dissenting, with whom McCLINTOCK, Justice, joins.
I would have reversed because the proofs of the necessary mental elements and the complaining witness’ reliance were made with respect to different misrepresentations.
In this case, the State has proved no misrepresentation which resulted in whole or in part in the complaining witness’ decision to part with her money and which was made with defendant’s knowledge of its falsity.
The elements of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses, recently enunciated by this court in Driver v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 391, 393, are: “(1) the pretenses; (2) their falsity; (3) the fact of obtaining the property by reason of the pretenses; (4) the knowledge on the part of the accused of their falsity; and (5) the intent to defraud.”
The Intent Issues
I have no problem with the conclusion that the specific-intent requirements of the crime of false pretenses were met with respect to at least some of the false representations. Even if Fitzgerald did pay to have the towels shipped to the complaining witness, it is clear by his own testimony that he chose the name “Cannon Brothers” in the hopes of inducing readers of the advertisement to believe that they were getting “Cannon” towels. As was said by the Nevada Supreme Court earlier this year:
“. . . ‘[Fjalse pretense’ is a ‘representation of some fact or circumstance which is not true and is calculated to mislead . . . [and] may consist of any act, word, symbol or token calculated and intended to deceive. It may be made either expressly, or by implication. . ’ ” Buckner v. State, Nev., 590 P.2d 628, 630 (1979), citing Bright v. Sheriff, 90 Nev. 168, 170, 521 P.2d 371, 373 (1974). [Emphasis supplied]
It was not true that Cannon Brothers sold the towels. The misrepresentation was designed to mislead. Accordingly, the two “intent elements” of the Wyoming crime of obtaining property by false pretenses were met with respect to certain false pretenses: (1) the knowledge on the part of the accused of their falsity; and (2) the intent to defraud. Driver v. State, supra.
Reliance on the False Representations
The complaining witness limited her testimony to the following: (1) She sent a *579bank draft to Cannon Brothers along with an order for towels; (2) she got nothing in return; (3) she tracked down Fitzgerald and demanded satisfaction; (4) Fitzgerald denied responsibility; and (5) she went to the police.
The law is clear that the above testimony is sufficient to allow the inference that the complaining witness parted with her money in reliance upon the representation that she would receive the towels. Hymes v. United States, D.C.App., 260 A.2d 679 (1970); State of New Jersey v. Allen, 53 N.J. 250, 250 A.2d 12 (1969); State v. Crow, Mo., 487 S.W.2d 461 (1972); and Davidson v. Commonwealth, Ky.Ct.App., 436 S.W.2d 495 (1969).
The representation that she would get the towels turned out to be false. However, the judge found that there was at least reasonable doubt as to whether Fitzgerald knew that representation to be false or intended — at the time of obtaining the money — to defraud the complaining witness by not giving her the towels.
Because of my ultimate resolution of this case, I need not consider whether a false representation as to future conduct is a sufficient false representation to justify conviction for the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses. This question was reserved in Driver v. State, supra, 589 P.2d at 394.
In this record, there is not one iota of evidence in support of the State’s case (or in the rebuttal of the defense) indicating that the complaining witness relied on any other false representation made by Fitzgerald. Whether or not the complaining witness thought she was ordering Cannon towels is not known. Whether or not the complaining witness was induced to mail in her money by Fitzgerald’s claim (in the advertisement) that he had sold millions of towels is not known. Whether or not the non-existent Chicago address used by Fitzgerald induced the complaining witness to part with her money is not known.
There is, therefore, insufficient evidence that Fitzgerald obtained money because someone relied on a false representation made by him and known by him to be false. Were it established that the complaining witness had sent Fitzgerald money upon the representations that she would get towels and that the towels would be Cannon towels, Fitzgerald’s good faith as to one of the two representations would not establish his innocence. Driver, supra. But, by the same logic and authority, the State had the burden of proving that the money was obtained, at least in part, because of reliance on a false representation made with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to defraud.
Additional authority for this obvious point is found at page 660 of LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law (1972), which contains citations to cases. More recent cases on this point are: State v. Boratto, 154 N.J.Super. 386, 381 A.2d 794 (1977), cert. granted by New Jersey Supreme Court, 77 N.J. 475, 391 A.2d 490 (1978); Kinder v. State, Tex. Crim.App., 477 S.W.2d 584, 586 (1971), reh. den.; and People v. Ferrell, Colo., 591 P.2d 1038, 1039 (1979).
The Rationale for Affirmance
The logic of the trial judge and the majority disturbs me. In pronouncing Fitzgerald guilty, the trial judge said:
“I come to the conclusion that there was an obtaining of a thing of value . by false pretenses, which was knowing and designed. In this somewhat odd sense, I am not convinced beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Fitzgerald, you intended to take the entire amount here received and keep it entirely to yourself; I am not convinced beyond reasonable doubt that you did not mean to obtain some delivery of some goods. I am convinced, however, that ... at the time of the inception of the scheme . you . . . designed to mislead and to state something that was not true. .
“This . . . seems to me to constitute what is required here by law, even if you meant to obtain some delivery. . . ”
*580For purposes of trying to understand the majority and the trial judge, I will assume, arguendo that somehow the intent to defraud permeated every misrepresentation made by the defendant. Still, the trial judge expressly found that the representation that the victim would get her towels was not proven to have been made with knowledge by the accused of its falsity.
It appears to me that the majority is adopting by implication one of two mistakes: Either (1) an express exculpatory finding, supra, can be negated by inferences, or (2) the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses has been committed where the complaining witness parts with property in reliance upon a misrepresentation made without knowledge by the accused of its falsity so long as the accused made other misrepresentations with intent to defraud, even if these other misrepresentations were not relied on by the complaining witness in parting with her property.
It may well be that we could, in logic and law, affirm this conviction had the prosecutor asked the complaining witness only one more question which would have established her rebaneé on a misrepresentation which satisfied both intent elements of the crime. But we may not, in my judgment, supply missing elements of a crime by speculation. Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 22, 97 S.Ct. 29, 30, 50 L.Ed.2d 25 (1976). To infer such reliance from this record is to engage in mere speculation.
I would have reversed.