dissenting.
I am unable to agree that Louella and her son by another marriage, Todd, should be considered “other dependents” under AS 09.55.580(a).
The question might be different if, as in Brown v. Estate of Jonz, 591 P.2d 532 (Alaska 1979),1 a stepchild were living in the home of the deceased, the deceased were the sole source of support for the stepchild, and the parent of the stepchild were still married to the deceased at the time of death. But here I can find no justification for including Louella and Todd within the intendment of the wrongful death statute. At the time of decedent’s death there existed no cognizable legal relationship between the decedent and either Louella or Todd.
In my opinion the statutory phrase “other dependents” was meant to cover persons, other than a spouse or children, who have a natural or legal tie to the decedent and who can demonstrate that they were in fact dependent upon the decedent. Most typically this would include parents who were dependent upon the decedent, and it might, in appropriate cases, include grandchildren or collateral relatives. Cf. In re Estate of Pushruk, 562 P.2d 329, 331 (Alaska 1977).
Statutes on marriage, divorce and adoption exist so that the very questions presented in this case can be determined with clarity. Absent a legally defined obligation, the trier of fact must speculate both as to the length of time that the decedent would choose to maintain the factual dependency and the amount he would have contributed during that period. When we abandon the structure created by those statutes we create a new, indeterminate class of “dependents” which renders somewhat meaningless the legal concepts of marriage, divorce, and adoption.
In the eye of the law the decedent in this case owed no alimentary obligation to Todd, and his marriage with Louella had been legally terminated. The sporadic contributions made by the decedent were not such that Louella or Todd could afford to rely or depend on them for their support, and could have been terminated at any time.2 I can find no moral or legal obligation which would justify, on the facts of this case, a finding of dependency. Thus I dissent.
. I did not participate in the decision of that case.
. When Sam and Louella divorced the second time in 1972, one of the grounds stated for the divorce was nonsupport. After the divorce, Sam never provided a steady or substantial source of support for Louella and Todd. According to Louella’s testimony he occasionally paid bills and provided the family with certain necessities, such as appliances and clothing, but she supported herself and her family primarily on her own earnings until she quit her job shortly after Sam’s death. Sam left neither a will nor life insurance for Louella or Todd.