dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe that the rationale of our recent decision in State v. Carlson, 555 P.2d 269 (Alaska 1976), requires us to extend its holding to the significantly different facts of this case.
In Carlson, the proposed disposition was the result of two-party negotiations between the defendant and the trial judge, after the prosecutor had refused to accept the defendant’s offer. The proposed disposition included a plea of guilty to a lesser offense included in the one which the prosecutor had charged.
We held that form of bargain impermissible for two reasons. First, the judge’s reduction of the charge without the consent of the prosecutor constituted an invasion of the prosecutorial function of charging defendants, and hence a violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. 555 P.2d at 271-72 and n.3. Second, we were concerned with possible unintended coercion ■ of the defendant when the judge who will try him if he does not plead guilty acts essentially as the surrogate of the prosecution in the bargaining process. Id. at 272.
The circumstances of the instant case are significantly different.1 No “plea bargaining” in the usual sense of that term took place, with either the judge or the prosecutor. The defendant did not go to the judge with an offer which the prosecutor had refused to accept. Instead, Judge Bucka-lew informed the defendant of the type of sentence he could expect if he decided to plead guilty to the charged offense, contingent upon the presentence report not revealing additional information adverse to the defendant.
This judicial participation in no way concerned the charging function. I view it as an exercise of the judicial function of disposing of cases.2 Hence separation of powers considerations do not support a decision *294that the trial judge’s conduct here was improper.
Nor do I believe that the other basis of the Carlson decision, the fear of unintended judicial coercion of the defendant, supports the state’s position in this case. Judge Buckalew did not give the defendant reason to believe he was the surrogate of the prosecution. He did not participate in give-and-take negotiating.
If anything, Judge Buckalew’s indication to the defendant of his tentative sentencing decision enabled the defendant and his counsel to make a better-informed decision on whether to plead guilty. One of the consequences of the rule adopted by the majority is “paradoxically, to deny the defendant important and relevant information which might be helpful in choosing a plea. Such a rule enforces the defendant’s . right to plead in the dark.” Comment, Official Inducements to Plead Guilty, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 167, 183 (1964).
The general sentencing proclivities of trial judges are often well known to criminal defense attorneys. No one suggests that attorneys do not or should not use this information in advising their clients whether to plead guilty. See People v. Earegood, 12 Mich.App. 256, 162 N.W.2d 802, 809 (1968). Here, Judge Buckalew gave the defendant and his counsel the benefit of his sentencing attitudes as applied to the circumstances of this defendant and this crime. In my view, this has more in common with attorneys’ generalized knowledge of judges’ sentencing standards than with the negotiated disposition which we held improper in the Carlson case. See D. Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial 48, 92-94 (1966); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining, 112 U.Pa.L.Rev. 865, 893 (1964).
I have serious doubts whether it is a wise response to the much-maligned practice of “plea bargaining” to required that it occur, if at all, away from ongoing judicial scrutiny. See generally Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in Pres. Comm. on Law Enforcement & the Adm. of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 108, 110-12, 117-18 (1967); Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 Yale L.J. 286 (1972). The defendant may feel as much, or more, coercion from the prosecutor during bargaining as from a judge. Note, supra, 82 Yale L.J. at 299, 305. See also Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 Harv.L. Rev. 1387, 1393 (1970).
I agree that trial judges should not engage in the type of conduct we held improper in Carlson, but disagree with the conclusion that the trial judge’s conduct in this case should be prohibited. Accordingly, I would deny the writ and other relief requested by the state.
. I concur in my colleagues’ comments concerning the practice of holding hearings off the record.
. The dictum in Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 534 P.2d 947, 950 (Alaska 1975), that the disposition of cases is an executive function refers, at most, to the discretion of the prosecutor to dismiss pending criminal cases. Read in light of the authorities cited to support it, it does not support an extension of the Carlson holding, which relied on Public Defender, to the instant case.
In Carlson itself we said,
“[A]lthough the court may judicially determine the disposition of a charge based on the *294evidence, the law and its sentencing power, it may not, in effect, usurp the executive function of choosing which charge to initiate based on defendant’s willingness to plead guilty to a lesser offense.” 555 P.2d at 271-72.