This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission denying unemployment benefits to claimant-appellant Owen. We affirm.
Owen’s claim for unemployment benefits was denied at the initial determination hearing, at a redetermination pro*78ceeding, and at an appeal proceeding before an appeals examiner. Following a hearing, the Industrial Commission affirmed the decision of the appeals examiner. Although the record before this Court includes the testimony taken before the appeals examiner, it does not include any testimony taken before the Industrial Commission. Clearly the burden of perfecting an appeal lies with the appellant as does the burden of procuring a transcript sufficient to establish facts necessary to the case of the appellant. See Kirkham v. 4.60 Acres, 100 Idaho 781, 605 P.2d 959 (1979); Hale v. Heninger, 87 Idaho 414, 393 P.2d 718 (1964).
The Industrial Commission concluded that the claimant Owen was not laid off by her employer but that the employer had work available for the claimant and expected her to keep working. The Industrial Commission also concluded that the claimant voluntarily quit her employment without good cause and refused to accept the employer’s offer of reemployment. Those conclusions are sustained by the findings of the Commission which in turn are sustained by the evidence contained in the record before us. We are compelled to defer to the findings of the Industrial Commission when they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. Const. art. 5, § 9; Guillard v. Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 647, 603 P.2d 981 (1979).
The claimant cannot recover unemployment benefits after voluntarily leaving employment without good cause, I.C. § 72-1366(e), and a claimant who has voluntarily left employment bears the burden of establishing that such termination was for good cause. Pyeatt v. Idaho State University, 98 Idaho 424, 565 P.2d 1381 (1977). See also Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes, 99 Idaho 77, 589 P.2d 89 (1979); Burroughs v. Employment Security Agency, 86 Idaho 412, 387 P.2d 473 (1963).
Owen began work as a “shake packer” in the Newburg Cedar Mill in 1976. A shake packer is a member of a team including a sawyer and splitter. It appears that the sawyer is the key person in each team and acts as the supervisor. A number of such teams work at the mill and are paid on a piecework basis. On January 9, 1978, the sawyer of Owen’s team quit work and left the mill which meant Owen was without work until another sawyer could be found. Owen also left the mill after failing to find the mill owner and inform him of the situation. The next day, January 10, a replacement sawyer was obtained for the team but Owen did not appear at work. The mill owner was required to construct a new team by the reassignment of night-shift workers.
It is clear that Owen did not return to the mill for at least six days, i. e., January 15, although the record could be read to indicate that she did not return to the mill until January 23. At such time as she did return to the mill she was offered the same position as a shake packer with apparently the same pay scale. However, since night-shift workers had necessarily been assigned to the day shift to complete the shake teams, Owen would have been required to work on a night-shift team. That team included the sawyer with whom she had previously worked and who had returned to work and been assigned to the night shift. Owen complained to the owner of the mill of her dislike for working the night shift and the owner stated that he would straighten things out and contact her. Thereupon she left the mill and never returned. In the meantime she had filed for unemployment benefits on January 10, 1978.
While Owen’s actions on January 9 may well have constituted a leaving with good cause, on January 10, 1978 the mill was fully operational and work was available for Owen. Her failure to return to work under those circumstances supports the finding that Owen voluntarily left her job without good cause. See McMunn v. Department of Public Lands, 94 Idaho 493, 491 P.2d 1265 (1971).
Owen asserts that the reason for her refusal of the offer of reemployment was dissatisfaction with Sunday night work. Owen had the burden of establishing that the offered employment was not suit*79able work. I.C. § 72-1366(g); Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes, supra; McMunn v. Department of Public Lands, supra. Owen did not carry or satisfy that burden of showing conformance with the statute, i. e., that her health, safety or morals would be jeopardized or that the conditions of the night shift would have been substantially less favorable to Owen. The record is devoid of a showing that Sunday night work was, in this industry and in that area, anything other than the usual, ordinary and accepted practice. Hence there is no showing that Owen’s refusal of the proffered employment was for any but personal and subjective reasons peculiar to her. See Pyeatt v. Idaho State University, supra; Flynn v. Amfac Foods, Inc., 97 Idaho 768, 554 P.2d 946 (1976); McMunn v. Department of Public Lands, supra. See generally Rogers v. Trim House, 99 Idaho 746, 588 P.2d 945 (1979).
The order of the Industrial Commission denying unemployment benefits is affirmed.
DONALDSON, C. J., and BAKES, J., concur.