(concurring and dissenting):
I concu-r in the results reached by the court in holding unconstitutional: (a) the definition of viability in section 2; (b) section 3(b)(i) (spousal consent); (e) sections 5(a) and 6(b) incorporating the unconstitutionally defined term, “viability”; and (d) those portions of section 6(d) that require record-keeping *541with respect to,the woman’s spouse and the reasons making the abortion necessary in order to protect the life or health of the mother.1 I must dissent, however, insofar as I would uphold the constitutionality of section 3(b) (ii), requiring the consent of a parent or one in loco parentis, and the remaining portions of section 6(d).2 My views on these subjects and the reasons for finding unconstitutional the Act’s definition 0f “viability” are set forth in my concurring and dissenting opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, Civil No. 2440, 401 F.Supp. 554 (E.D.Pa., September 4, 1975).3
. The majority has held that section 6(d) of the Act is unconstitutional in its entirety. I would hold section 6(d) invalid only to the extent that it requires information concerning “the name and address, if known, of the spouse of the woman,” and “a full statement of those facts which the person performing the abortion relied upon as establishing that the abortion was necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.” Since the spousal consent requirement of section 3 (b) (i) is unconstitutional, the provision requiring the name and address of the spouse serves no essential purpose and could “chill” the rights of a woman seeking an abortion. The provision requiring a statement of the facts establishing the necessity of the abortion from the standpoint of the “life or health of the mother” is defective because it relates directly to a determination of viability under section 6(b), which has been held unconstitutional both in Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, Civil No. 2440, 401 F.Supp. 554 (E.D.Pa. September 4, 1975), and by the Court here.
. I would uphold section 6(d) of the Act to the extent that it requires information concerning "the name, address and age of the woman upon whom the abortion was performed ; the date on which the abortion was performed; the date on which the determination of pregnancy as required by this section was made; . . . the approximate age, in months, of the fetus; ... the name and address, if known, of the parent or person in loco parentis if the woman is under eighteen years of age and unmarried.” I would also uphold section 6(d) to the extent that it requires “a copy of each of the documents showing consent to the abortion as required by section 3 of this act” (insofar as those consent requirements are valid), and to the extent that it provides that “[a] 11 information and documents required by this subsection shall be treated with confidentiality customarily accorded to medical records.”
. The recent order of the Supreme Court in Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 96 S. Ct. 170, 46 L.Ed.2d 152 (1975) (per curiam), is noted. There the Supreme Court reversed the holding of the state supreme court that the Connecticut abortion statute, similar to the Texas statute that was struck down in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), could not support the conviction of a non-physician for attempting to procure an abortion. Observing that Roe v. Wade recognized only a right to an abortion “performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions,” id. at 120, 93 S.Ct. at 710, the Supreme Court stated:
Roe teaches that a state cannot restrict a decision by a woman, with the advice of her physician, to terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester because neither its interest in maternal health nor its interest in the potential life of the fetus is sufficiently great at that stage.
Literal reading of the Supreme Court’s phraseology might lead to the conclusion that any restriction by the state of a woman’s right to an abortion during the first trimester — including the condition that a minor obtain, prior to abortion, the consent of a parent or one in looo parentis — is unconstitutional. However, I am not persuaded by such an interpretation. This is so because the Supreme Court in Menillo was addressing an issue far removed from that under consideration here. The question in Menillo was simply the constitutionality, under Roe, of state statutes that penalize the procurement or administration of an abortion by a non-physician.