Appellant-plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict which found appellee-defendant not negligent with reference to medical malpractice. The malpractice action was filed against appellee, against Sweetwater County Memorial Hospital, and against James Hooker, an employee of the hospital. It was premised on alleged negligence in the medical treatment afforded to appellant in connection with a *330broken arm. A directed verdict was entered in favor of the hospital and James Hooker.
Appellant words the issues on appeal as follows:
“A. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that reports by Dr. Harrison as an insured to his insurance carrier were not discoverable, thereby precluding their use in cross examination during pre-trial depositions and at trial, as well as precluding their use in trial preparation when it appeared in testimony at trial that there was a conflict as to when and how frequently medical attention was sought by the Appellant.
“B. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that reports prepared by Dr. Harrison and furnished to a medical review panel investigating an alleged claim of medical malpractice were not discoverable, thereby precluding their use in cross examination during pre-trial depositions and at trial, as well as precluding their use in trial preparation when it appeared in testimony at trial' that there was a conflict as to when and how frequently medical attention was sought by the Appellant.” (Emphasis added.)
Argument was presented to us and to the trial court as to each of these issues in two respects: (1) Were the reports protected from discovery by appellant because of an attorney-client privilege? and (2) Were they protected from such discovery as being the work product of appellee? The trial court ruled that protection existed on both grounds.
We affirm the judgment because protection from such discovery was afforded under the work product concept, i.e., we do not find an abuse of discretion by the trial court in its determination that appellant-plaintiff failed to show (1) a substantial need for the statements made by appellee-defendant to his insurance company or for the reports made by him to a medical review panel, and (2) that she was unable without undue hardship to obtain a substantial equivalent thereof by other means, as is required by Rule 26(b)(3), W.R.C.P.1
*331The trial court’s ruling was in the form of a denial of appellant’s motion for an order to compel discovery. The motion was made after the following interrogatories were posed by appellant to appellee and the following responses thereto were made by ap-pellee:
“10. Have you made any statements to agents of your insurance company, or to any other person in relation to the incidents set forth in the Complaint filed herein? If so, please state the date said statement was given, the name of the person taking the statement, and the present location of such statement.
“ANSWER: No formal statements given though have had discussions with counsel and representatives of insurance company. Written statements dated February 23 and 24, 1977 were given to insurance carrier.
“11. Has any other physician, or panel of physicians reviewed this case and the treatment rendered by you therein, for any purpose whatsoever with a view toward determining the negligence or lack of negligence, or with a view toward critiquing the care provided by you. If so, please state the name of each such physician, or panel of physicians, when such review occurred, what, if any, reports were rendered as a result of such review of critiquing, and the present location of such reports.
“ANSWER: Yes, the panel was held in cooperation with the Wyoming State Medical Society, my attorneys and my insurance carrier. All information is work product and privilege is asserted.”
Appellant’s “Renewed Request for Production” was refused by appellee, and appellant then filed her motion to compel discovery.
The circumstances of this case are such that the determination of the propriety of the attempted discovery should be resolved on the basis of the failure of appellant to make the showing required by Rule 26(b)(3), W.R.C.P.2 necessary to obtain work-product material. It is unnecessary to consider application of subsection (b)(4) of Rule 26 3 as it could pertain to obtaining “facts known and opinions held by experts,” 1.e. the medical review panel. The issues presented here on appeal have to do with statements and reports made by appellee. Although, in attempted discovery, appellant concerned herself with more aspects of the medical review panel than the reports of Dr. Harrison, the other aspects were not presented on appeal. Appellant words each of the issues on appeal, supra, as having to do with the “reports of Dr. Harrison.”
The statements and reports sought by appellant are “documents and tangible things” which, if not privileged, are discoverable only under the conditions set forth in Rule 26(b)(3).4
And it is upon consideration of this sub-subsection (Rule 26(b)(3)) as it pertains to the circumstances of this case that the trial court’s ruling may be affirmed. Even if the statements to the insurance carrier were not privileged, they, and the reports furnished to the medical review panel, were “prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for * * * [appellee] or by or for * * * [appellee’s] representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer or agent)” (emphasis added) as designated in Rule 26(b)(3).5 Then, to be discoverable under the rule, two conditions must be met. One, it must be shown that the party seeking recovery “has substantial *332need of the materials in the preparation of his case,” and two, that such party “is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.” The trial court found that neither of these conditions were met by appellant. The findings were proper under the circumstances of this case.
As appellant states the issues here presented, supra, the alleged necessity for the discovery was triggered by the fact that “it appeared in testimony at trial that there was a conflict as to when and how frequently medical attention was sought by the Appellant.” The record reflects a sound basis for the refusal of the trial court to find such to be sufficient to satisfy the two conditions for the requested discovery. The material could not have been in “preparation” of the case for trial if the triggering occurred at the trial. Nor does the record support a showing that “the substantial equivalent of the materials” could not, or was not, obtained “without undue hardship.”
In truth, the times and frequency of the medical treatment (the information desired by appellant) were detailed by appellant in her testimony. A written chronology of such as prepared by her was introduced into evidence. Hospital records and appellee’s office records were referred to and placed in evidence. The testimony was to the effect that appellant fell on March 11, 1976, and broke her arm. She went to the emergency room of the hospital where the break was set and a cast was placed on her arm by James Hooker, a medical assistant. Ap-pellee first visited her the next day in the hospital. During the following month, appellant suffered pain with the arm and her fingers were swollen and discolored. She had several contacts, by telephone and in person, with James Hooker and appellee because of the pain. Appellee prescribed medicine for her, and the cast was trimmed and split about six times. It was replaced once by appellee. On April 14, 1976, appellant went to Hill Air Force Base where she consulted a Dr. Harold Jenson who arranged an appointment with an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Adams. She subsequently received treatment at Hill Air Force Base, and, on July 27,1976, Dr. Adams performed surgery on her arm to decompress the median nerve.
The only disagreement between appellant and appellee in their testimony6 was in three respects: (1) Appellant testified to a number of telephone calls to appellee. Ap-pellee could not recall all of them. Appellant’s testimony was therefore unchallenged in this respect. (2) Appellant testified that Dr. Jenson prepared a note for appellee in which he suggested a course of treatment pending the operation including stellate blocks and that she communicated this information orally to appellee and also delivered the note to him. Appellee testified that he did not receive the information or the note. However, appellant testified that appellee stated he would not use the treatment anyway, inasmuch as “we don’t do it that way.” (3) Appellee testified that, on April 8, 1976, during a visit by appellant and her husband to his office (the last time appellee said he had contact with appellant) appellee told the husband that he didn’t understand why appellant was still having pain and that she should see an orthopod. Appellant and her husband denied that ap-pellee had recommended a consultation with an orthopod. They said that the contact with physicians at Hill Air Force Base was on April 13, 1976, and that their last contact with appellee was on April 11, 1976.7
Whether or not the referral to an ortho-pod was by appellee and whether appellant’s last contact with appellee was on April 8 or on April 11,1976, an appointment was nonetheless made on April 13, 1976 for appellant to go to Hill Air Force Base Hospital on April 14, 1976, where she was examined by Dr. Jenson who referred her to Dr. Adams, an orthopedic surgeon.
*333It is possible that the reports made by appellee to his insurer and the statements made by him to the medical review panel may have been at variance with his testimony relative to times and frequencies of medical treatment afforded appellant. But mere possibility or surmise in this respect does not constitute the showing of need required by Rule 26(b)(3).
“* * * [Although a party is entitled to production of documents that would be useful to impeach a witness, his mere surmise that he might find impeaching matter has been held not sufficient to justify production. * * *” 8 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2025, pp. 226-227.
If the mere potential or possibility that the documents contained impeaching material were sufficient to warrant production, the conditions for production set forth in Rule 26(b)(3) would be meaningless. Any effort at discovery would be said to have a possible impeachment purpose. Stephens Produce Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 515 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1975).
Appellant had the equivalent of appel-lee’s statement and report relative to the times and frequencies of medical treatment afforded appellant. She had her own recollections thereof and the written chronology prepared by her. She had the hospital records and appellee’s office records. She had appellee’s deposition and she had his trial testimony which was subjected to cross-examination. There was no showing by appellant of a substantial need for the statement and report for preparation of her case, or that she was unable to obtain the substantial equivalent thereof by other means without undue hardship. The trial court so found.
“While some showing of necessity in the interest of justice over and beyond the fact that the material is relevant and not privileged has clearly been necessary to productions of documents, certainly the courts have exercised quite broad discretion in the application of Rule 34.[8] Under Rule 26(b)(3), they will continue to do so. Each case will be determined on its peculiar facts. Under the Rule as presently worded the factors to be taken into account in the exercise of the district court’s discretion the importance of the information sought in the preparation of the case of the party seeking it, and the difficulty it will face in obtaining substantially equivalent information from other sources if production is denied. * * *” 4 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 26.64[3], pp. 26-419, 26-421.
See United States v. Chatham City Corporation, 72 F.R.D. 640 (S.D.Ga. 1976); Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co., 385 F.Supp. 1029 (N.D.Ga. 1974); Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corporation, 65 F.R.D. 26 (D.Md. 1974); Stephens Produce Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra.
The trial court’s ruling in this instance did not exceed the bounds of reason under the circumstances.
“A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *” Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980).
Although the issues presented on this appeal do not encompass that of whether or not the results of the medical review panel utilized by appellee are subject to discovery, we are aware of the practice used by many attorneys in evaluation of their cases to inquire of a stenographer, an elevator operator, a barber, and other contacts concerning their estimation of damages which they would award under given circumstances, or their determination of liability of parties under given circumstances. Such is a form of work product and not subject to discovery. A medical review *334panel is in the same category. The record does not reflect whether or not appellant also organized a medical review panel and presented the situation to it in evaluation of the merits of her position.
The trial court’s finding that there was an attorney-client privilege with respect to the reports and statements made to the insurer by appellee was in accord with the general proposition as stated in Annotation: Privilege of communications or reports between liability or indemnity insurer and insured, 22 A.L.R.2d 659.
“According to the weight of authority, a report or other communication made by an insured to his liability insurance company, concerning an event which may be made the basis of a claim against him covered by the policy, is a privileged communication, as being between attorney and client, if the policy requires the company to defend him through its attorney, and the communication is intended for the information or assistance of the attorney in so defending him.” 22 A.L.R.2d 660, § 2.
Supporting cases were cited in it and its supplements from California, Colorado, England, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Tennessee and Texas. Typical of the rationale for this position is that stated in Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Mise. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782, 785 (1949):
“The statements of these defendants were intended as a communication by them to the attorney ultimately to be retained for them by the carrier, under their contract. The delivery of the statements by these defendants to the carrier’s representative, whether he be layman or lawyer constitutes the carrier and such representative the agent of defendants, to transmit such statements to their attorney when he has been selected and retained by the carrier.
“The fact that defendants did not select their own counsel is of no moment. They had a contract, for which they paid a valuable consideration, which obligated the carrier to provide them with counsel. The carrier stood in the position of an agent of these defendants to select and retain their attorney for them.”
The dissenting opinion is in accord with the Wisconsin court, and it adequately sets forth the rationale used by that court in the proposition that statements by the insured to his insurance carrier are not within the attorney-client privilege.
The circumstances of this case do not warrant any departure from the position of the majority of the courts. The information was furnished to the insurance carrier in full expectation that it was being furnished to an agent of the attorney who would defend appellee in this instance. The prime purpose for which one purchases liability insurance is to acquire protection against liability for the covered occurrences.
Of course, if the privilege exists, inquiry into application of additional provisions of Rule 26(b) is unnecessary. The rule provides that discovery may be had “regarding any matter, not privileged” (emphasis added) and then sets forth certain instances in which matters not privileged may be discovered only if certain conditions are met.
Affirmed.
. Following are the pertinent portions of Rule 26(b), W.R.C.P.:
“(b) Scope of discovery. — Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
“(1) In General. — Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence;
* * * * * *
“(3) Trial Preparation; Materials. — Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation;
* ⅝: ⅝: * * *
“(4) Trial Preparation; Experts. — Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows: “(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion, (ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such provisions, pursuant to subdivision *331(b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate; “(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.”
. See footnote 1.
. See footnote 1.
. See footnote 1.
. See footnote 1.
. Appellant did not designate the testimony of Drs. Jenson and Adams to be part of the record on appeal.
. Appellant was hospitalized in Salt Lake City, Utah on May 3, 1976 and eventually underwent surgery there.
. Prior to the 1970 revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 34 thereof required a good cause showing for production of any document.