After having suffered annual losses of approximately $650,000.00 for several years prior to December 1964, the Union Pacific Railroad at that time sold the Sun Valley Resort to Janss Corporation, appellant herein, for the sum of $1,863,843.00.- The property included 4000 acres of land ■ in Blaine County, Idaho, and the hotel and *929other buildings which were located on the land. In 1965 the property was examined for the purpose of tax assessment, and was valued at $4,000,000.00. After appellant objected to that figure, the tax assessor for Blaine County, a representative of the appellant, and a member of the State Tax Commission examined the property in detail and allowed for such functional obsolescence as was pointed out by the appellant’s representative. The previous figure was then adjusted, and the property was assessed for the 1966 tax year at the cash value of $3,089,000.00.
Appellant protested the assessed valuation of the property before the Blaine County Board of Equalization, contending that the purchase was made in an arm’s length transaction, and that the value of the property for tax purposes should be the price at which it was purchased. From denial of their claim, appellant appealed to the State Tax Commission. During the latter proceeding, testimony was given indicating that since the purchase of the property in question, the property in the area has greatly increased in value. The State Tax Commission affirmed the Board of Equalization’s denial of appellant’s claim for reduction in assessed valuation of the property, and from that decision appellant appealed to the district court. By stipulation of the parties, the case was heard in the district court on the record established in the Tax Commission hearing and upon briefs filed by the parties. From the order of the district court affirming the ruling of the State Tax Commission, appellant has effected this appeal.
One major issue is presented by this appeal: How is the full cash value of the property ascertained for the purpose of tax assessment? Appellant argues that one arm’s length transaction in which the property is exchanged for cash establishes the “market value” of that property, and that “market value” is the equivalent of “full cash value” of property for the purposes of tax assessment. Based upon that contention, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in not ruling that the price appellant paid for the property in question was the full cash value of the land at which the property should have been assessed.
The ascertainment of property value for the purpose of assessment of taxes is controlled primarily by statute. The statutory law in 1966 provided:
“[I.C.] 63-111. Value defined. — By the term ‘value,’ ‘cash value,’ ‘full cash value,’ ‘true value’ or ‘true cash value’ is meant the value at which the property would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor, or the amount the property would sell for at a voluntary sale made in the ordinary course of business, taking into consideration its earning power when put to the same uses to which property similarly situated is applied.” (Amended 1965)
“[I.C.] 63-202. RULES AND REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO FULL CASH VALUE — DUTY OF ASSESSORS. — It shall be the duty of the State Tax Commission to prepare and distribute to each County Assessor and each Board of County Commissioners within the state of Idaho, rules and regulations prescribing and directing the manner in which full cash value is to be determined. Such rules and regulations shall include the following criteria for determining value to the extent that the same are applicable to the property being evaluated: (1) earning capacity; (2) relative location; (3) desirability and functional use; (4) reproduction cost less depreciation; (5) comparison with other like properties of known or recognized value; and (6) market value in the ordinary course of trade. The State Tax Commission shall also prepare and distribute from time to time such amendments and changes to said rules and regulations as shall be necessary in order to carry out the intent and purposes of this act. Said rules and regulations shall be in such form as the Commission shall direct, and shall *930be made available upon request to other public officers and the general public in reasonable quantities without charge. In ascertaining the full cash value of any item of property subject to taxation, the assessor of each county shall be, and hereby is required to abide by, adhere to and conform with the rules and regulations hereinabove required to be promulgated by the State Tax Commission.” (Amended 1965)
Prior to 1965, I.C. § 63-202 did not include the six factors set out therein for consideration in determining the full cash value of the property. By amending the statute and including the factors, the legislature must have intended that such factors be considered by the tax assessor, and the statute clearly orders him to do so "to the extent that the same are applicable to the property being evaluated.” A primary rule of statutory construction is that all sections of the applicable statutes should be considered and construed together to determine the intention of the legislature. Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948); Jackson v. Jackson, 87 Idaho 330, 393 P.2d 28 (1964) ; Lebrecht v. Union Indemnity Co., 53 Idaho 228, 22 P.2d 1066 (1933). Construing the two quoted statutes together, when the assessment of the property in question was made in 1966, the tax assessor was bound by statute to determine the full cash value of the property by considering each of the applicable factors set out in the statutes, and could not arrive at the full cash value by merely taking the sale price decided upon by Janss and Union Pacific Railroad in the single transaction that occurred between them.
Appellant argues, however, that the factors listed in the statutes for consideration in ascertaining “full cash value” are all substitutes for finding the “market value,” and may not be used when the property to be assessed has been sold recently in an arm’s length transaction. The statutes, however, do not support such an interpretation, and neither do the cases cited as authority by the appellant for such proposition.
As the Court held in Abbot v. State Tax Commission, 88 Idaho 200, 398 P.2d 221 (1965):
“In determining the value of property for taxation purposes the assessor may and should consider cost, location, actual cash sale value and all other factors, known or available to his knowledge, which affect the value of the property assessed, to the end that the property of each taxpayer will bear its just proportion of the burden of taxation. Anderson’s Red & White Store v. Kootenai County, 70 Idaho 260, 215 P.2d 815.”, (88 Idaho at page 208, 398 P.2d at page 225)
and this was decided prior to the 1965 amendment to the statutes.
The court in Abbot did also state that "This court has consistently held that the only criterion for determining value of property for ad valorem tax purposes is the full cash or market value. Boise Community Hotel v. Board of Equalization, 87 Idaho 152, 391 P.2d 840; C. C. Anderson Stores Co. v. State Tax Comm., 86 Idaho 249, 384 P.2d 677.”
Also in C. C. Anderson Stores Co. v. State Tax Comm., 91 Idaho 413, 422 P.2d 337 (1967) this court pointed out that property which is bought and sold for cash on the current market has a market value, which, as to such property, becomes the dominant factor in its valuation. However, as set out in that opinion, because the property involved was unique — the only one of its kind in Idaho at that time — it had no market value and the valuation had to be based upon other considerations. Likewise, “market value” can not be established by a single arm’s length transaction in which a unique property — such as Sun Valley — is sold for cash.
The principles governing the ascertainment of value for the purposes of taxation are the same as those that control in condemnation cases, confiscation cases, and generally in controversies involving the as*931certainment of “just compensation.” Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 56 S.Ct. 426, 80 L.Ed. 532 (1936); 51 Am.Jur. 653, § 701 Taxation. In such cases the “market value” becomes an important standard of measurement in the valuation of property only after there have been numerous sales or exchanges of similar property. Only then may the inference arise that the equivalent arrived at by the haggling of the market is probably the price at which the property would be offered and accepted. But when the property is of a kind seldom exchanged, it has no “market value,” and then recourse must be had to other means of ascertaining value. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 1434, 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1949); United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 70 S.Ct. 217, 94 L.Ed. 195 (1949); Sibley v. Town of Middlefield, 143 Conn. 100, 120 A.2d 77 (1956). As we stated recently in the case of Gillingham v. Stadler, 93 Idaho 874, 477 P.2d 497 (1970):
“In any single individual transaction there are many variables which are dependent upon the peculiar aspects of the transfer and which affect the price agreed upon by the parties. Market value, therefore, is generally established by numerous sales of the same or comparable property and, although the price paid for property may be admissible to prove its market value, that fact alone is not conclusive.”
Although a single arm’s length transaction does not establish market value, and the price indicated thereby is not controlling as to the value of the property, such price may be considered as one factor in arriving at the full cash value of the property in question. As explained by Justice Clark in the U. S. Supieme Court case of United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nav. Co., supra:
“At times, however, peculiar circumstances may make it impossible to determine a 'market value.’ There may have been, for example, so few sales of similar property that we cannot predict with any assurance that the prices paid would have been repeated in the sale we postulate of the property taken. We then say that there is 'no market’ for the property in question. But that does not put out of hand the bearing which the scattered sales may have on what an ordinary purchaser would have paid for the claimant’s property. We simply must be wary that we give these sparse sales less weight than we accord cmarkef price, and take into consideration ti ose special circumstances in other sales which would not have affected our hypothetical buyer. And it is here that other means of measuring value may have relevance— but only, of course, as bearing on what a prospective purchaser would have paid.” (emphasis supplied) (338 U.S. at page 402, 70 S.Ct. at page 221)
The record indicates that the tax assessor, in determining the full cash value of the appellant’s property, considered the proper factors and criteria pursuant to the rules and regulations of the State Tax Commission and the controlling statutes. Since the appellant has not shown that the value arrived at from such assessment is prejudically discriminative as to his property, or that the assessment was otherwise unlawful or erroneous, the presumption that the value affixed by the assessor is correct prevails. Abbot v. State Tax Commission, supra; C. C. Anderson Stores Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra.
We have reviewed appellant’s other assignments of error and find no reversible error therein.
The order of the district court is affirmed. Costs to respondent.
DONALDSON and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.