dissenting:
I dissent for the reason that, in my opinion, the totality of the circumstances did not justify an investigative stop of appellant’s automobile.
The discernible facts known to Officer Davin at the time he stopped appellant’s automobile were that while he was in the vicinity of a convenience market located at Cave Creek and Cactus Roads, he observed a black male enter an automobile in which a white male was seated. At a briefing earlier that day, the officer was informed that an armed robbery had been committed two days earlier in the vicinity of the convenience market by two male subjects, one black and one white, and that there was a “lead on the case” that one of the subjects involved in the robbery lived in that general area of town, aside from that generalized information, there was nothing whatsoever to cause the officer to suspect that the appellant was involved in the robbery two days prior or that he was involved in any other crimes.
At the hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress, the officer, in response to questions asked by appellant’s counsel on cross-examination, testified as to what the stop was “mostly based on” — i. e.:
Q. Would it be fair to say that you stopped this vehicle simply on the basis of a hunch or suspicion?
A. I stopped the vehicle mostly based on the fact that it was a black and a white man together in an area where that is very unusual. It appeared that they knew each other because he came out of the Circle K, got in the vehicle with the second subject, and they drove away together, with the second subject having been in the car prior to Mr. Ampey getting in it. (emphasis added)
It is conceded that the only reason for the investigative stop was the possibility that appellant might somehow be linked to the armed robbery of two days prior. Yet there were no specific and articulable facts which would cause Officer Davin to suspect that this particular black individual had in any manner been involved in the armed robbery. In the absence of any such specifics and in view of the very general information available to Officer Davin, I must conclude that the totality of circumstances did not constitute a “reasonable suspicion” to justify an investigative stop under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). To hold otherwise would, in my opinion, serve to justify a carte blanche investigative stop of any and all automobiles in the vicinity of Cave Creek and Cactus Roads occupied by a black male and a white male until such time as those who actually committed the robbery were apprehended. The logical extensions of such a proposition are endless and simply do not square with constitutionally protected rights of the individual.
In my opinion, the totality of circumstances did not establish or even approximate a “reasonable suspicion” for the investigative stop, detention, and ensuing search. I am therefore of the opinion that the motion to suppress should have been granted.