dissenting.
I agree with much of what the majority has said in its partial resolution of this appeal. Through a slightly different analysis, I too conclude that elected officials “may” be workers under OAR 839-06-105(4)(a). Because the right to reinstatement provided by ORS 659.415 applies only to a worker who has sustained a compensable injury under the *242terms of the Workers’ Compensation Law, ORS chapter 656, I too conclude that the statutory definition, the cases interpreting it, and its legislative history provide context for the BOLI administrative rule. Ultimately, I too conclude that the legislative history shows that in 1959 the legislature amended ORS 656.005(30), then numbered ORS 656.002(16), for the purpose of including elected officials, who would otherwise be excluded because they are not subject to the direction and control of an employer. Or Laws 1959, ch 448, § 1. Further, I would hold, as the majority implicitly does, that BOLI’s intention in adopting the administrative rule was to adopt the statutory definition of worker.
As far as it goes, the majority is correct. However, the majoritys opinion stops short of answering the only question that the parties seek to have resolved on appeal: whether the elected members of defendant’s board of directors are workers. That is a legal question, and one that is put squarely to us. The parties ask us to decide whether these elected officials in this case are workers. The majoritys chosen route is nothing more than an advisory opinion: The board members can be workers under the statute, but they may not be, depending on other potential questions of interpretation of the statute that the parties have not precisely raised.
The majority appears to be concerned with the parties’ failure to argue the question of the effect of the word “salaried,” as used in the rule and the statute. As the majority says in a footnote, in its original form, the statute did not contain a comma between the words “salaried” and “elected.” The comma appeared in 1973, when the legislature enacted other, unrelated amendments to the statute. Or Laws 1973, ch 620, § 1. The majority is unwilling to address the effect of that change here, however, because the parties have so “narrowly focused” the issue. It is true that the parties have not expressly asked that the effect of the word “salaried” be considered, undoubtedly because they were not aware of the possibility that it could have any effect, having not discovered that in its 1959 form the statute contained no comma between the words “salaried” and “elected.” However, our discovery of the change obligates us to complete the statutory inquiry that the parties have initiated. Our responsibility to interpret the statute correctly and completely according to *243the legislature’s intent does not begin where the parties have framed the question for us or end at the point where the parties’ analysis is no longer helpful. We have an independent obligation to interpret the statutes fully and completely. As the Supreme Court said in State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 766 P2d 373 (1988), efficient procedures requiring that issues be raised on appeal are instruments for, not obstacles to, deciding the merits of an appeal. When a question of statutory interpretation is involved, we may not let the parties’ briefing of the issue restrict our ability to give a correct and complete interpretation. PacifiCorp v. City of Ashland, 89 Or App 366, 370, 749 P2d 1189, rev den 305 Or 594 (1988).
As it was amended in 1959, ORS 656.002(16) included “salaried elected and appointed officials.” Or Laws 1959, ch 448, § 1. As I have noted, there was no comma between “salaried” and “elected.” Thus, as it then read, the word “salaried” modified “elected” and “appointed.” Only salaried elected officials were included as workers. That was consistent with another amendment to ORS 656.002 made in 1959 that required that persons work for “remuneration.” Or Laws 1959, ch 448, § 1.
The comma between “salaried” and “elected” first appeared in 1973. In that session, the legislature amended ORS 656.002 twice. In Oregon Laws 1973, chapter 497, section 3, the legislature first amended the statute to add a new subsection (2) defining “average weekly wage,” and it renumbered the remaining subsections. In did not touch the definition of the term “workman,” then contained in subsection (21), and renumbered to subsection (22). In Oregon Laws 1973, chapter 620, section 1, the legislature again amended ORS 656.002, by adding two subparagraphs to subsection (7), which defined “compensable injury.” It did not make any amendment to subsection (22). However, as enacted and later codified, a comma appeared in the bill between “salaried” and “elected,” not as an amendment or as part of other amendments. The comma is significant: With its insertion, the meaning of the statute is changed, at least grammatically. “Salaried” no longer modifies “elected” or “appointed,” but simply becomes its own category of “official,” as the first in a series of three types of officials who are considered to be workers. It is difficult to conceive of a rationale for such a *244change. There is no testimony with regard to the insertion of the comma and no indication that it was added pursuant to legislative action. In the absence of legislative history, it is unlikely that the comma was inserted deliberately for the purpose of creating a separate category of “salaried official,” or to eliminate the requirement that “elected” and “appointed” officials be salaried. For that reason, I conclude that the insertion of the comma was a clerical error.
The statute has been amended many times over the years, and the comma remains. We are mindful of the view that, having withstood the test of time without being changed, the comma should be regarded as expressing the legislature’s intent, no matter what the cause of its insertion. See Coston v. Portland Trust Co. et al., 131 Or 71, 282 P2d 442 (1929). However, in the light of the patent nature of the clerical error that resulted in its insertion, I would conclude that the comma must be disregarded. As the Supreme Court said in State v. Lermeny, 213 Or 574, 580, 326 P2d 768 (1958), when a clerical error defeats the purpose of an act, the court will correct the error to conform to the intended meaning of the legislation. See Bush v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 295 Or 619, 669 P2d 324 (1983); see also Zidell Marine Corp v. West Painting, Inc., 133 Or App 726, 894 P2d 481, affd 322 Or 347, 906 P2d 809 (1995). Specifically, punctuation, although a proper guide to interpretation, will be disregarded if it defeats a clear legislative intent. Fleishauer v. Bilstad, 233 Or 578, 379 P2d 880 (1963).
In my view, there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s statutory construction template, PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), that makes binding on the court’s interpretation of a statute an obvious clerical error that changes the meaning of the statute so as to defeat the legislative purpose. As it was originally enacted in 1959, only salaried elected officials were considered to be workers under ORS 656.002. Nothing in the legislative history shows that the legislature intended the results of the clerical error inserting the comma. We should, accordingly, disregard the comma between “salaried” and “elected,” and hold that only salaried elected officials are to be treated as workers under the Workers’ Compensation Act and for *245purposes of the right to reinstatement under ORS chapter 659.
As the majority says, the issue before us is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant. Because the record on summary judgment shows conclusively that the members of defendant’s elected Board of Directors are not “salaried,” I would affirm the trial court’s granting of summary judgment for defendant. Although the trial court did not expressly consider the question of the effect of the comma or the significance of the word “salaried,” it correctly granted summary judgment to defendant, and we should affirm that ruling for the reasons explained in this dissent, despite the fact that the parties and the trial court focused on a different question. See, e.g., Bevan v. Garrett, 284 Or 293, 586 P2d 1119 (1978); Baumann v. Wright, 249 Or 212, 437 P2d 488 (1968); Capital Investments v. Lofgren, 81 Or App 93, 97, 724 P2d 862 (1986). Because the majority reverses a correct decision of the trial court and sends the case back for the resolution of issues that are ours to decide, I dissent.