with whom RABI-NO WITZ, Justice, joins, concurring.
I concur in the result the court reaches, but I disagree with its reasoning. My disagreement lies in the failure of the court to distinguish between the right of a party to be given notice, as required by Civil Rule 5(a), and the responsibility that attaches for failure to respond to a notice.
If I understand the court’s holding, it is the fact of consolidation of two separate civil actions that is critical. Presumably the result would be the same whether or not Harry had authorized Mr. Hellenthal to act on his behalf in Civil Action No. 82-6747. Neither Harry nor the court cite any authority for this extraordinary proposi*471tion, quite possibly because it does not exist.
As attorney of record for Harry in Civil Action No. 73-2860, Mr. Hellenthal was entitled to be served with all pleadings relating to that action, including those that resulted in its consolidation with Civil Action No. 82-6747. However, the consolidation of the separate civil actions for purposes of trial does not in and of itself mean that Mr. Hellenthal was authorized to act, or could be held responsible for failure to act, on behalf of Harry on issues raised in Civil Action No. 82-6747. If he was not authorized by Harry to act on Harry’s behalf in Civil Action No. 82-6747, then of course neither he nor Harry are in any position to complain about whatever action was taken.
In setting aside the default judgment because Mr. Hellenthal did not receive notice of relief requested on issues raised in Civil Action No. 82-6747, the court necessarily implies that he was authorized to act on Harry’s behalf in that case. Thus, implicit in the court’s holding is a conclusion that an attorney who represents a client in one case may be held responsible for failing to act in any other cases which are later consolidated with it, irrespective of the attorney’s authority in fact. Since the attorney may not have been authorized to act in the later cases, he acts — or fails to act — at his peril.
In my view, the correct answer to the question posed is that Harry made an entry of appearance through Mr. Hellenthal in Civil Action No. 82-6747 for the purpose of triggering the notice requirement found in Civil Rule 55(c)(1). According to the commentators, an “appearance” for purposes of the rule requires neither an answer nor a formal notice of appearance:
[A] party may be deemed to have filed an appearance when there have been contacts between plaintiff and the defaulting party that indicate defaulting party intends to defend the suit.
Failure to give the required notice is generally regarded by the courts as a serious procedural irregularity. [Footnotes omitted].
6 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice 11 55.-05[3], at 55-55 and -57 (1983). See also 10 A. Wright, A. Miller and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2686, at 432 (1983).
There is ample precedent for setting aside a default judgment entered where notice of the application for judgment is lacking, despite the lack of a formal appearance in the action, where contacts between the parties are sufficient to make it clear to the plaintiff that the defendant intends to contest the matter.
In H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktienge-sellschaft Gebruder L., 432 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir.1970), where the parties had communicated about possible out-of-court settlements, it was held that there had been an “appearance” for the purposes of Rule 55 even though the defendant’s pleadings had not been properly filed. In arriving at this conclusion, the court noted that “[t]he policy underlying the modernization of federal procedure, namely, the abandonment or relaxation of restrictive rules which prevent the hearing of cases on their merits, is central to this issue.” Id. at 691. See also Lutomski v. Panther Valley Coin Exchange, 653 F.2d 270 (6th Cir.1981) (defendant’s request for extensions of time indicated an intent to defend the lawsuit); Charlton L. Davis & Co., P.C. v. Fedder Data Center, 556 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.1977) (request for an extension of time by phone and letter indicated an attempt to defend the lawsuit); Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913 (3rd Cir.1966) (request for an extension of time to answer complaint constituted “appearance”); United States v. Melichar, 56 F.R.D. 49 (E.D.Wis.1971) (participation in stipulations extending the time to answer constituted an “appearance” for the purposes of Rule 55).
Mr. Hellenthal requested an extension of time to answer the complaint in Civil Action No. 82-6747. That informal request was granted by Patsy’s attorney. Thereafter, Patsy’s attorney informed Mr. Hel-*472lenthal that default would be applied for if an answer was not forthcoming. Although Mr. Hellenthal could not recall that communication, the letter was in his file. From these facts it seems clear that Harry intended to defend and therefore an appearance was entered on his behalf in the second proceeding, not merely because of the consolidation but because of an “appearance” to which legal significance attaches.
Accordingly, since Harry would be bound by the failure of Mr. Hellenthal to respond to a notice had it been given to him, he may complain about the lack of notice. The default judgment should be set aside.