— I concur in the order reversing the granting of a new trial.
This ease differs materially from People v. Shirley, post p. 521 [11 Cal.Rptr. 537, 360 P.2d 33], also decided this day. In the instant ease, as the main opinion correctly points out, the challenged instruction and the regulation upon which it was based merely told the jury that a disputable presumption arises that a man and woman are married when they publicly deport themselves as husband and wife. This is in precise accord with the rebuttable presumption created by section 1963, subdivision 30, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The later regulations which were involved in the Shirley ease, supra, and which are correctly set forth in footnote 1 of the main decision in this case, are, in my opinion, illegal and void for the reasons set forth in my dissent in the Shirley ease, supra.
I concur in the order of reversal.