dissenting.
At the outset, it must be noted that the trial court made no findings of fact, despite the existence of affidavits and arguments which raise factual questions. Before the trial court exercises its discretion, I think it only reasonable to first determine what the facts are.
This court remarks that
It is clear that the fundamental assumption which formed the basis for the parties’ dissolution agreement was that Sherrie and Charles would continue to *873live together in their residence and that they eventually would remarry. Given the fact that the parties’ poorly thought out property division was reached without the benefit of counsel, and the fact that the marital residence was their principal asset [footnote omitted], we hold that the destruction of the underlying assumption made it inequitable that Sherrie not be given the relief she sought.
684 P.2d at 872. This paragraph is replete with factual matter, which this court apparently feels comfortable “finding” just as if it were a trial court.
The evidence is not so clear, however. Despite the material quoted from Sherrie’s affidavit, apparently she was not living with Charles when the amendment to the petition for dissolution was executed, and clearly was not living with him when the dissolution was granted. I fail to understand how Sherrie could “continue living together with our children as a family unit after the marriage ended,” since she was not so doing at the time of and for a couple of months prior to its dissolution. Not quoted from her affidavit is her response to a question from the Master at the dissolution hearing, in regard to the possibility of a reconciliation:
I was skeptical that his plan would work. I did not make any effort to conceal our intentions from the court and during the hearing on the petition when the Master asked me if I thought there might be a reconciliation I replied T can’t answer that question. I would have to say at this point no.’
This court remarks that Sherrie found the situation “unworkable.” When she moved out of the house for the last time, in November or December, 1981, the situation probably was unworkable, and understandably so, since she had been married to another man since June, 1981. At first blush I would think that might have had some effect on the possibility of a reconciliation. Apparently her last return to the former family residence was, to begin with, a matter of convenience until she could find a place of her own in Anchorage, although extreme ambivalence about who she wanted to live with might be a plausible inference.
This sketch of the evidence is not made to show what the facts are, but rather to show that we should be told what they are. Certainly it cannot be said by this court that any “fundamental assumption” failed. The evidence does not conclusively so demonstrate.
If we assume that an assumption did fail, I still do not view this case as within the ambit of Civil Rule 60(b)(6).1
In O’Link v. O’Link, 632 P.2d 225, 229 (Alaska 1981), we noted that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances. We quoted with approval the following from 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2864, at 213-214 (1973) (footnote omitted):
In general, relief is given under clause (6) in cases in which the judgment was obtained by the improper conduct of the party in whose favor it was rendered or the judgment resulted from the excusable default of the party against whom it was directed under circumstances going beyond the earlier clauses of the rule....
The broad power granted by clause (6) is not for the purpose of relieving a party from free, calculated, and deliberate choices he has made. A party remains under a duty to take legal steps to protect his own interests.
Applying this purpose to the apparent “facts” of the case at bar, no claim is made that Charles obtained the judgment through improper conduct. The judgment was not a default judgment, but rather in the nature of a consent judgment. Both parties signed the dissolution petition and amendment thereto. Charles signed a form Appearance and Waiver, and Sherrie appeared at the hearing before the Master. *874Whether a fundamental assumption failed or not, Sherrie does not claim she did not make a deliberate choice. Indeed, her affidavit would seem to make it clear that her choice was very deliberate.
Sherrie’s modification motion was filed 22 months after the decree of dissolution was entered, a year after she remarried, and six to eight months after she last lived in the former family residence. The motion seeks to modify a specific aspect of the property distribution and rights of the parties. The rule respecting the finality of judgments ought be enforced in cases such as this, where parties have so long conducted their affairs under terms of agreements voluntarily entered into. This is no exceptional case. It is bad law.
If the case must be decided on the record before us, I would conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Sherrie any relief. The correct resolution of the case, however, is to remand for a determination of the facts.
. Counsel for Sherrie does not either. He repeatedly asserts that his motion is pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b)(5), not any other subsection of Rule 60(b), including Rule 60(b)(6). I agree.