delivered the opinion of the Court.
Andrew C. Sunday appeals from convictions entered in the District Court, First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, on *296charges of deliberate homicide, burglary and theft, in violation of sections 45-5-102, 45-6-204 and 45-6-301, MCA, respectively.
Sunday came to Montana in early September 1977 with James Wilson, Donna Mitchell and Mitchell’s three year old daughter. On September 4, 1977, they stopped their car at a rest area on Highway 200, east of the continental divide near Lincoln, Montana. Desiring to “get away from all the hassles” and “live off the land”, they packed up supplies and walked into the wilderness along the continental divide.
It soon became apparent they could not go far on foot. So, in the early morning hours of September 5, 1977, Sunday and Wilson took three horses from the Evergreen resort owned and operated by Kenneth and Marion McLean. Additionally, they broke into a tack shed which was used for storing horse tack used in the McLeans’ horse-renting business. They took three saddles and three bridles. The tack shed was eight feet by twenty feet and was made out of rough lumber. It contained no living facilities.
Sunday, Wilson and the Mitchells spent the next two days riding the horses along the continental divide. On the afternoon of September 6, 1977, they saw a pickup truck rapidly approaching. They tried to escape into the trees but were cut off by the pickup. The pickup was driven by Kenneth McLean. His wife was also in the pickup. Kenneth McLean stopped the pickup about sixty-five feet from Sunday, Wilson and the Mitchells.
Kenneth McLean got out of the pickup carrying a .308 caliber bolt action revolver. His wife got out carrying a .38 caliber revolver. Sunday dismounted from his horse holding a 30.30 caliber rifle. Wilson testified Sunday asked Wilson if he wanted the privilege of shooting the McLeans. Wilson had a 22.250 caliber bolt action rifle, and Mitchell had a .410 gauge single shot shotgun.
As Kenneth McLean approached, he said, “What the God damn hell is going on? What kind of prank is this? Give us our horses, or we will shoot you.” Mrs. McLean added, “Your God damn right we will.” Immediately after his threat, McLean operated the bolt *297mechanism to his gun and inserted a cartridge. According to Sunday, Kenneth McLean pointed the gun directly at Sunday. Wilson and Mitchell testified the gun was pointed at the ground.
A shooting spree followed. Sunday shot Kenneth McLean in the leg. Then, Marion McLean began shooting at Sunday. Sunday returned the fire hitting Marion McLean in her abdomen and thoracic area. Sunday next approached Marion McLean. Noticing Kenneth McLean rise from the ground, Sunday turned and fired two fatal shots at Kenneth McLean. Meanwhile, Wilson who was approaching Kenneth McLean noticed Marion McLean rise. Wilson shot Marion McLean in the head killing her instantly.
Sunday then took $25 from Kenneth McLean’s wallet. Wilson took approximately $100 from Marion McLean. Sunday, Wilson and Mitchell picked up the McLeans’ weapons and left the area in the McLeans’ pickup. They were eventually arrested in Oregon.
On September 26, 1977, Sunday was charged in an amended information with two counts of deliberate homicide, two counts of felony theft and one count of burglary.
In October 1977, Sunday gave notice of his intent to rely on self-defense. On January 9, 1978, Sunday moved for a change of venue. The motion was denied on April 12, 1978, on the ground any possible prejudice was “speculation at this point.”
On July 6, 1978, Sunday moved for permission to conduct individual voir dire of the prospective jurors. The motion was denied, but the District Court said the motion might be renewed during voir dire if necessary. Sunday renewed the motion during voir dire with respect to one prospective juror, Mrs. Garrett. The District Court again denied the motion saying it would guide Mrs. Garrett. Sunday passed the panel without challenging Mrs. Garrett for cause. Later, both the State and Sunday exercised all eight of their preemptory challenges.
In July 1978, a jury verdict was rendered finding Sunday guilty of all the charges. Sunday was sentenced to a total of 240 years in the state penitentiary.
*298Sunday presents eleven issues for review. These issues may be grouped as follows:
1. Whether it was error to deny Sunday’s motions for change of venue and individual voir dire of jurors;
2. Whether the State failed to prove the crimes charged against Sunday;
3. Whether the District Court failed to properly instruct the jury; and
4. Whether the sentences imposed on Sunday were erroneous.
ISSUE NO. L Change of Venue and Individual Voir Dire.
Sunday contends it was error to deny his motions for change of venue and individual voir dire. The contention is without merit.
A denial of a motion for change of venue or a motion for individual voir dire will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Olson (1971), 156 Mont. 339, 480 P.2d 822. Sunday has not made such a showing.
A change of venue must be based on more than an affiant’s unsupported opinions and the mere fact of pretrial publicity. The published accounts must be so passionate as to excite undue prejudice, to the extent of rendering it impossible for the accused to have a jury free from prejudice. State v. Corliss (1967), 150 Mont. 40, 49, 430 P.2d 632, 637.
Sunday’s motion for change of venue was not adequately supported. The motion was supported by the single affidavit of defense counsel. The affidavit stated defense counsel believed Sunday could not receive a fair trial due to inflammatory county-wide publicity. The affidavit was unsupported by any evidence of the number or inflammatory nature of the publications. Also, Sunday never renewed his motion for a change of venue at any time during or after jury selection.
Sunday also did not adequately support his motion for individual voir dire. Sunday never demonstrated the extent of the pretrial publicity, its inflammatory nature or whether it had any prejudicial effect on the prospective jurors. Moreover, Sunday *299passed the jury panel, including Mrs. Garrett, the main object of Sunday’s concern, without challenging any potential juror for cause due to bias or prejudice. See, section 46-16-304(2)(j), MCA.
ISSUE NO. 2: Failure to Prove the Crimes Charged.
Sunday maintains the State failed to prove Sunday committed burglary since the tack shed is not an “occupied structure” as required by section 45-6-204, MCA.
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is the intent of the legislature controls. Dodd v. City of East Helena (1979), 180 Mont. 518, 591 P.2d 241, 243. In construing legislative intent, this Court construes criminal statutes according to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect their object and to promote justice. State v. Shannon (1976), 171 Mont. 25, 28, 554 P.2d 743, 744.
The intent of the burglary statute was to prohibit wrongful intrusions into those places where the threat to people was most alarming. State v. Shannon, supra. Thus, in defining “occupied structure”, the legislature included those places where the chance of human confrontation was most likely, in those places suitable “for human occupancy or night lodging” and “for carrying on business.” Section 45-2-101(34), MCA.
The McLeans’ tack shed was a structure suitable for carrying on business and was so used by the McLeans. The McLeans operated a horse rental business. Horse tack was an integral part of that business, and the horse tack was stored in the tack shed. Moreover, both the guests and employees of the Evergreen Resort would enter the shed frequently and at irregular hours.
Count V of the amended information charged Sunday with the felony theft of (1) a 1966 International pickup truck, (2) a .308 caliber rifle, (3) a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson pistol, (4) a gunbelt and holster, and, (5) $150 in cash. Sunday contends the State failed to prove the value of the personalty listed in count V exceeded $150 as is required by section 45-6-301, MCA, the theft statute. We agree.
*300Under our felony theft statute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the personalty allegedly taken exceeds $150. At trial, the only value testimony was given by Sunday and Mitchell and related to the amount of cash taken from the McLeans. Sunday testified he took $20 to $25 from Kenneth McLean’s wallet. Mitchell testified Wilson took about $100 from Marion McLean’s purse.
The State asserts Sunday waived any objection to the State’s failure to prove value by not raising the issue prior to the entry of the judgment of conviction. The State’s assertion is without merit. Under the facts here, value is an essential element of the crime charged, and such an error may be raised at any time.
The State next asks this Court to take judicial notice of the fact that the aggregate value of the personalty involved here is greater than $150. We will not do this.
Rule 201(b), M.R.Evid., sets forth the kinds of facts which may be judicially noticed. That provision reads as follows:
“. . . A fact to be judicially noticed must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.”
We will not go beyond the scope of this provision and take judicial notice of a basic element of the crime charged not otherwise proved.
It is also noteworthy that the jury was not properly instructed as to value. None of the instructions concerning felony theft mentioned that a value greater than $ 150 is necessary for a felony theft conviction. Thus, the jury reached its decision on the felony theft charge without even considering a fundamental element of the crime charged. We will not presume the jury knew about this element of felony theft.
Sunday next contends the convictions for the deliberate homicides of Kenneth and Marion McLean are not supported by the evidence. More specifically, Sunday maintains the evidence estab*301lishes the homicides were justified, or at most, Sunday could be convicted of mitigated deliberate homicide.
Whether Sunday was justified in killing the McLeans and whether Sunday acted under extreme emotional distress were questions of fact for the jury. State v. Larson (1978), 175 Mont. 395, 574 P.2d 266, 269. Upon appeal, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. The evidence must be viewed in light most favorable to the State. McGuinn v. State (1978), 177 Mont. 215, 581 P.2d 417, 419.
The verdicts of deliberate homicide are supported by substantial evidence which if believed by the jury would result in convictions for deliberate homicide. Both Wilson and Mitchell testified Kenneth McLean did not point his rifle at Sunday. In addition, Wilson testified Sunday asked Wilson if he wanted the privilege of shooting the McLeans. Sunday’s own testimony corroborates the sequence of events as described by Wilson and Mitchell.
Sunday also contends the evidence clearly shows Wilson’s actions were the sole intervening cause of Marion McLean’s death. Therefore, according to Sunday, it was error to submit count II of the amended information, the deliberate homicide of Marion McLean, to the jury. We do not agree.
Sunday shot Marion McLean in her abdomen and thoracic area. Shorthly thereafter, Wilson shot Marion McLean in the head killing her instantly. A pathologist testified the wound inflicted by Sunday would have caused Marion McLean’s death within minutes had she not been shot by Wilson.
The principal end of the law of homicide is to protect human life by preventing behavior which can cause death. The evidence adduced at trial clearly shows Sunday engaged in conduct which was likely to cause the death of a human being. Moreover, Sunday’s situation would be no different if Marion McLean had been struck by a bolt of lightning rather than shot in the head by Wilson.
ISSUE NO. 3: Instructional Error.
*302Court’s instruction no. 16 reads as follows:
“You are instructed that a criminal homicide is deliberate homicide if:
“(1) It is committed purposely or knowingly; or
“(2) It is committed while the offender is engaged in flight after committing or attempting to commit burglary or any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.”
Sunday contends it was error to give the second part of the instruction concerning the felony-murder rule. According to Sunday, he was not charged under the felony-murder rule, there are no facts supporting the application of the rule, and even assuming proof of a felonious act, there was no showing of a connection between it and the McLeans’ death.
Sunday’s contention is without merit. The evidence establishes that Sunday caused the McLeans’ death while in flight after committing a burglary. Court’s instruction no. 16 paraphrases section 45-5-102, MCA, the statute defining deliberate homicide. That statute specifically covers criminal homicides committed while in flight after committing a burglary. The connection between Sunday’s felonious act and the McLean’s death was decided by the jury. As was stated in Commonwealth v. Almeida (1949), 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595, 611-612:
“. . . There can be no doubt about the ‘justice’ of holding that felon guilty of murder in the first degree who engages in a robbery or burglary and thereby inevitably calls into action defense forces against him, the activity of which forces result in the death of a human being.”
Additionally, at trial, Sunday did not require the State to specify which theory of deliberate homicide the State was following. Nor did Sunday object to the court’s instruction no. 16 on the grounds now asserted upon appeal. This Court will not reverse the District Court’s rulings on the instructions on grounds not raised at the time the instruction was proposed. State v. Campbell (1965), 146 Mont. 251. 263. 405 P.2d 978, 987.
*303Sunday next contends the jury was incorrectly and incompletely instructed on the affirmative defense of self-defense. In this regard, Sunday asserts the court’s instructions (1) failed to explain self-defense as a concept of fear to be judged in light of appearances and (2) failed to explain Sunday had no duty to retreat.
In considering this issue, we will first set out the relevant law applicable to the concept of self-defense. A person is justified in the use of force likely to cause death or serious bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm to himself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. Section 45-3-102, MCA. Self-defense is to be judged in terms of the apparent danger which the defendant perceived, as a reasonable person, rather than in terms of the danger actually confronting him. The belief in the necessity of using force must be reasonable, but even a mistaken belief may be reasonable. State v. Reiner (1978), 179 Mont. 239, 587 P.2d 950, 956. A defendant may stand his ground even if he reasonably believes he is in imminent danger of great bodily harm. See State v. Porter (1964), 143 Mont. 528, 391 P.2d 704.
Sunday cannot complain if these concepts were conveyed to the jury by the District Court in the body of its instructions. If so, Sunday was given ample opportunity to present his theory of defense to the jury. State v. Collins (1978), 178 Mont. 36, 582 P.2d 1179. We find such is the case here.
The jury was instructed that self-defense was a concept of fear to be judged in light of appearances even if those appearances were false. Court’s instructions no. 27 and 31 directed the jury to consider whether Sunday “reasonably believed” that force by him was necessary. These instructions do not say that reasonable belief must be founded upon subjective appearances or the danger actually confronting Sunday. State v. Reiner, supra. Similarly, instructions, like court’s instructions no. 27 and 31, which state the general law of self-defense adequately cover Montana’s “no retreat” rule. State v. Porter, supra.
*304District Court’s instruction no. 28 instructed the jury that Sunday had the burden of producing sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt in order to avail himself of the affirmative defense of self-defense. Sunday maintains it was error to give this instruction. We do not agree.
Sunday contends the instruction is misleading and confusing when compared with court’s instruction no. 17 which instructed the jury that the State had the burden of proving lack of justification. Sunday is barred from asserting this upon appeal as a ground for reversible error. This was not a ground of his objection at trial. State v. Campbell, supra.
Sunday next asserts that court’s instruction no. 28 is an incorrect statement of the law. The assertion is without merit.
In Montana, the defendant must present some evidence of self-defense in order to raise it as an issue unless the State’s evidence puts self-defense in issue. State v. Cooper (1979), 180 Mont. 68, 589 P.2d 133.
At trial, Wilson and Mitchell, both witnesses for the State, testified Kenneth McLean did not point his gun at Sunday. Wilson also testified that Sunday asked Wilson if he wanted the privilege of shooting the McLeans. The State did not raise the issue of self-defense by showing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the homicides including evidence which negates the application of self-defense.
Finally, Sunday contends court’s instruction no. 28 unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proving self-defense to Sunday. It did not. The absence of justification is not an element of deliberate homicide, and proving lack of justification does not serve to negate any of the facts which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support a conviction of deliberate homicide. Patterson v. New York (1977), 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281; State v. Cooper, supra.
Court’s instruction no. 22 reads:
“You are instructed that purpose or knowledge are manifested by circumstances connected with the offense. Purpose or know*305ledge need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be inferred from acts, conduct and circumstances appearing in evidence.”
Sunday maintains this instruction and court’s instruction no. 23, “You are instructed that the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts”, are reversible error under Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39. We do not agree.
Court’s instruction no. 22 is a permissive inference. It allows, but does not require, the jury to infer ultimate facts from basic facts adduced by the State. County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen (1979), 442 U.S. 140, 156, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d 777, 792; State v. Coleman (1979), 180 Mont. 68, 605 P.2d 1000.
Since a permissive inference is involved, Sunday must show the invalidity of the inference as applied to him. Sunday must show there is no rational way under the facts of this cause for the jury to make the connection permitted by the inference. Only then is there a risk the presumptively rational jury will use the inference to make an erroneous factual determination. County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, supra. Sunday has not carried his burden upon appeal.
Similarly, it was not prejudicial error to give court’s instruction no. 23. The homicide charges against Sunday were submitted to the jury in the disjunctive, as a deliberate homicide or as a felony-murder case. Under either theory, Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, is not controlling.
A person is guilty of deliberate homicide if it is committed “purposely” or “knowingly.” Section 45-5-102, MCA. A person acts “purposely” with regard to any offense if it is his conscious object (1) to engage in that conduct defined as the offense or (2) to cause a result which is the offense. Section 45-2-101(52), MCA. Applying this definition of purpose to this cause, if the jury found that Sunday consciously sought to kill or consciously conducted himself to cause a death as a result of his conduct, the elements of intent and act are merged in his conduct once purpose is shown. Thus, *306under the criminal code, proof that the defendant acted “purposely” is sufficient proof that he acted “knowingly”. Section 45-2-102, MCA.
A person is shown to have acted “knowingly” with respect to deliberate homicide upon proof of either of two mental elements: (1) when he is aware of his conduct which constitutes an offense; or, (2) when he is aware that it is highly probable that a death of a human being will be the result of his conduct. Section 45-2-101(27), MCA. As we noted in State v. Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000, 36 St.Rep. at 2242, it is his awareness either of his conduct or the highly probable result of his conduct that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to establish his “knowledge” as a mental element of the crime. But we repeat, if purpose is shown beyond a reasonable doubt, knowledge is thereby established under the code.
Therefore, in simplest terms, the burden of the State here under the charge of deliberate homicide was to prove Sunday by a voluntary act caused the death of a human being while having the mental state described as “purposely” or “knowingly”. Those are the material elements of a deliberate homicide under the Montana Criminal Code of 1973.
Here, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Sunday purposely shot the McLeans. Sunday testified he fired the first shot at Kenneth McLean. In fact, it was not shown that Kenneth McLean even fired a shot. True, Sunday contends he acted purposely but that he was justified in defending himself. However, by Sunday’s own admission, it was Sunday’s conscious object to shoot the McLeans or to cause that result. Section 45-2-101(52), MCA. Therefore, the jury was never called upon to decide as an issue of fact whether Sunday acted purposely or knowingly to cause the death of a human being. Sunday’s own testimony admitted that. Rather, the issue became whether Sunday’s purposeful act was a justified use of force, self-defense. Section 45-3-102, MCA.
Court’s instruction no. 23 was therefore superfluous. Sunday intended by his conduct to do the McLeans grave bodily harm. *307That was the ordinary consequence of his voluntary acts. The objected to instruction did not relate to a material issue in the cause and, at most, was harmless error. Such error is not cause for reversal. Section 46-20-701, MCA.
We are aware of the apparently conflicting opinion of the Court where self-defense is an issue, and the Sandstrom instruction is involved, in Holloway v. McElroy (D.Ga.1979), 474 F.Supp. 1363, 1368. The rationale of that Court is not explained. We find in this case that self-defense admits a purposeful act, but claims the purposeful act was justified.
Likewise, court’s instruction no. 23 was not prejudicial error under the felony-murder theory submitted to the jury.
The felony-murder rule is embodied in the definition of deliberate homicide in the Montana Criminal Code of 1973. Section 45-5-102, MCA. Intent as such is not an element under the felony-murder rule.
The felony-murder statute requires proof of the following combination of elements:
1. The intent to commit a felony, burglary here;
2. An unintentional death caused by the attempt, perpetration or attempted escape of a felon; and
3. The death must be an outgrowth of the felony itself and related to the burglary by an unbroken chain of causation. Bassiouni, Substantive Criminal Law (1978), at 250, 251.
Earlier in this opinion, we affirmed the charge of burglary against Sunday. His intent to' commit the burglary was proven by direct evidence and by Sunday’s own admissions. Therefore, “purpose” as an element of that crime was established. Intent was no longer an issue under the felony-murder statute once it was shown by the evidence that Sunday committed a burglary and Sunday killed the McLeans while in flight after the commission of the burglary. It was the commission of the burglary which gave rise to the dangerous circumstances which invited the McLeans deaths. The intent to commit the burglary was a sufficiently supplied in*308tent for all the consequences including the homicides arising therefrom. Bassiouni, supra, at 247.
If the jury applied the felony-murder theory here, the court’s instruction no. 23 was superfluous because the jury had no issue of intent to decide. Intent was not an element of the deliberate homicides, and intent was not an issue before the jury. The instruction played no part in the jury’s deliberations as to the deliberate homicides.
ISSUE NO. 4: Sentences.
Upon his convictions, Sunday was sentenced to serve 100 years for each count of deliberate homicide, 10 years for each theft count and 20 years for burglary. The terms are to be served consecutively, 240 years total, and Sunday is ineligible for parole or participation in the work furlough program.
Wilson pleaded guilty to two counts of deliberate homicide and to two counts of theft. He received a sentence of 100 years for each deliberate homicide count and 10 years on each theft count. The sentences are to be served concurrently, and while the county attorney will not recommend parole, he will not fight Wilson’s parole.
Sunday contends the District Court did not have the authority to impose a 20 year sentence for burglary. As for the-other sentences, Sunday asserts they are unconscionable and unjustified when compared to the sentences received by Wilson who was equally guilty.
■ We agree the District Court did not have the authority to sentence Sunday to 20 years for burglary. By statute, the maximum possible sentence for burglary is 10 years in the state penitentiary. Section 45-6-204, MCA. Accordingly, under section 46-20-703, MCA, we reduce Sunday’s sentence for burglary to 10 years in the state penitentiary with the other provisions of the sentence to remain unchanged.
Likewise, also under section 46-20-703, MCA, we reverse the 10 year sentence Sunday received upon his conviction for felony theft as charged in count V of the amended information. The State failed *309to prove an essential element of felony theft in count V that the property taken exceeded $ 150 in value.
With regard to the terms of the other sentences imposed upon Sunday, we find the District Court did not abuse its discretion. All the other sentences are within the maximum allowed by law for each offense. Similarly, the other provisions of the sentence, no parole and no work furlough, are also proper under the applicable statute. Section 46-18-202, MCA. The District Court determined that the restrictions were necessary for the protection of society because of Sunday’s extensive criminal record, his uncaring attitude and the malevolent way in which he killed the McLeans.
This Court will not second guess the trial judge, who after observing the demeanor and attitude of the defendant, uses his discretion in fixing punishment. Matter of Jones (1978), 176 Mont. 412, 578 P.2d 1150, 1155.
Accordingly, Sunday’s conviction for felony theft as charged in count V of the amended information and the sentence imposed thereon are reversed. The count V felony theft charge is dismissed. The twenty year sentence for burglary is reduced to ten years in the state penitentiary to be served under the other conditions laid down by the District Court. The burglary conviction is otherwise affirmed. Sunday’s other convictions and the sentences imposed thereon are affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HASWELL and JUSTICES DALY and HARRISON concur. MR. JUSTICE SHEA dissents and will file a written dissent later.