(dissenting) — I am in accord with the holding that the contents of the “Safety and Health Regulations for Longshoring,” which appear in the Federal Register, are to be judicially noticed, and that violation of those regulations is evidence of unseaworthiness, but is not conclusive on the *569issue. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the instructions given prejudicially failed to effectuate these points.
Instruction Nos. 9 and 11 adequately advised the jury of the same substantive elements as' are contained in the instructions proposed by plaintiff. Those instructions informed the jury of the correct standard of seaworthiness, including ladders, and of the legal effect of an improperly secured ladder. All that is absent from the instructions given, as compared with the requested instructions, is the advice to the jury that federal safety and health regulations set forth these requirements. The majority, in effect, requires a trial court to include this information in instructions. I disagree.
A comparison of the contents of the federal regulations with the elements contained in the instructions given shows virtual identity of substance. The regulation (29 C.F.R. § 1504.25 (1965)) states: “[T]here shall be at least one safe and accessible ladder . . .(c). . . suitably secured against shifting or slipping . . .” Compare this language with that of instruction Nos. 9 and 11. “If you find . . . a ladder . . . was not properly secured and for that reason gave way . . .” (Instruction No. 9.) “. . . [The] duty to maintain the barge ... in a seaworthy condition extends to ladders ... A ladder ... is unseaworthy if it is unsecured aboard the vessel in such a way as not to be reasonably suitable and fit to be used for the purpose or use for which provided or intended.” (Instruction No. 11.)
The better practice is to place the regulations in evidence and thus before the jury in the same manner as other evidence. However, assuming that it is proper to use the judicial notice with instruction procedure, in view of the fact that instruction Nos. 9 and 11 embodied essentially the same elements, I see no basis for treating the failure to give the requested instructions as reversible error. The usual instruction tells the jury what the law is, without adding that the law stated is derived from particular cases in the federal or state reports or from particular sections of *570statutes, rules or regulations. See State v. Sage, 22 Idaho 489, 126 P. 403 (1912). We pointed out in another context, “The law does not require a trial judge to give reasons for a rule. It is enough if he charges the law.” Cloherty v. Griffiths, 82 Wash. 634, 637, 144 P. 912 (1914). The only exceptions of consequence are cases where violation of a statute or ordinance renders a party negligent as a matter of law. E.g., see WPI 60.01, 70.02 (1967). The fact that such a statute has its own, independent significance and is more than evidence permits the distinction. Absent such independent effect, statute or other source references are not suggested. E.g., see WPI 72.01, 72.02 (1967). In this case, as the majority observes, violation of the federal safety regulations does not have such legal effect, but is merely evidence.
Even if I were to concede that citations to sources in jury instructions do no harm, it does not follow that failure to include such source information is reversible error. Reference to statutes or other sources, the violation of which does not have independent legal significance, adds nothing to the substance of the law stated. In such circumstances, I fail to see any error in refusing to include source references in the instructions.
Moreover, I am reluctant to accept as harmless the additions of source references where the statute, rule or regulation has no dispositive effect, as in this case. There is danger inherent in the very nature of such additions. When the source of the law is not significant per se, the only effect of citation is rhetorical. In formal logic the device is known as argumentum ad verecundiam, playing upon the prestige of the source. See Tammelo, Outlines of Modern Legal Logic 116 (1969). At best, its use in instructions needlessly injects a misleading element into the legal search for truth. At worst, the balance of images created by such additions may be unduly prejudicial to one of the parties. Further, there is the potential danger that the refusal of a trial court to cite some sources while naming others may amount to a comment on the evidence.
*571I would vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.
Sharp, J., concurs with Neill, J.