dissenting.
The Court’s ruling today goes too far in subordinating the constitutional rights of employees to the convenience of employers. The “agreement” between Seawright and AGF — which was not signed, con*980tained a unilateral working-as-acceptance provision, and constituted a total waiver of the right to access a court — goes past the acceptable limit of what employers can force upon their employees without the employees’ consent.
First and foremost, Seawright’s signature appears nowhere on any arbitration agreement. Thus we have no proof that she manifested assent to the contract. Although Tennessee law does permit unilateral contracts, no Tennessee court has decided whether continuing employment is effective as a waiver of constitutional rights. A unilateral contract is one where an offeror “reasonably expects to induce action of a definite and substantial character” from the offeree. See Curtiss Candy Co. v. Silberman, 45 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir.1930). Implicit in this understanding is that the offeree is aware of the significance of the act performed. Without a signal that she understands that a contract is being made, how is one to know if she has truly accepted? 1
The majority cites Seawright’s failure to express her lack of assent as evidence that she assented (distinguishing her from the plaintiff in Lee, who told her boss she did not agree to the program). See Lee v. Red Lobster Inns of Am., Inc., 92 Fed.Appx. 158, 162 (6th Cir.2004). As we held in that case, however, it is too onerous to require employees to object to new agreements imposed upon them: “a contract such as this places the burden on the employee to repeatedly object to a company’s unilaterally adopted arbitration policy or risk being found to have agreed to it. This is not how contracts are formed.” Id. “The mere receipt of an unsolicited offer does not impair the offeree’s freedom of action or inaction or impose on him any duty to speak.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69, cmt. a (1981)). After today, however, an employee apparently must expressly reject the agreement in order not to be bound by it.
The majority also cites Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 F.Supp.2d 891, 895 (M.D.Tenn.2003) and Byrd v. CIGNA Healthcare, 2002 WL 32059026, at *2-3, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26902, at *7 (E.D.Tenn.2002) for the proposition that continuing employment binds an employee to arbitrate employment-related claims. Fisher, however, is inapposite because the arbitration agreement at issue there was non-binding. Indeed, even in that case, the precedent cited by the court involved employment agreements that were signed and then acted under. Byrd too, is different from Seawright’s case. Byrd signed a receipt for an employee handbook that contained the policy that stated, “I have reviewed the material which includes information on policies, programs and services for employees of the CIGNA companies.” Id. at *3 (emphasis added). Here, Sea-wright’s only signature was on an “Information Session Sign-In Sheet,” in which “I acknowledge that I have attended the information session and received a copy of the AGF Employee Dispute Resolution pamphlet.” Joint App’x 319 (emphasis added). The script for the information session says that the sign-in sheet “confirms that you attended the information session,” not that the employees read or understood the policy’s binding nature. Id. at 315. Without a signature on a document that proves Seawright was at least aware of the nature of the agreement, it is *981impossible to say she knowingly waived her rights.
In Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir.2005), we reiterated that employees cannot not be compelled to arbitrate their claims if they did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their constitutional right to a jury trial. See also Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668 (6th Cir.2003) (en bane) (adopting the knowing and voluntary standard for agreements to arbitrate in lieu of litigation). According to Morrison, to evaluate whether a plaintiff has knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her right to pursue employment claims in federal court, a court must evaluate a number of factors, including the employee’s experience, background, education, and amount of time she had to consider the agreement. Id. (quoting Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.1995)). The majority is correct that Seawright is an educated, capable employee with the capacity to understand contract terms. The Morrison factors assume, however, that an employee is aware that she is entering into a new agreement.
Because Seawright never performed any action that signaled that she knowingly and voluntarily entered into the agreement (and waived her rights), it is unreasonable to hold her to the agreement’s terms. Thus I respectfully DISSENT from the majority’s opinion.
. Homer Simpson talking to God: “Here's the deal: you freeze everything as it is, and I won't ask for anything more. If that is OK, please give me absolutely no sign, [no response] OK, deal. In gratitude, I present you this offering of cookies and milk. If you want me to eat them for you, please give me no sign, [no response] Thy will be done.” The Simpsons: And Maggie Makes Three (Fox television broadcast, Jan. 22, 1995).