Following a trial by jury, appellant, Bruce Kohl, was convicted of two counts of homicide by vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,1 two counts of homicide by vehicle,2 two counts of driving while under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance,3 and the summary offenses of reckless driving4 and driving a vehicle at unsafe speed.5 The trial court denied appellant’s post-trial motions and sentenced appellant to the mandatory minimum sentence of not less than three (3) years to a maximum of seven (7) years on the four homicide counts, and imposed a fine and a sentence of not less than thirty (30) days nor more than *76twelve (12) months on the summary offenses. Following denial of his Motion to Modify Sentence, appellant brought this timely appeal. On appeal, appellant challenges the constitutionality of a blood alcohol test performed on a sample of his blood under the authority of the implied consent law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a).6 We find that the blood test was constitutionally invalid, and remand and reverse for a new trial.
Appellant’s convictions stem from a one-car collision which occurred at approximately four o’clock in the morning on March 30, 1985. While proceeding around a sharp bend in the road, appellant’s car struck a utility pole and then a nearby retaining wall, causing the death of his two passengers, Jeffrey Greb and Mark Moser. The police arrived at the scene shortly after the accident, in time to remove appellant and the two passengers from the car before the car burst into flames. Jeffrey Greb died at the scene of the accident, and Mark Moser died while being transported to the hospital.
Appellant, rendered unconscious by the accident, was taken from the accident scene to the hospital. He remained unconscious throughout the day. When appellant was brought into the hospital, the emergency room doctor ordered a blood test of appellant for basic blood work. A police officer went from the scene of the accident to the hospital. When he arrived at the hospital, the officer requested that a blood sample be taken from appellant for analysis as to alcohol content. The police officers investigating the accident did not smell alcohol on appellant’s breath or notice any other signs of alcohol consumption by appellant.
A hospital technician performed a blood alcohol analysis on the sample taken for medical reasons and on the sample drawn by request of the police officer. The analysis on the test requested by the police produced a blood alcohol level of 0.15%. There were no results of the analysis performed on the sample drawn for medical purposes. At the time the *77blood was drawn from his body, no charges had been filed against appellant, appellant was not under arrest, and the police did not have a warrant to conduct the test. Appellant was arrested upon his release from the hospital on April 29, 1985.
In his pretrial motion, appellant moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the basis that the test violated his constitutional rights in that the police lacked probable cause to order the test and appellant did not consent to the test. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that on the basis of the facts of this case, probable cause to order the search did exist. Following his trial and conviction, appellant filed post-verdict motions, which were denied by the trial court.
On appeal, appellant claims that the trial court erred in admitting the results of the blood alcohol test performed on the sample of his blood because the test violated the Fourth Amendment. We agree.
The blood alcohol test performed on appellant was authorized by the “implied consent law” set forth in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a):
§ 1547. Chemical testing to determine amount of alcohol or controlled substance
(a) General rule.—Any person who drives, operates or is in actual physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath, blood or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of a controlled substance if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle:
(1) while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance or both; or
(2) which was involved in an accident in which the operator or passenger of any vehicle involved or a *78pedestrian required treatment at a medical facility or was killed.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ...”7
The administration of a blood alcohol test is a search falling within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1412, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 1616, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985).
The Fourth Amendment applies only to searches and seizures effected by the Government or its agents. Commonwealth v. Cieri, 346 Pa.Super. 77, 499 A.2d 317, 320-21 (1985), quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1985) (citations omitted). Here, appellant’s blood was drawn and tested for alcohol content by hospital technicians at the request of the police officer. The hospital personnel acted as agents of the Commonwealth in administering the test. See Commonwealth v. Cieri, supra, 346 Pa.Superior Ct. at 85, 499 A.2d at 321 (where private hospital nurse withdrew defendant’s blood according to routine hospital procedure, and later forwarded sample to police for blood alcohol test, nurse *79acted as an “instrument” or “agent” of the government). Thus, the blood alcohol test performed on appellant’s blood sample must meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST UNDER § 1547(a)(1)
This Court has previously upheld the constitutional validity of a warrantless search conducted under § 1547(a)(1), interpreting the requirement that the officer have “reasonable grounds” to believe that the driver was driving under the influence as requiring that the officer have “probable cause” to believe that the driver was under the influence. Commonwealth v. Quarles, 229 Pa.Super. 363, 388, 324 A.2d 452, 466 (1974). See also Commonwealth v. Smith, 382 Pa.Super. 288, 555 A.2d 185, 189 (1989); Commonwealth v. Cieri, supra 346 Pa.Super. at 87, 499 A.2d at 322. Probable cause exists where the officer has knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a prudent person to believe that the driver has been driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. Smith, supra 382 Pa.Super. at 296, 555 A.2d at 189; Commonwealth v. Pelkey, 349 Pa.Super. 373, 378-79, 503 A.2d 414, 416 (1985), citing Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 158, 253 A.2d 276, 279 (1969).
The trial court held that the test performed on appellant’s blood sample fell within the purview of § 1547(a)(1), finding that the police officer had probable cause to believe that appellant had been driving while under the influence. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court cited the following facts:
The police knew that a serious one-car accident at 4:00 A.M. had occurred causing the death of two men and serious injury to a third. Defendant was found unconscious and pinned behind the steering wheel of his car. They believed that the defendant had operated his vehicle at an excessive rate of speed due to the excessive damage to the car on a roadway and bridge with posted speed limits of 35 m.p.h. The pavement was dry, the visibility *80clear and there were no obstructions of any kind that would inhibit the defendant’s driving. The accident scene contained no brake marks or attempts to steer the vehicle away from the telephone pole and cement wall where the car finally came to rest.
Suppression Court Opinion at 13.
We disagree that these facts establish the requisite probable cause to believe that appellant was driving while under the influence. This case is markedly different from those cases in which this Court has held that the probable cause requirement of § 1547(a)(1) had been met. In Commonwealth v. Smith, supra, 382 Pa.Super. at 297, 555 A.2d at 189, this Court held that the police officer had probable cause to believe the defendant had been driving under the influence of alcohol where the defendant smelled of alcohol and had glassy, bloodshot eyes, and the accident consisted of defendant’s car rolling over at least once. In Commonwealth v. Hipp, 380 Pa.Super. 345, 551 A.2d 1086 (1988), the Court found the police officer had probable cause to believe appellant had been driving under the influence where appellant’s eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. In Commonwealth v. Haynos, 363 Pa.Super. 1, 525 A.2d 394 (1987), allocatur denied, 517 Pa. 604, 536 A.2d 1329 (1987), the Court held that probable cause existed where the arresting officer observed that defendant was involved in a one-car accident and the officer detected an odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath. In Commonwealth v. DeFaveri, 352 Pa.Super. 96, 507 A.2d 398 (1986), appeal denied, the Court found that probable cause existed where a serious accident had occurred, and defendant smelled strongly of alcohol and was combative at the scene of the accident. In Commonwealth v. Pelkey, supra, probable cause existed where a serious motor vehicle accident had occurred involving a driver who was found in a semiconscious state with the odor of alcohol on his breath. 349 Pa.Super. at 379, 503 A.2d at 416. In Commonwealth v. Cieri, supra, the Court held that probable cause existed where the police sergeant and *81the hospital nurse smelled alcohol on appellant’s breath, there was evidence of marijuana use in appellant’s car, and a serious accident had occurred. 346 Pa.Super. at 88-89, 499 A.2d at 323. In Commonwealth v. Guiliano, 274 Pa.Super. 419, 424, 418 A.2d 476, 479 (1980), probable cause existed where appellant’s pupils, eyes, and speech all suggested consumption of alcohol, and a serious one-car accident had occurred. In Commonwealth v. Funk, 254 Pa.Super. 233, 385 A.3d 995 (1978), the Court held that probable cause existed where police officers smelled alcohol on appellant, appellant was “stuporous” at the time the blood was taken, and an accident had occurred.
Significantly, in each of these cases there was some indicia of alcohol or drug consumption by the defendant before the police requested a blood or breathalyzer test. Here, neither the officer nor the hospital personnel detected any signs of alcohol consumption by appellant. There was no odor of alcohol on appellant, there was no evidence of bottles or cups that may have contained alcohol, and no one observed appellant driving erratically. Based upon these facts and the facts supporting the finding of probable cause in the cases cited above, we hold that the police did not have probable cause to believe appellant was driving under the influence. In the absence of any evidence of alcohol or drug use, the occurrence of a one-car accident during the early morning hours of a clear, dry day in an area with a low accident incidence rate is not a sufficient factual basis to support the belief that the driver was under the influence of alcohol.
Because the police did not have probable cause to believe that appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol, we hold that the blood test was not valid under § 1547(a)(1) of the implied consent law.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST UNDER § 1547(a)(2)
The trial court found that the blood test was also valid under § 1547(a)(2), because appellant had been the *82operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in death and bodily injury which required treatment at a medical facility. Undoubtedly, the conditions of § 1547(a)(2) were met. Appellant challenges § 1547(a)(2) as unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
In our opinion in the companion to this case, Commonwealth v. Danforth, 395 Pa.Super. 1, 576 A.2d 1013 (1990) (en banc), we held that a blood test administered on the basis of § 1547(a)(2) violates an individual’s federal and state constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. We reasoned that the conditions set forth in § 1547(a)(2) do not establish probable cause to believe that the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident was under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, and, therefore, a test authorized by § 1547(a)(2) is constitutionally invalid. Hence, we find that the test performed on appellant was not valid under § 1547(a)(2).8
We hold that the blood alcohol test performed on appellant violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The results should not have been admitted against him at trial. See Commonwealth v. *83Williams, 380 Pa.Super. 227, 551 A.2d 313, 317 (1988).9 We vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
Vacated and remanded. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
CIRILLO, P.J., and CAVANAUGH, DEL SOLE and JOHNSON, JJ., join. OLSZEWSKI, J., files a concurring opinion. TAMILIA, J., files a dissenting opinion joined by BROSKY, J. KELLY, J., files a dissenting opinion.. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3735.
. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732.
. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(a)(1) and (4).
. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714.
. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361.
. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a). (Purdon 1984).
. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is also provided in article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause ...
PA. CONST, art. I, § 8.
. We disagree that the cases cited by Judge Kelly in his Dissenting Opinion in support of his conclusion that § 1547(a)(2) is unconstitutional are dispositive of the question, because those cases involve inventory searches of automobiles, random stops of drivers to check the driver’s license and the registration of the vehicle, and police roadblocks and checkpoints. These types of searches have long been recognized as being "limited in magnitude compared to other intrusions,” see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); thus, we find that the analysis set forth in the cases is not readily applicable to the blood, breath and urine tests authorized by § 1547(a). Moreover, we disagree that the constitutionality of the blood test in this case is appropriately resolved by Judge Kelly's newly developed "reasonable suspicion/medical exigency” test. As discussed in part I, supra, if a police officer has probable cause to believe that the motorist has been driving under the influence, the officer may lawfully administer a blood, breath or urine test pursuant to section 1547(a)(1). Further, the fact that a search may lead to "potentially exculpatory” evidence has never been a justification for making an unconstitutional search valid. If that were the test, then every search would be constitutionally valid because any search has the potential for dispelling suspicions that a crime has been committed.
. Appellant also contends that (1) the trial court erred in allowing a pathologist to testify over objection to the speed of his vehicle; (2) the mandatory sentencing provision for the crime of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol is unconstitutional. Because of our disposition of appellant’s suppression claim, we need not address these issues.