requires school officials to undertake reasonable, commensurate action in response. This common sense requirement allows parents to rest assured that their children will not be stripped and searched without their knowledge or participation for allegedly giving another student the equivalent of two Advils.
The conclusion that a strip search of a child may be constitutionally justified on the basis of uncorroborated rumor directly conflicts with the Second Circuit’s contrary conclusion in Phaneuf v. Fraikin. In Phaneuf the Second Circuit held that the student’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by an unreasonable search by school officials. School officials had received a student tip that eighteen-year-old Phaneuf planned to hide marijuana “down her pants.” 488 F.3d at 593. When confronted by school officials, Phaneuf denied possessing marijuana. Id. Officials searched Phaneuf s purse and found cigarettes and a lighter — in violation of school policy. Id. at 594. Phaneuf s mother was then called, who conducted a strip search of Phaneuf behind a closed curtain. Even with Phaneuf s mother present, and behind a closed curtain, the Second Circuit found the search to be unreasonable, holding that (1) officials were required to “investigate, corroborate, or otherwise substantiate” the student tip, (2) Phaneufs non-drug disciplinary history could not support a strip search, (3) “suspicious” denial of possession of contraband also cannot support a strip search, and (4) the connection between tobacco possession and drug possession is far too attenuated to justify a strip search. Id. at 597-600. Savana not only had no history of drug abuse, but was an honor student with no disciplinary trouble whatsoever. In addition, unlike in Pha-neuf, school officials had no cause to believe that Savana was hiding anything in her clothing. More to the point, the only connection between Savana and an impending pill distribution — aside from Marissa’s unsubstantiated tip — was possession of the planner containing cigarettes in violation of school policy.
Certainly, some strip searches have been upheld under circumstances far different from the one at bar. See, e.g., Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1322 (justifying a *840search where the student, an enrollee in a behavioral disorder program and a dropout from a drug rehabilitation program, had an unusual “bulge” in the crotch area of his pants, had previously informed officials that he had “crotched” drugs during a police raid, and was known to have possessed drugs while on school grounds); Williams, 936 F.2d at 882-83 (justifying a search when officials had (1) statements from other students witnessing the plaintiff actually using the drug, (2) a report from a teacher that the student had written notes about using drugs, (3) received reports from the plaintiffs parent that she was using drugs, (4) a report from a student the day of the search that the plaintiff had drugs on her in a small glass vial.). These cases are quite distinguishable from the case at bar. Indeed, no federal case to examine the question extends official discretion as far as today’s holding.
The school’s strip search of Savana Red-ding violated the Fourth Amendment. To hold otherwise would be to conclude that her constitutional rights did, in fact, disappear at the schoolhouse gate. I would reverse the judgment of the district court.
. The school makes much of the fact that the ibuprofen tablets were “prescription *837strength.” However, the policy upon which the school relies for justifying the strip search specifically includes over-the-counter medications. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Savana was being strip searched because the ibuprofen was "prescription strength.” Rather, the record seems to indicate that school was just searching for generic "pills." The “prescription strength” tablet was 400 mg; the over-the-counter tablets, marketed as Advil or Motrin are 200 mg. In any case, Savana has consistently denied that the pills were hers, and the school does not contend that the pills possessed by the other student were, in fact, Savana's.
. As I noted earlier, Savana has consistently denied, both to the school officials, and to the court under penalty of perjury, that she supplied the pills to Marissa. She affirmatively declared that she had never brought prescription pills to school and had never given any *838pills to any student. She denies that any of the objects found in the planner were hers. She affirmatively alleges that she knows that the objects were owned by Marissa. She denies that alcohol was served at her house, and the school has essentially conceded that this was false accusation.