OPINION
MATTHEW W. BOROWIEC, Judge.The sole issue to be decided in this case is whether defendant, Arizona Protection Agency, Inc., can be held liable for plaintiff’s loss as a result of a criminal act of defendant’s former employee, committed after termination of the employment. We believe there may be liability.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We consider the motion to be one for summary judgment because matters outside the pleadings were presented. 16 A.R.S. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b). We find that defendant was not shown to be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 16 A.R.S. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56(c); Chanay v. Chittenden, 115 Ariz. 32, 563 P.2d 287 (1977).
The facts sufficient for our purposes, pieced together from the pleadings, the affidavit of defendant’s vice-president accompanying the motion to dismiss, and plaintiff’s opposition to the motion, are: Defendant contracted to install a burglar alarm system in plaintiff’s home; the person defendant employed to do the work was either a wanted felon or a person with a long felony record; and after the work was completed and the employment terminated, the former employee returned to plaintiff’s home, disconnected the alarm system and stole plaintiff’s possessions, damaging plaintiff in the claimed sum of $371,800.00. Plaintiff alleges defendant was negligent in the . . employment and maintaining . . .’’of this employee.
We find no case in point or a different rule pronounced by our appellate courts or legislature; therefore we look to the Restatement of Law. Irwin v. Murphey, 81 Ariz. 148, 302 P.2d 534 (1956); Rodriguez v. Terry, 79 Ariz. 348, 290 P.2d 248 (1955); Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945).
An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to *382another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal. Restatement 2d of Torts, § 302B.
The fact that the felon was at one time the employee of defendant does not prevent the application of the Restatement principle, supra. Comments to Restatement 2d of Torts, § 302B deal both with the conduct of employees of and strangers to the party found to be negligent.
In light of the sensitive nature of the work and the temptations and opportunity attendant thereto, defendant owed a duty to plaintiff to employ a responsible and trustworthy person, without a criminal proclivity that could reasonably be determined, to install the alarm system.
. an especial temptation and opportunity for criminal misconduct, brought about by the defendant, will call upon him to take precautions against it. Prosser on Torts, Fourth Edition, § 33, Page 174.
A case of like hue and not so dissimilar to ours that we cannot gain therefrom is this court’s decision in Central Alarm of Tucson v. Ganem, 116 Ariz. 74, 567 P.2d 1203 (App.1977). In that case, defendant Central Alarm was held to be negligent for the burglary loss at plaintiff’s pawn shop as a result of the criminal conduct of a third person unknown to defendant, who gained access to plaintiff’s pawn shop and deactivated the alarm system installed by defendant. This was made possible by defendant leaving a key to the alarm system “. . where an unauthorized person could obtain access to the controls of the system and deactivate it. . . ” Id., 116 Ariz. at 77, 567 P.2d at 1206. The burglar in Central Alarm was not a former employee of defendant, but this is of little moment. In our case, defendant may have provided the key to the burglar by employing one of his character and propensity, and giving him access to plaintiff’s home.
Unquestionably, defendant may be found negligent in knowingly employing a wanted felon or a felon with a long record to install the burglar alarm. If it could be negligence to employ such a person, then it could be negligence where this is not known to the employer but should have been known, especially in light of the sensitive nature of the work, the temptations inherent therein and the opportunities presented. The risk is there and the possible loss is certainly foreseeable.
It remains to be seen in the development of the facts whether the surreptitious entry and theft was the result of the employment of the felon; whether the felon’s background projected the risk; and whether defendant had any knowledge of this background or could have acquired such knowledge. It remains to be determined whether defendant took the precautions a reasonable man would be required to take under the circumstances.
Reversed and remanded.
RICHMOND, J., concurs.NOTE; Chief Judge JAMES D. HATHAWAY having requested that he be relieved from consideration of this matter, Superior Court Judge MATTHEW W. BOROWIEC was called to sit in his stead and participate in the determination of this decision.