Defendant was charged with the crime of harassment by a complaint that alleged he subjected the victim "to offensive physical contact, to-wit: by causing spital to land on the person of said [victim].” The parties treat "causing spital to land” as a convoluted way of saying defendant spit on the victim. Defendant demurred on the ground that spitting on another is not, as a matter of law, offensive physical contact and thus not prohibited by the harassment statute. The trial court granted the demurrer. The state appeals. We reverse.
ORS 166.065(l)(a) provides: "A person commits the crime of harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he * * * [s]ubjects another to offensive physical contact.” We held in State v. Sallinger, 11 Or App 592, 598, 504 P2d 1383 (1972): "* * * by 'offensive physical contact’ the legislature meant striking, slapping, shoving, kicking, grabbing, and similar acts that are an interference with the 'contactee’ * * To here make explicit what was at least implicit in Sallinger, we hold: (1) our statement of illustrations — striking, slapping, etc. — was not intended to be a comprehensive enumeration of the acts prohibited by the statute; (2) rather, our illustrations were designed to point out that ORS 166.065(l)(a) was intended to prohibit all forms of contact that are comparable with, the equivalent of or substantially similar to, striking, slapping, etc. in respect to interference with the integrity of the victim; (3) striking, slapping, etc. and comparable acts are not, as a matter of law, "offensive physical contact” within the meaning of ORS 166.065(l)(a) — instead, it remains a question for the factfinder in each individual case whether under the specific circumstances pleaded and proved the defendant subjected another to offensive physical contact; and (4) in making that assessment the factfinder must apply an objective standard — what would a reasonable person regard as offensive contact in the *146circumstances, not what was the victim’s subjective reaction.
Applying that understanding here, we conclude that spitting on another can be an interference with the physical integrity of the victim that is comparable to striking, slapping, etc. It follows that the trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that spitting on another cannot be offensive physical contact within the meaning of ORS 166.065(l)(a).
Defendant presents two arguments for a contrary conclusion. He first invokes Judge Foley’s specially concurring opinion in Sallinger which contended that the majority interpretation of ORS 166.065(l)(a) left as noncriminal "fondling of a female’s breasts” or spitting "into a stranger’s face.” 11 Or App at 599-600. Specially concurring and dissenting opinions often contain hyperbole and thus can be of doubtful, or even dangerous, utility in interpreting a majority opinion. For example, Judge Foley’s suggestion that the Sallin-ger majority legalized nonconsensual breast fondling overlooked the separate crime of sexual abuse, ORS 163.415 — 163.425. That separate crime can be and had been committed in several cases involving noncon-sensual touching of a woman’s breasts. See, State v. Turner, 33 Or App 157, 575 P2d 1007, rev den 282 Or 537 (1978); State v. Pagel, 16 Or App 412, 518 P2d 1037, rev den, cert den 419 US 867 (1974).
Likewise, Judge Foley’s individual belief that the Sallinger majority ruled that spitting on another cannot be "offensive physical contact” within the meaning of ORS 166.065(l)(a) simply is not precedent for that conclusion. On the contrary, we think the opposite conclusion is fully consistent with the Sallinger majority opinion, as elaborated above.
Defendant’s second contention is stated as follows:
"Although spitting is undoubtedly offensive physical conduct, it is currently not punishable as offensive 'physical contact’ under the statutory scheme.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*147If we understand this correctly, defendant would limit the meaning of "contact” in ORS 166.065(l)(a) to situations in which the flesh of the defendant literally touched the flesh of the victim. Defendant would thus exclude from the range of prohibited "contact” such acts as hitting another with a thrown missile, poking another with a stick or — carried to a logical extreme— striking the clothing rather than the flesh of the victim. We reject the suggested limitation of the meaning of "contact” as untenable.
The difficulty in interpreting and applying the harassment statute is further documented by the specially concurring opinion filed today by Judge Buttler. He would interpret the expression "offensive contact” to mean "nonconsensual contact.” But by prohibiting only "offensive contact,” the legislature necessarily implied that there is such a thing as "inoffensive contact” which is not prohibited. As just one possible example, the legislature may have thought that the act of one person, with the requisite intent, bumping into another in a crowd was simply too inconsequential to warrant any possibility of a criminal sanction. But whatever the intended dividing line between offensive and inoffensive contact, we are not aware of any definitions that would make it synonymous with the dividing line between consensual and nonconsensual contact. As we said years ago in Sallinger, 11 Or App at 598, we continue to find the history of ORS 166.065(l)(a) too inconclusive to hold that the legislature said "offensive contact” when it really meant "nonconsensual contact.”
In conclusion, the trial court’s determination that spitting on another cannot, as a matter of law, be offensive physical contact within the meaning of ORS 166.065(l)(a) was an erroneous interpretation of the statute.
Reversed and remanded for trial.