in which SONNER and SHARER, JJ., join
I concur in the result. I write separately in response to the sufficiency of the evidence issues discussed by the dissenting *428opinions in regard to competing inferences in a case involving only circumstantial evidence.
Here, the State’s case rests on circumstantial evidence that appellant “knowingly” transported a handgun while traveling on the public roads and highways of the State of Maryland. As indicated in the various dissents, a greater nexus between the weapon and the alleged transporter may or may not negate or undermine any inference of the transporter’s knowledge of the weapon and, thus, the alleged transporter’s guilt. Although we are not directly concerned with whether appellant “possessed” the weapon, individually or jointly, evidence of possession might obviously aid an inquiry as to appellant’s knowledge of the weapon. In fact, the trial court in this case concluded appellant was in joint possession of the weapon.
Notwithstanding the extended discussion regarding the concepts of “equal access” and “greater nexus,” the plurality opinion and the dissents recognize that the ultimate question is whether the evidence was legally sufficient to convict appellant. Concepts of “equal access” and “greater nexus” are no more than analytical aids to be used in evaluating the evidence presented.
As in all criminal cases, it was the State’s burden to prove appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden can be met by the use of direct or circumstantial evidence, but the evidence produced must be sufficient to fairly convince a rational fact finder, beyond a reasonable doubt, of a defendant’s guilt. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction in a particular case is a question of law for the court that does not involve weighing or choosing between competing inferences reasonably generated by the evidence. See Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 234, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993). In making that determination, the court is only concerned with whether a claimed inference is reasonably generated by the evidence. Such an analysis does not require the court to select the more persuasive of the inferences, but only to determine that the suggested inference is in accordance with reason.
*429This exercise, reserved to the court, is different than any implied weighing of inferences of fact by the fact finder in Jordan v. State, 219 Md. 36, 148 A.2d 292 (1959), where the competing inferences supported a finding of guilt of both a greater and a lesser offense. Confronted with that situation the Court of Appeals held that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of the doubt and could only be convicted of the lesser offense. In this case, we are faced with an inference of innocence and an inference of guilt. The whole of the evidence admitted by the trial court that was directly related to the transportation charge and resulting in appellant’s conviction was produced through the testimony of one officer. The following “facts” were established:
(1) A loaded handgun was found in the trunk of a vehicle rented by appellant “a week or so” earlier and driven by appellant at the time of the incident.
(2) In addition to appellant, two male passengers occupied the vehicle.
(3) One of the two male passengers in the vehicle was in the backseat, from which there was direct access to the trunk.
(4) The handgun was not in plain view, but was covered by a jacket, the ownership of which was claimed by one of the two passengers in the vehicle; the jacket was returned to the passenger.
(5) Everyone in the vehicle disclaimed ownership or knowledge of the weapon.
(6) No effort was made to gather fingerprints from the weapon or the ammunition because the officer had handled the gun.
There was no conflicting testimony and no need to resolve issues of credibility. For our purposes, the “facts” testified to by the officer are the facts. The question is what inferences related to the transportation charge are reasonably generated by those facts. Therefore, there is little value to engaging in speculation about the pockets in the jacket, how access to the trunk might have been gained, who knew what regarding that access, how well the occupants knew one another, or even how *430long they had been in the car together. The record is silent on these matters. In the same way, little is to be gained by speculation on what other evidence might have been produced by the State. In the resolution of this case, we can consider only the facts that are presented.
“Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts that point to a particular conclusion, a conclusion based on reason, experience, collective wisdom and common sense.” J.F. Murphy, Jr. Maryland Evidence Handbook, § 408 at 135-136 (3rd ed.1999). The general principle regarding a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence is set forth in Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 536-537, 573 A.2d 831 (1990):
A conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence alone. To ensure that the trier of fact bases a finding of guilt on the appropriate degree of certainty, we have long held that a conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone is not to be sustained unless the circumstances, taken together, are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. [Citations omitted; emphasis in original.]
The long running discussion in this Court and in the Court of Appeals concerning “single strands” of circumstantial evidence or circumstantial evidence “alone,” and its inconsistency ■with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence has related to whether a case is to be sent to a jury and if a jury instruction reflecting the Wilson principle should be provided.
Then Chief Judge Wilner, now of the Court of Appeals, said for this Court in Hebron v. State, 92 Md.App. 508, 516-17, 608 A.2d 1291 (1992), aff'd, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993), in regard to circumstantial evidence and the effect of Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), in Maryland:
Assuming arguendo that a case based solely on a single strand of circumstantial evidence is properly presentable to the jury in the first instance, which we think is not allowed, an instruction on reasonable doubt is all that is needed. If the jury finds from the evidence a reasonable hypothesis of *431innocence, it will necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to guilt and will be obliged to acquit....
Equally cogent in our view is the fact that, under the language used in Wilson and earlier cases, the issue raised by a case resting entirely on a single strand of circumstantial evidence is not one of reasonable doubt, which is for the jury to determine, but of evidentiary sufficiency, which is for the judge to determine. Wilson, it will be recalled, confirmed that a conviction based solely on a single strand of circumstantial evidence “is not to be sustained” unless the circumstances, taken together, are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
This is, and always has been, a rule relating to evidentiary sufficiency. If the State’s case is based solely on a single strand of circumstantial evidence and that evidence does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, neither the judge nor a jury can lawfully return a verdict of guilty. [Bold emphasis added; italics in original.]
In affirming this Court’s opinion in Hebron, 331 Md. at 234-35, 627 A.2d 1029, Judge Bell, now Chief Judge, said for the Court of Appeals:
The cases referring to circumstantial evidence not excluding every reasonable hypothesis of a defendant’s innocence are cases in which there is circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt and other evidence, either circumstantial or direct, tending to negate that evidence and no basis upon which a rational finder of fact could return a verdict of guilty without speculating as to which of the two versions is the correct version. A jury faced with that state of the evidence could not logically, nor lawfully, return a guilty verdict; hence, as the Court of Special Appeals pointed out, given that scenario, “there is nothing for the jury to decide, and, upon proper motion, the judge is duty-bound, as a matter of law, to enter a judgment of acquittal.” Hebron, 92 Md.App. at 517, 608 A.2d at 1296.
*432Whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, consists of multiple strands or just a single strand, it must initially be considered by the judge for its sufficiency to sustain a conviction. [Emphasis supplied.]
This is consistent with Judge Moylan’s statement in Eiland v. State, 92 Md.App. 56, 69, 607 A.2d 42 (1992), rev’d on other grounds, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993):
The small kernel of residual vitality is to be found not in cases where circumstantial evidence of guilt combines with direct evidence of guilt nor even in exclusively circumstantial cases where multiple strands of circumstance point in the same direction, reinforcing and corroborating each other. It is to be found, rather, in those cases where the State’s proof of guilt depends exclusively upon a 'single strand of circumstantial evidence. As part of the very nature of such proof, the circumstance must serve as the predicate for an inference of guilt. The treacherous 'language (because it is so frequently abused) simply states the truism that a fact finder could not fairly be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt if the circumstantial predicate could also give rise to reasonable inferences of innocence. It is self-evident that a finding of guilt based upon a process of elimination must effectively eliminate the other reasonable possibilities. See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 244 Md. 488, 224 A.2d 111 (1966). [Bold emphasis added; italics in original.]
See also Davis v. State, 100 Md.App. 369, 641 A.2d 941 (1994) (“The circumstantial evidence recovered from [appellant’s] home and the testimony provided concerning it, therefore, did not eliminate the reasonable possibility that appellant kept the marijuana and paraphernalia strictly for personal use. Likewise, physical evidence presented at trial in no way precluded a conclusion that if kept for use by others, the drugs and paraphernalia were to be used there on only one occasion.”).
To be sure, concerns about the policy implications and the practical consequences of that “small kernel’ of residual vitality” left in Wilson, as limited ás it is, are valid, especially in *433cases involving drags and guns. This case fairly presents the issue and raises important questions: Can we adequately protect the innocent person without aiding the savvy criminal? Are we to presume guilt, as this statute set out to do, or are we going to continue to require that guilt be proven by the State? Is a driver/owner or lessee of a vehicle obligated to know what his passengers are carrying? Obviously, as a society we want to retain the ability to convict the knowing transporter of contraband, and yet, at the same time, we recognize a need to protect innocent drivers and passengers from guilt by association or as a result of their mere presence at the scene of a crime. .
One of the dissenting opinions suggests that, “based primarily upon Jackson and Hebron, ... the Wilson principle has no practical vitality.” (Eyler, James R., J., dissent, op. at 443). Whatever quarrel there may be with the Wilson principle it appears to be alive and well even though its appearances are thankfully infrequent. As pointed out by Judge Eyler, Wilson was recently cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in Moye v. State, 369 Md. at 14, 796 A.2d 821 (2002).
In publishing Wilson’s premature obituary, I believe too much is read into the quote from State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 379 S.E.2d 888, 889 (1989), which was included by Chief Judge Bell in Hebron and cited in Judge Eyler’s dissent. The Edwards quote affirms the principle that, in considering the sufficiency of the evidence, the judge is not concerned with the weight of the evidence. Saying that it is the judge’s duty to submit the case to a jury if “there be any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced,” (emphasis supplied), is not inconsistent with the previous holdings of this Court and the Court of Appeals that, in cases involving only circumstantial evidence, a fact finder could not fairly be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt if that evidence also generates a reasonable inference of innocence. Similarly, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), speaks of the “rational” trier of fact, id., 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, and that the evidence must “fairly” *434support a conclusion that the elements of the crime have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., 443 U.S. at 313-314, 99 S.Ct. 2781. The essence of Hebron and Eiland is that, in a case dependent upon circumstantial evidence and the inferences generated by that evidence, a fair fact finder, confronted with a reasonable inference of innocence, cannot be fairly convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Choosing between two reasonable inferences ultimately involves some speculation.
An inference is a “conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 781 (7th ed.1999). Neither the plurality opinion nor the dissents appears to take issue with the proposition that the presence of a weapon in a vehicle could support a rational inference that the driver/owner or lessee is “knowingly” transporting a weapon. In other words, a fact finder may, but need not, infer that the transportation of the weapon is done knowingly. See MPJI-CP 4:35.3, comment at 438.
Here, however, there are other circumstances. The vehicle had three occupants, at least two of whom, if not all three, might have had access to the trunk, including, in the case of one passenger, direct access to the trunk from the backseat. The weapon was not in plain sight, but was covered by a jacket, ownership of which was claimed by one of the passengers. Thus, the circumstantial predicate permits a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. That the weapon was placed in the trunk by a passenger and covered with a coat without the driver’s knowledge is a reasonable possibility that cannot be eliminated without some speculation. In that situation, a rational fact finder could not be fairly convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of appellant’s guilt.
Judge SONNER and Judge SHARER authorize me to state that they join in this concurring opinion.
JAMES R. EYLER, Judge, in which MURPHY, C.J., DEBORAH S. EYLER, KRAUSER, and GREENE, JJ., join
As the majority thoroughly reviewed cases with facts sufficiently similar to the one before us to be relevant to its *435disposition, there is no need for me to engage in further review of those cases. Factual situations of the type presented are not subject to the formulation of bright line rules. Each case must be determined by its facts, and the question of sufficiency of the evidence must be decided by application of the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). I believe the evidence in the case sub judice satisfied the Jackson standard, thereby creating an issue that was properly decided by the fact-finder. As a result, I dissent.
Appellate courts do not engage in fact-finding and operate, as they must, under a standard of review. Frequently, the standard of review for a particular issue is expressly set forth in an opinion. .Often, however, it is set forth in boilerplate fashion as a lead in to the real subject of the discussion-the merits. I agree with the majority on the standard but disagree on its application to the facts. I believe it is instructive to take a close look at the standard because an in-depth look aids courts in applying the standard in a given case. Additionally, there is language in other cases which, from time to time, creates confusion.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946, the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, and the Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1949, there was no appellate review of facts by federal or Maryland courts in civil cases at law or in criminal cases. See Edwards v. State, 198 Md. 132, 154-55, 83 A.2d 578 (1951). When they were adopted, the Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure authorized appellate review of the evidence after a non-jury criminal conviction. The standard was clearly erroneous, essentially the same as the standard in present Maryland Rule 8-131(c). This standard was applied in Edtoards, supra.
The Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure further provided that, in a jury trial of a criminal charge, a defendant could request an instruction to the jury that the evidence was legally insufficient, but such an instruction was merely advisory. See *436Wright v. State, 198 Md. 163, 169, 81 A.2d 602 (1951). The Maryland Constitution provided that, in criminal cases, the jurors were the judges of law and of fact.
Effective December 1, 1950, the Maryland Constitution was amended to permit a court to pass upon the sufficiency of evidence in a jury trial. This provision currently appears as Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights (“except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.”). Article 23 is implemented by Article 27, section 593, of the Maryland Code and by Rule 4-324.
Since 1950, therefore, criminal convictions in non-jury and jury trials have been reviewable for legal sufficiency of the evidence. The interplay between sufficiency of evidence and the degree to which the trier of fact had to be convinced in a criminal case—beyond a reasonable doubt—different from that required in a civil case—coupled with perceived qualitative differences between circumstantial and direct evidence, created some confusion in subsequent cases. There was early and general agreement, however, that there was no real difference in the standard for determining sufficiency of evidence as between jury and non-jury cases. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 5 Md.App. 450, 458, 247 A.2d 731 (1968).
In Edwards, the Court of Appeals reviewed a criminal conviction after a non-jury trial. The State’s evidence was circumstantial in nature. The defendant argued that the State was required to negate to a moral certainty all reasonable hypotheses of innocence, and the State failed to do so. The court, applying the clearly erroneous standard contained in the Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure, affirmed the conviction. The Court stated that, given the evidence, the result would be the same even if it assumed that. circumstantial evidence had to exclude to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. See Edwards, 198 Md. at 157-58, 83 A.2d 578. I discuss Edwards because the Court, in Shelton v. State, 198 Md. 405, 84 A.2d 76 (1951), discussed below, relied on that opinion. I note in passing, however, that Edwards seemed to recognize the distinction between the *437quantum of proof necessary to present an issue to a fact-finder, on the one hand, and the degree to which the fact-finder had to be convinced, on the other hand.
In Shelton v. State, supra, the defendant was convicted by a jury of violating a Prince George’s County lottery law. The Court of Appeals reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence under the December 1, 1950 constitutional amendment and held that it was sufficient to support the verdict. The Shelton Court referred to Edwards and explained that the test of sufficiency was whether the evidence showed directly the fact to be proven or supported a rational inference of the fact to be proven. See Shelton, 198 Md. at 412, 84 A.2d 76. This sounds very much like the constitutional test later enunciated in Jackson. The Court went on to state, however, that, “[i]n a criminal case the fact must be shown or the inference supported beyond a reasonable doubt or to a moral certainty, or a reasonable doubt of an opposite fact must be created. Before a verdict of guilty is justified, the circumstances, taken together, must be inconsistent with, or such as to exclude, every reasonable hypothesis or theory of innocence.” Id. at 412, 84 A.2d 76 (citing Bullock v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 1, 60 S.W.2d 108 (1933)).
Interestingly, the Court in Bullock, the case relied upon by the Shelton Court, after stating that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, explained that, if circumstances tending to show guilt “are as consistent with” the defendant’s innocence as with his guilt, they are insufficient. See Bullock, 60 S.W.2d at 110-11. This language implies some weighing of the strength of inferences to be drawn from underlying facts and also implies that excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is not literally required. In other words, these and other early cases wherein the courts affirmed convictions based on circumstantial evidence, did so even though the defendant could have been innocent, i.e., the evidence did not rule out innocence. The evidence was simply strong enough to enable the trier of fact to find guilt.
*438On the federal side, the Supreme Court, in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), rejected the argument advanced by the defendant in Edwards. The Court held that if the government’s evidence was circumstantial in nature, it was inappropriate to instruct the jury that the evidence must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. The Court explained that circumstantial evidence is not qualitatively different from direct evidence, and even though the evidence is circumstantial, the government is not required to negate every possible explanation. The Court further opined that a jury uses its everyday experiences with people and events to weigh the probabilities, and if a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, a court can require no more. See Holland, 348 U.S. at 139-40, 75 S.Ct. 127.
In 1970, the Supreme Court, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), held that the right to due process prohibits a criminal conviction of any person except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In 1979, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The Court, in rejecting the notion that a mere modicum of relevant evidence is legally sufficient, held that, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the constitutional test is whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (emphasis in original). The Court explained that the evidence must “fairly” support a conclusion that every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 313-14, 99 S.Ct. 2781. Finally, I note that in the Jackson opinion, the Court reaffirmed Holland and stated that if the proven facts support conflicting inferences, a court will presume that the fact-finder resolved the conflict in favor of the prosecution. See id. at 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781. The Jackson principles were reaffirmed in Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992). In that case, the Court stated that it had explained in Jackson the defer*439ence owed to the fact-finder, made it clear that all of the evidence (not each piece separately) is to be considered in a light favorable to the prosecution, and that the prosecution need not rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt. If conflicting inferences are supported on the record, a court, on review, shall presume the trier of fact resolved the conflict in favor of the prosecution. See id. at 296-97, 112 S.Ct. 2482.
Prior to Jackson, Maryland courts, on occasion, articulated a standard for sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases very similar to, if not the same as, that enunciated by the Supreme Court in Jackson. See, e.g., Nichols v. State, 5 Md.App. 340, 348-49, 247 A.2d 722 (1968); Cobb v. State, 2 Md.App. 230, 234, 234 A.2d 155 (1967). Among other things, the standard recognized that there is no qualitative difference between direct and circumstantial evidence. See Nichols, 5 Md.App. at 350, 247 A.2d 722.
Despite the fact that, prior to 1979, many Maryland cases recited the substantive equivalent of the Jackson test and, since 1979, the Jackson test, and despite the fact many stated there is no difference between direct and circumstantial evidence, there is language in several cases implying that the test is different when circumstantial evidence is present. The case often cited is Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 573 A.2d 831 (1990). There the Court of Appeals, after reciting the Jackson test, stated that if the State’s case consists of circumstantial evidence alone, the circumstances, taken together, must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See Wilson, 319 Md. at 535-37, 573 A.2d 831. This case continues to be cited with approval, as recently as in Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2, 14, 796 A.2d 821 (2002).
In Wilson, the defendant house cleaner was charged with stealing three rings out of an upstairs bedroom in the victim’s house. The evidence was that the defendant had been in the upstairs of the house cleaning during the pertinent time period, but that at least five other people also had access to the upstairs of the house during that time period. The defendant was convicted of theft, non-jury. The Court of *440Appeals reversed, holding that evidence of the defendant’s mere presence in the upstairs area of the house where others also were present, without more, was insufficient. The Court explained that when proof of a fact is based on circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact need not be convinced “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt of each link in the chain of circumstances,’ ” but rather the circumstances are to be considered collectively, with “the final analysis affording the basis of an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wilson, 319 Md. at 536, 573 A.2d 831 (quoting Pressley v. State, 295 Md. 143, 148-19, 454 A.2d 347 (1983)). The Court continued, however, and stated that “a conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone is not to be sustained unless the circumstances, taken together, •are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. at 537, 573 A.2d 831 (citing Brown v. State, 222 Md. 290, 159 A.2d 844 (1960), Shelton v. State, supra, and West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 539 A.2d 231 (1988)).
In Brown, the Court of Appeals repeated the language contained in Edwards and Shelton and stated that “when guilt is based solely on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances, taken together, must be inconsistent with, or such as to exclude, every reasonable hypothesis or theory of innocence.” Brown, 222 Md. at 296, 159 A.2d 844 (emphasis in original). The Court added, however, that this did not mean that the inculpatory facts had to be absolutely incompatible with innocence and not susceptible of explanation upon any hypothesis other .than that of guilt. See id. at 296, 159 A.2d 844.
In West, the defendant was convicted of robbery and related offenses. The charges arose out of a purse snatching incident, and the State’s evidence was circumstantial. The Court reversed certain theft convictions based on insufficiency of evidence. The evidence at trial was that the defendant was in possession of property stolen from the victim. The State argued that possession supported an inference of receiving stolen property or of theft. The defendant argued that, because there was direct evidence by a witness that he was not the thief, coupled with evidence, that someone was with him when he was found in possession, this vitiated the infer*441ence of theft (distinguished from receiving stolen property). The Court agreed with the defendant, stating that the evidence would have supported an inference of theft absent evidence to the contrary. The Court stated: “This accords also with the principle, deeply rooted in the common law, that a conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone is not to be sustained unless the circumstances are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” West, 312 Md. at 211-12, 539 A.2d 231 (citing Hodges Case, 168 Eng. Rep. 1136-37 (1838); People v. Galbo, 218 N.Y. 283, 112 N.E. 1041, 1045 (1916); L. Hochheimer, The Laiv of Crimes and Criminal Procedure, section 158 (1904); cf. J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 438 (1883)).
The Court of Appeals of New York, in People v. Galbo, 218 N.Y. 283, 112 N.E. 1041 (1916), reviewed a murder conviction where the State’s evidence was that the defendant was found in possession of the body. The Court held that the evidence was insufficient to permit an inference that the defendant was the murderer in the face of other evidence that the victim was large and put up a struggle, and that the defendant was physically handicapped and had no injury. See Galbo, 112 N.E. at 1044-45.
This Court, in Eiland v. State, 92 Md.App. 56, 607 A.2d 42 (1992), rev’d sub nom on other grounds, Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993), reviewed a murder conviction. The defendant, relying on the language in Wilson that circumstantial evidence must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, argued that the evidence was legally insufficient. This Court stated that Wilson reaffirmed Jackson as the ultimate test and then expressed doubt regarding the value of the Wilson statement in question, but recognized that the Wilson Court had, at least, limited the application of the principle to the situation where there is only one strand of circumstantial evidence and no direct evidence. See Eiland, 92 Md.App. at 68-69, 607 A.2d 42.
In 1993, the Court of Appeals decided Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993). The Court affirmed a convic*442tion rendered by a jury for breaking and entering a dwelling. The defendant had asked the trial court to instruct the jurors that if they concluded that they could draw a reasonable inference of innocence from the circumstantial evidence presented, they had to find the defendant not guilty. After reiterating the principle that a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence cannot stand unless the circumstances are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the Court held that the principle relates to legal sufficiency—a question of law for the court—and should not be part of instructions to the jury. See Hebron, 331 Md. at 233-34, 627 A.2d 1029.
' The Hebron Court stated that the requested instruction was based on the notion that circumstantial evidence is inferior to direct evidence, a notion rejected by Holland and by a number of states, and then observed that Maryland has long held there is no difference between direct and circumstantial evidence, citing several cases from the late 1960’s. See id. at 226, 627 A.2d 1029. After discussing Wilson and similar cases, the Court reiterated the statement from Wilson that the principle in question has no application when the circumstances consist of more than a single strand. It then stated: “This is no more than a restatement of the settled proposition that a finding of guilt cannot be based on evidence that equally supports an inference of innocence as well as of guilt.” Id. at 228, 627 A.2d 1029.
The Hebron Court also cited with approval Jordan v. State, 219 Md. 36, 148 A.2d 292 (1959). Of significance for present purposes, the Court cited Jordan for the proposition that when facts are such as to permit two equally reasonable inferences, one consistent with guilt of a greater offense and the other guilt of a lesser offense, a defendant may be convicted only for the latter. See Hebron, 331 Md. at 230-31, 627 A.2d 1029. These statements imply a weighing of inferences.
Finally, in Hebron, the Court quoted from a South Carolina case with respect to the standard of review, applicable wheth*443er the evidence is direct or circumstantial and whether it consists of multiple strands or one strand:
In determining whether to send the case to the jury on circumstantial evidence, the proper standard to be applied by the judge is as follows:
‘[T]he judge is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight; and although he should not refuse to grant the motion where the evidence merely raises a suspicion that the accused is guilty, it is his duty to submit the case to the jury if there be any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced.’
Id. at 234-35, 627 A.2d 1029 (quoting State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 379 S.E.2d 888, 889 (1989) (quoting State v. Little-john, 228 S.C. 324, 89 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1955))).
In my view, based primarily upon Jackson and Hebron, the Jackson constitutional standard is the applicable standard to determine sufficiency of the evidence, and the Wilson principle has no practical vitality. First, if there is any direct evidence, the Wilson principle does not apply. In that situation, sufficiency of evidence is rarely an issue; the question is one of credibility. Second, in the case of circumstantial evidence alone, the Wilson principle applies only when there is a single strand of evidence. Even in that instance, however, the principle is not helpful. Caselaw dictates that direct and circumstantial evidence are to be treated the same. Further, all circumstances are to be considered together and not each piece separately. Finally, the State does not have to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence to get to the trier of fact. Attempting to decide whether there is one strand or multiple strands of circumstantial evidence in a given case does not appear to be helpful. It is a question of the strength of the inferences to be drawn.
If the evidence is solely circumstantial, as Hebron indicates, the determination of sufficiency involves some weighing of inferences. In that situation, the strength and genuineness of *444inferences, in addition to credibility, have to be assessed in order to decide the ultimate issue. The court decides, in the first instance, as a generalization, whether the inference of guilt, drawn from the circumstantial evidence presented, would permit a fact-finder to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and if so, the case is submitted to the fact-finder for that determination in the particular case before it. If the inferences are such that the fact-finder would have to speculate, the case should not go to the fact-finder.
If the inference of guilt is sufficiently strong, guilt is a fact question, even though the evidence would also support an inference of innocence. In other words, the meaningful test is whether the evidence supports a rational inference from which the trier of fact could fairly be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This test is the- same whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or some combination of both.
Presumably because of the historical distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, courts have been more prone to let any and all direct evidence pass the sufficiency test while attempting to formulate a rule for circumstantial evidence other than assessing the strength of the inferences presented. It may be that, at some point, the credibility of direct evidence is so lacking that it cannot meet the sufficiency test. See, e.g., Kucharczyk v. State, 235 Md. 334, 337, 201 A.2d 683 (1964) (explaining that the sole prosecution witness’s testimony was “so contradictory that it lacked probative force and was thus insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the facts required to be proven.”).
The principle espoused in Kucharczyk, however, has been severely limited and is rarely applicable, as this Court cautioned in Bailey v. State, 16 Md.App. 83, 294 A.2d 123 (1972): “Some appreciation of the limited utility of the so-called Kucharczyk doctrine may be gathered from the fact that it was never applied pre-Kucharczyk in a criminal appeal and it has never been applied post -Kucharczyk in a criminal appeal.” Bailey, 16 Md.App. at 94, 294 A.2d 123; see also Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 183, 486 A.2d 196 (1985)(ruling that “[t]he *445type of confusion and inconsistency contained in this and other testimony given by Smith at trial neither rises to, nor even approaches, the level of unreliability which would place it within the narrow ambit of the principle set forth by the Court in Kucharczyk”). I perceive no reason why the same reluctance on the part of the courts to prevent a case from going to the fact-finder based on the lack of credibility of a witness’s testimony—because contradictory, biased, or otherwise impeached—should not also exist when a case is based on circumstantial evidence. This is particularly true given the notion, well-settled in Maryland, that no preference exists for either direct or circumstantial evidence.
Why should a witness’s testimony, impeached by, for example, contradictions, bias, inability to observe, and prior convictions, support a rational inference of guilt, and a strong inference(s) comporting with daily life experiences and with no evidence to the contrary not support a rational inference of guilt? In a given case, whether the inference(s) persuades the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt is not decided by the trier of fact in a vacuum. A fact-finder resolves verbal conflicts in testimony by making credibility determinations. Not only in that situation, however, but also when inferences are to be drawn from circumstantial evidence, witnesses communicate through non-verbal, as well as verbal, methods and non-testifying parties communicate through non-verbal methods. The evidence, as a whole, direct and/or circumstantial, should be reviewed by the court to determine if it suffices to support a rational determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In applying that standard to the facts of this case, I believe the evidence was sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find guilt. Appellant was the renter and driver of the vehicle. He had been in possession of the vehicle for approximately a week and was in possession of it at the time of the occurrence. Appellant had access to the entire vehicle. Appellant knew the other occupants of the vehicle, and they had been in the car together for a significant period of time. The gun was not in a container or in a secure place such that one might infer *446the owner attempted to conceal it from the other occupants. All three occupants, at the time of the stop, denied ownership of the jacket covering the gun. There was evidence that the vehicle had a fold-down rear seat, but it is likely that the seat was not down because there was a passenger in the back. If it were down, it is likely that appellant would have knowledge of that and, therefore, of the presence of the gun. The gun was in the center of the trunk. Assuming the back seat was up, there is no indication that the passengers knew the trunk was accessible from behind the armrest. Even if they did, it was highly unlikely that a passenger could have placed the gun in the center of the trunk and placed a jacket over it, by working through the armrest opening, without appellant’s knowledge.
The ownership of the gun is not an element of the crime. Unlike many of the cases relied on for the Wilson principle and discussed above, this in not an either-or situation. In other words, it is not a question of which occupant was the gun’s owner; all occupants could have had knowledge of the gun. The question is the strength of the inference to be drawn that appellant did have knowledge; there are no inferences pointing in the opposite direction. I assume the majority would have held the evidence was sufficient if appellant had been the sole occupant of the vehicle. The presence of others does not affirmatively show that appellant did not have knowledge; it affects whether the inference of knowledge is sufficiently strong to support a conviction.
Even if I applied the “greater nexus” test enunciated by the majority, I would affirm. As summarized above, there was evidence in addition to the fact that appellant was the driver and lessee of the vehicle. The evidence does not indicate any greater nexus between a passenger and the gun than the nexus between appellant and the gun. There is a strong inference, as the majority recognizes, that appellant had knowledge of the gun. There is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that he did not have knowledge of the gun. The presence of the passengers weakens the inference that appel*447lant had knowledge, but it does not neutralize or negate the inference.
Cases involving issues of possession or knowledge of illegal items are necessarily fact specific. Society is faced with the dilemma of, on the one hand, enforcing its laws and not enabling an individual to avoid justice by traveling with companions, and on the other hand, not convicting innocent relatives, friends, or bystanders. In such a fact-intensive situation, our system of justice generally relies on the fact-finder to make the critical determination of knowledge vel non on a case by case basis. In my view, a fact-finder could be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a person in the position of appellant in the instant case had knowledge of the gun. Consequently, because there was enough evidence to support a rational inference of guilt and because the fact-finder was convinced to the appropriate degree—beyond a reasonable doubt—I would affirm.
Chief Judge MURPHY and Judges DEBORAH S. EYLER, KRAUSER, and GREENE have authorized me to state that they join in this dissenting opinion.
KRAUSER, Judge, in which MURPHY, C.J., JAMES R. EYLER, DEBORAH S. EYLER, and GREENE, JJ., join
I respectfully dissent. The issue before us is whether appellant knew he was transporting a firearm; not, as one might surmise from the plurality’s opinion, whether he had greater access to that firearm than the passengers of his vehicle. Ignoring that distinction, the plurality engages in a largely irrelevant analysis of one “possession of contraband” case after another. Indeed, almost every case it discusses 1 in *448its review of the “equal access” rule, which it rejects, or the newly minted “greater nexus” theory, which it embraces, is a case in which the central issue is possession, not knowledge. The difference is important.
Access plays a key role in establishing possession, but it does not necessarily play a role in establishing knowledge, a component of the crime of possession. Whether appellant had greater access to the firearm found by police than his passengers is not dispositive; it is only a factor in determining whether appellant knew that he was transporting a firearm.
Indeed, it is not hard to imagine circumstances under which appellant, as the driver of the vehicle, would have less access to the. contraband than any of his passengers or even no access at all and still have knowingly transported a firearm. Had one of his passengers, for example, entered his car openly carrying a gun and had appellant agreed to transport the gun and his passenger to. ,a particular location, should it make any difference that his passenger had greater access to the gun than he did? Or what if appellant had been asked to drive a truck, the locked cargo compartment of which was loaded with firearms, but given no key or other access to the truck’s cargo and, to make matters more interesting, what if he had even been instructed that under no circumstance was he to enter the cargo compartment where an armed guard was stationed? As long as he knew what he was transporting would he be any less guilty of knowingly transporting firearms because he had no access to the contraband? The answer,’' bf course, is no.
Nonetheless, I do agree with the plurality’s rejection of the equal access rule. Under that rule, according to the plurality, “knowledge of the presence of the contraband cannot be inferred from [one’s] ownership or possession of the vehicle when another person had equal access to the portion of the *449vehicle in which contraband was found.” That definition, I must point out, actually recasts a standard applied by some courts in determining possession. Indeed, if one simply substitutes the word “possession” for the phrase “knowledge of the presence,” the first four words of the plurality’s definition of the equal access rule, a correct statement of that rule emerges. To quote Lombardo v. Georgia, 187 Ga.App. 440, 370 S.E.2d 503 (1988), one of the cases relied upon by the plurality in support of its curious rewording of that rule:
The equal access rule, ‘as it applies in the automobile context, is merely that evidence showing that a person or persons other than the owner or driver of the automobile had equal access to contraband found in the automobile may ■or will, depending upon the strength of the evidence, overcome the presumption that the contraband was in the exclusive possession of the owner or driver.’
Id. at 505(quoting Mendez v. Georgia, 185 Ga.App. 1, 363 S.E.2d 262 (1987)(internal citation omitted)).
It is clear from this definition that the equal access rule is a rale for determining possession not knowledge. Whatever value that rale has in determining possession, it has little applicability when the issue is knowledge.
After rejecting the equal access rule—reaching the right result for the wrong reasons—the plurality promulgates what it calls the “greater nexus rale.” As formulated by the plurality, that rule provides that “one’s status as a driver-owner is sufficient to permit an inference that the driver-owner has knowledge of contraband in the vehicle” unless “there is a greater nexus between the passenger and the contraband than between the driver-owner and the contraband:” light rule; wrong case. An interesting standard, it deseives consideration the next time we have a case before us involving contraband found in a vehicle, occupied by a driver and at least one passenger, where possession is the issue. Until then, it is a rule in search of a case. The nexus between the contraband and a passenger, although crucial in a posses*450sion case, is not necessarily determinative of what the accused knew.
Here, there was sufficient evidence from which the fact-finder could conclude that appellant knew that he was transporting a gun. Based upon appellant’s exclusive use and possession of the vehicle, as its lessor and driver, for a week before he was stopped by police, knowledge of the vehicle’s contents could reasonably be imputed to appellant. That point was made by the plurality and I agree. In its words, “one’s status as a driver-owner is sufficient to permit an inference that the driver-owner has knowledge of contraband.”
Explaining how it reached this conclusion the plurality writes: “The driver-owner has the keys to the car, as well as legal control over where the car goes and what goes into it. Because the space of a vehicle is confined, a driver-owner generally can monitor what articles are located in it. Thus, we conclude that there is a sufficient factual basis to draw an inference of knowledge from the defendant’s driver-owner status.” “To hold otherwise,” the opinion warns, “would allow savvy transporters of contraband to avoid conviction by simply inviting passengers to accompany them on the illegal journeys.” On this point, the logic of that opinion is sound and compelling.
But that rule, as the plurality notes, cannot be blindly applied in all circumstances, particularly, where countervailing evidence suggests that the driver-owner had no knowledge of the presence of the contraband in his vehicle. In an effort to qualify that rule to accommodate the ever shifting sands of circumstances, the plurality, taking its cue from its own misconstruction of the equal access rule, promulgates the so-called “greater nexus” rule. Under that rule, the plurality declares, if a greater nexus exists between a passenger of that vehicle and the contraband, then the driver-owner can not be convicted of knowingly transporting a firearm based solely on the driver-owner inference. And how does the plurality define “nexus?” In this case, it equates nexus with access to the contraband. That equation is unfortunate. The plurality’s *451willingness to make the outcome of this case depend on relative degrees of access to the trunk, for the reasons I have limned, is the result of its ill-advised conflation of access with knowledge.
But, interestingly enough, even under the plurality’s “greater nexus” theory, which, in this case, the plurality applies by comparing the driver access to the firearm in question to the passenger’s, there is sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction for knowingly transporting a firearm. At all times, as far as we know, appellant enjoyed a greater degree of access to the trunk of his vehicle than either of his two passengers. As the driver and lessor of the vehicle in question, appellant had exclusive control over access to the trunk. Presumably, and there is no evidence to the contrary, he alone had the keys to the trunk. And even if the trunk could have been opened by a pop-up mechanism, as the plurality suggests without any evidence that such a mechanism was even present, that mechanism, because of its location, might also have been under the exclusive control of the driver. Consequently, neither passenger could have obtained access to the trunk without the approval and assistance of appellant. The converse, however, is not true.
Appellant, as the driver, did not need the approval or assistance of either passenger to enter the trunk. Indeed, as the driver of that vehicle, appellant enjoyed greater control over the trunk than he did over the passenger compartment of the vehicle which he shared with his passengers. It is important to remember that the trunk is in reality only a large container and that appellant was the only one with the key to it.
That a jacket of one of the passengers was found lying over the gun should not play the dispositive role assigned to it by the plurality. There is little reason to infer that it was the passenger, rather than appellant, who placed it there, and certainly no basis to infer that the gun was placed there by the passenger without appellant’s knowledge, because, as stat*452ed earlier, the passenger needed appellant’s approval and assistance to gain entry.
Even more disheartening, the plurality, without a shred of supporting evidence, concludes “that the location of the gun does suggest that either the passenger placed the gun there, and then put his coat on top, or that the gun fell out of the passenger’s coat after both were placed in the trunk.” Given that no evidence was presented that the jacket even had pockets or that the pockets were large enough to accommodate a gun or that the gun could be easily dislodged from the pockets imagined by the plurality or, more important, that appellant was not present when the gun was placed in the trunk and had no knowledge that this was being done, the plurality’s suppositions never rise above the level of rank speculation. Yet, it holds, as a matter of law, that the fact-finder could not have drawn the more reasonable inference that the jacket in question was placed on top of the gun to conceal it from public view when the trunk was open and that the gun was placed if not by appellant then with his knowledge and assistance.
Finally, the fact that the trunk could have been accessed from the interior of the passenger compartment by pulling down the rear seat armrest was given short shrift by the plurality and, in my view, rightly so. As the court stated, “[although any back-seat passenger also could have placed the gun there through the passageway between the back seat and the trunk, the mere existence of this passageway is not what drives our decision.” Presumably, the plurality recognized, in the absence of any evidence that the owner of the jacket had any knowledge of, let alone access to, that passageway, (he might well have been the occupant of the front seat, not the back, at the time the car was stopped by police) that it would have required piling unsupported inference upon unsupported inference to arrive at the conclusion that the owner of the jacket had equal or greater access to the trunk than the driver.
*453It can therefore be said that, even under the more demanding equal access rule, there was sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of knowledge. If that is so, then, of course, there was sufficient evidence under the plurality’s less demanding greater nexus rule. In short, under either of these misapplied standards, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that appellant knowingly transported a firearm.
Chief Judge MURPHY and Judges JAMES R. EYLER, DEBORAH S. EYLER, and GREENE have authorized me to state that they join in this dissenting opinion.
MURPHY, Chief Judge, in which JAMES R. EYLER, DEBORAH S. EYLER, KRAUSER, and GREENE, JJ., join
While I join in the dissenting opinions filed by Judge Eyler and Judge Krauser, I wish to note the following additional reasons why appellant’s conviction should be affirmed. First, the majority applies an “access” doctrine that is inapplicable to “joint” possession cases. It is well settled that “the equal access doctrine does not apply to those charged with being in joint constructive possession of contraband.” Fain v. State, 211 Ga.App. 399, 439 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1993). The “greater access” doctrine is just as inapplicable.
Second, evidence establishing a defendant’s knowledge that there is a gun in his or her vehicle is distinguishable from evidence establishing that the defendant is in constructive possession of the weapon. In Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 512 A.2d 358 (1986), while rejecting the contention that voluntary intoxication is a defense to the crime of “knowingly transporting a handgun in a vehicle,” the Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he legislative purpose [in amending the statute to add the word “knowingly”] seems only to have been the exclusion of innocent violations, so that a person who shows that he was not aware that his vehicle was transporting a handgun will not incur penalties.” Id. at 69, 512 A.2d 358. By equating “possession” with “transporting,” the majority opinion overlooks the well established principle of statutory construction that “[i]f there is no clear indication to the contrary, and it is *454reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase shall be rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Green v. Taylor, 142 Md.App. 44, 52-53, 787 A.2d 840 (2001) (quoting Thomas v. Police Comm’r of Baltimore City, 211 Md. 357, 361, 127 A.2d 625 (1956)).
Assume that in the case at bar (1) appellant had been charged in a two count indictment, the first count charging “unlawful carrying,” and the second count charging “unlawful transporting,” (2) appellant elected to be tried by a jury, (3) the jurors received the very same evidence that was presented to the trial judge, and (4) the court is now holding an instructions conference.1 Under the theory set forth in the majority opinion, the instructions as to the “carrying” count would be no different from the instructions as to the “transporting” count. I disagree with that conclusion.
In Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998), a majority of the United States Supreme Court concluded that (1) the phrase “carries a firearm” (as that term appears in 18 U.S.C.S.- § 924 (c)(1), which proscribes carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense) is not limited to carrying of firearms on the person, and (2) “ ‘transport’ is a broader category that includes ‘carry’ but also encompasses other activity.” 524 U.S. at 135, 118 S.Ct. at 1918. Thus, the correct “carrying” instructions would be based upon the principles of (actual, constructive, and joint) possession,2 while the correct “trans*455porting” instructions would make it clear that—even if the jurors were not persuaded that appellant was in joint constructive possession of the handgun—he should be found guilty of the “knowingly transporting” violation if the jurors were persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that he drove the vehicle with knowledge that the handgun was in the trunk.
*456I am persuaded that the State’s evidence was sufficient to generate a jury issue on both the “carrying” count and the “transporting” count. A reasonable trier-of-fact could reasonably conclude that appellant was in constructive possession of the handgun. In Commonwealth v. Macolino, 503 Pa. 201, 469 A.2d 132 (1983), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pointed out that the doctrine of joint constructive possession is necessary to prevent “a privileged sanctuary for the storage of illegal contraband,” and without that doctrine, “[sjimply by storing contraband in a place controlled by more than one party, a spouse, roommate, partner, would render all impervious to prosecution.” Id. at 136. While joint constructive possession must be proven by inference, “[tjhere are few facts, even ultimate facts, that cannot be established by inference.” Moore v. State, 73 Md.App. 36, 45, 533 A.2d 1 (1987).
There is nothing mysterious about the use' of inferences in the factfinding process. Jurors routinely apply their common sense, powers of logic, and accumulated experiences in life to arrive at conclusions from demonstrated sets of facts.
Robinson v. State, 315 Md. 309, 318, 554 A.2d 395 (1989). A reasonable trier-of-fact can reasonably infer that a person who has the key to the trunk of a vehicle is in constructive possession of the items contained therein. ' United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 495, 498-99 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Eldridge, 984 F.2d 943, 946 (8th Cir.1993).
The permissive inference that appellant had knowledge of the presence of the handgun is even stronger than the inference that it was his gun. Yet, according to the majority, the evidence presented against appellant in this case would not get to a jury because no rational trier-of-fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant' had knowledge of the presence of a handgun in the trunk of the vehicle that he (1) had rented, and (2) was driving on the occasion when the handgun was discovered.
Appellant’s conviction should be affirmed.
*457Judges JAMES R. EYLER, DEBORAH S. EYLER, KRAUSER, and GREENE have authorized me to state that they join in this dissenting opinion.
. In its discussion of the equal access rule, the one "knowledge” case the plurality cited was Ohio v. Duganitz, 76 Ohio App.3d 363, 601 N.E.2d 642 (1991), cert. dismissed, 63 Ohio St.3d 1445, 589 N.E.2d 389 (1992). That case, however, was not an equal access case. There, the Ohio court held that the driver of a vehicle had not knowingly carried a weapon, which was found under a blanket on the front seat between the driver and his front-seat passenger. In so ruling the court heavily relied upon the fact that the passenger had been alone in the car for *448.approximately one minute after the driver had exited "and could have just as easily slid the gun under the blanket.” Id. at 646. Thus, the case’s holding had little to do with equal access and a lot to do with the ■ opportunity of the. passenger, in the absence of the driver, to conceal the weapon from him and others.
. According to the majority, there would be no instructions conference because appellant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal on both counts.
. The court could have modified the following portion of the recommended instruction for use in cases involving possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)):
To "possess” means to have something within a person’s control. This does not necessarily mean that the defendant must hold it physically, that is, have actual possession of it. As long as the firearm is within the defendant’s control, he possesses it. If you find that the defendant either had actual possession of the firearm, or that he had the power and intention to exercise control over it, even though it was *455not in his physical possession, you may find that the government has proven possession.
The law also recognizes that possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone possess it, that is sole possession. However, it is possible that more than one person may have the power and intention to exercise control over the firearm. This is called joint possession. If you find that the defendant had such power and intention, then he possessed the firearm under this element even if he possessed it jointly with another. Proof of ownership of the firearm is not required.
To satisfy this element, you must also find that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm. This means that he possessed the firearm purposely and voluntarily, and not by accident or mistake. It also means that he knew that the weapon was a firearm, as we commonly use the word. However, the government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that he was breaking the law.
Matthew Bender & Company, 2-35 Modern Federal Jury Instructions-Criminal P 35.07, Form Instruction 35-49 (2001). See also United States v. Martinez., 588 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.1979), which expressly approved the following instruction:
Now, the law recognizes two kinds of possession: actual possession and constructive possession.
A person who knowingly has direct physical control of a thing at a given time is then in actual possession of it. I’ve got a pencil here. I’m in actual possession of this pencil.
A person, who although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing either directly or through another person or persons is then in constructive possession of it.
I have pencils on my desk in my chambers. My law clerk will go get them for me if I want them. And that's possession, also. That’s constructive possession.
The law recognizes, also, that possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole.
If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint.
You may find that the element of possession, as that term is used in these instructions, is present if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual or constructive possession either alone or jointly with others.
588 F.2d at 498 n. 3.