dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm judgment of sentence imposed for appellant’s conviction of drunk driving. I would not address the constitutionality of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a)(2), as I find that appellant’s express consent was voluntary and valid, and so would find recourse to statutory implied consent unnecessary to uphold the search (by blood test) challenged here. Nonetheless, as the majority base their disposition of this appeal on that ground, I shall commence my dissent by explaining my views on the implied consent issue, before proceeding to explain, at length, why I disagree with the majority on the critical issue of whether appellant’s express consent was voluntary and valid.
I. Constitutionality of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 154-7(c)
As enacted, the current implied consent statute leaves unfettered discretion to the officer in the field to determine whether or not to invoke implied consent and request that a conscious driver submit to a blood test or direct that the test be performed on an unconscious driver. 75 Pa.C. S.A. § 1547(a)(2). While every driver who falls within the triggering language of the statute is deemed to consent, there is no requirement that every driver deemed to consent be tested. Rather, the officer in the field may pick and choose which to test on an entirely ad hoc basis. The absence of sufficient restrictions on the officer’s discretion as to which conscious drivers are to be requested to submit to a blood test, or which unconscious drivers are to be subjected to a blood test, renders the implied consent provision unconstitutional, even if a mandatory “request or sub*39mit” provision applicable to all such drivers could pass constitutional muster. Cf. Florida v. Wells, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (1990 WL 43473); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, 535 A.2d 1035 (1987); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973); Commonwealth v. Leninsky, 360 Pa.Super. 49, 519 A.2d 984 (1986). Hence, I agree that the current statute is unconstitutional.
I do not find it necessary here to determine if the rationale of “special need” to preserve highly evanescent evidence of blood alcohol content at the time of a serious train accident via warrantless, suspicionless blood testing of train crews for non-criminal prosecution, regulatory purposes in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), could be extended to permit warrantless, suspicionless blood tests of drivers involved in serious automobile accidents for criminal prosecution purposes. Nonetheless, in response to the majority’s broad prohibition, I note that I would be inclined to agree with Judge Tamilia that the rationale in Skinner should be extended to cover implied consent cases, provided the officer’s discretion, as to which persons (deemed to have consented) would be tested, was regulated in a rational and systematic manner.
II. State Constitutional Grounds
For the same reason that I would find the statute unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, I would likewise find it unconstitutional under Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8. I cannot agree, however, with the majority’s suggestion that 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a)(2) is invalid because of a heightened protection provided under Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 which is not provided under the Fourth Amendment.
In Commonwealth v. Shaeffer, 370 Pa.Super. 179, 536 A.2d 354 (1987) (allocatur granted), this author explained in dissenting from a similar conclusion by the majority of that en banc panel that our state constitution imposed broader restrictions than the Fourth Amendment:
*40A.
As the majority notes, the Pennsylvania proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures antedates the federal provision. Majority Opinion, supra, 370 Pa.Super. at 192-194, 536 A.2d at 361. Indeed, each of the guarantees contained in the federal Bill of Rights had its antecedents in one or more of the state constitutions and colonial charters. See generally 'S. Fisher, The Evolution of the Constitution of the United States (Philadelphia 1897). “Far from being the model of the states, the federal Bill of Rights was added to meet demands for the. same guarantees against the new central government the people had secured against their own local officials.” Linde, First Think First, Rediscovering the State’s Bill of Rights, 9 U.Balt.L.Rev. 379, 381 (1980). Eight of the thirteen original states adopted a state constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures prior to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment. See Cuddihy, “Fourth Amendment (Historical Origins),” in 2 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 762 (Levy ed. 1987); see also S. Fisher, supra at 199-201. Moreover, it is appropriate to note that from 1776 until 1949 when the Fourth Amendment was first applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures in the Pennsylvania Constitution, and not the Fourth Amendment, protected Pennsylvanians from unreasonable searches and seizures by state law enforcement personnel. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 203 Pa.Super. 541, 201 A.2d 434 (1964); Commonwealth v. Rubin, 82 Pa.Super. 315, 319 (1923); accord Woodside, Pennsylvania Constitutional Law, at 116 (1985).
Clearly, Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 has identity and vitality separate and distinct from that of the Fourth Amendment; it remains therefore emphatically the province and duty of the Pennsylvania judiciary to declare its scope and limitations. See Commonwealth v. DeJohn, supra, 486 Pa. at 44, 403 A.2d at 1289; Beck, Pennsylvania *41Supreme Court Review—1982, 56 Temple Law Quarterly 705, 708-10 (1983); Roberts, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; Constitutional Government in Action, 54 Temple Law Quarterly 403, 411 (1981); see also Brennen, The Bill of Rights and the States: The revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 535 (1986); Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 Syracuse L.Rev. 731 (1982).
However, even proponents of “new federalism” recognize that the case for an independent role for state courts “should not be read as a case for unthinking activism. No judge, state or federal, is a knight errant whose only concern is to do good. Hence, the state judge, when presented with the invitation to develop a body of state constitutional law, should pause to consider some of the dangers along the way.” Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 Va.L.Rev. 873, 940-41 (1976) (also coining the phrase “new-federalism” to describe the use of state sovereignty to insulate state constitution protections broader than the federal constitutional protections from review in the federal courts); cf Berger, New Theories of Interpretation: The Activists' Flight from the Constitution, 47 Ohio St.L.J. 1 (Winter 1986) (analyzing and criticizing the activist approaches).
As the majority recognizes, we are “expected to deal carefully with a Supreme Court opinion and to explain forthrightly why [we find ourselves] required to reason differently.” Majority Opinion, supra, 370 Pa.Super. at 189-190, 536 A.2d at 359, quoting Commonwealth v. DeJohn, supra, 486 Pa. at 44, 403 A.2d at 1289. Moreover, if should be noted that the recognition of a higher standard for searches and seizures under state constitutional law than that required under federal constitutional law in one set of circumstances, does not require that a higher standard should be imposed in all other circumstances. In Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 *42A.2d 921 (1985), our Supreme Court explained, “[w]hile we can interpret our own constitution to afford defendants greater protections than the federal constitution does, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 63-64, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (1983) (collecting cases), there should be a compelling reason to do so.” 509 Pa. at 484-85, 503 A.2d at 926. (Emphasis added).
B.
Pennsylvanians undoubtedly have the right to adopt a state constitution which provides greater limitations on the warrantless use of electronic participant monitoring by law enforcement personnel than the federal constitution provides. The question in the instant case, however, is not whether Pennsylvanians may, but whether we have already done so.
The mere fact that Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 antedates the Fourth Amendment does not provide a reason to construe it differently than the Fourth Amendment. Both were directed toward eliminating the same evils—general warrants and writs of assistance. See Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316, 317-18 (1814); Commonwealth v. Rubin, supra, 82 Pa.Super at 319-20; see also V The Founder’s Constitution 219, 219-44 (tracing the origins of the Fourth Amendment); Galloway, Fourth Amendment Ban on General Searches and Seizures, 10 Search and Seizure L.Rep. 141, 141-48 (1983); Marke, “The writs of Assistance Case and the Fourth Amendment,” in Essays in Legal History in Honor of Felix Frankfurter, at 351-72 (Forkosch ed. 1966); White, Commentaries on the Constitution of Pennsylvania, at 157-59 (Philadelphia 1907).
Moreover, there are no significant textual differences which would provide a reason for differing construction of the clauses. Commonwealth v. Gray, supra, 509 Pa. at 485-86, 503 A.2d at 926; see also Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454, 472, 530 A.2d 74, 83 (1987) (Hutchinson, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. *43258, 266 n. 11, 312 A.2d 29, 34 n. 11 (1973), cert. denied 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3183, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974); compare U.S. Const.Amend. 4 and Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8. Indeed, the revision of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 in 1790 significantly reduced textual differences which might otherwise have supported a broader construction of the Pennsylvania provision than the federal provision. It is significant that these changes were made unanimously and contemporaneously with the ratification of the Fourth Amendment by Pennsylvania.
536 A.2d at 382-84 (footnotes omitted). See Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 519 Pa. 415, 548 A.2d 1211 (1988) (construing Pa. Const. Art. 1, sec. 8 in accordance with Fourth Amendment precedent); Commonwealth v. Reese, 520 Pa. 29, 549 A.2d 909 (1988) (same); Commonwealth v. Blystone, 519 Pa. 450, 549 A.2d 81 (1988) (same; overruling Commonwealth v. Shaeffer, supra); aff'd — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990).
That our federal system permits states to provide broader restrictions on the government’s authority to conduct searches and seizures than minimally required by the Fourth Amendment is unquestioned. Here, however, the majority has provided no basis in the text of our constitution, the history of its application for over 175 years before Mapp v. Ohio, or in its history since, which would justify the expansive construction of Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 employed by them here. Indeed, the majority’s decision on this point is announced, rather than explained.
In absence of a clearly defined and compelling rationale based upon the text or history of Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8,1 will continue to scrupulously avoid construing that provision to provide greater restrictions than imposed by the Fourth Amendment. I will do so especially with regard to the suppression of otherwise admissible evidence, as the exclusionary rule was imposed upon our settled state constitutional jurisprudence (which had repeatedly, expressly, and unequivocally rejected the exclusionary rule) by the mandate of the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth *44Amendment and the federal constitution’s Supremacy Clause. I find no textual or historical basis for a state constitutionally based exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania, and I will apply such an exclusionary rule no further than our Supreme Court expressly commands. See Commonwealth v. Shaeffer, 370 Pa.Super. 179, 235-40 & 267-69, 536 A.2d 364, 382-85 & 398-99 (1987) (Kelly, J., concurring and dissenting) (allocatur granted); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 390 Pa.Super. 493, 498, 568 A.2d 1281, 1285-87 (1990); Commonwealth v. Haggarty, 388 Pa.Super. 67, 73-76, 564 A.2d 1269, 1272-73 (1989) (Kelly, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Slaton, 383 Pa.Super. 301, 343, 556 A.2d 1343, 1363-64 (1989) (Kelly, J., concurring and dissenting); Commonwealth v. Melson, 383 Pa.Super. 139, 150, 556 A.2d 836, 841 (1989) (Kelly, J., dissenting).
III. Express Consent
The majority find that appellant’s voluntary consent to the blood test was invalid. They do not find her consent invalid because she was coerced, or even because she was deceived. Rather, they find her consent invalid because she “was not put on notice of the possible criminal ramifications of the blood test.” Majority Opinion, supra, 395 Pa.Superior Ct. at 27, 576 A.2d at 1026. For several reasons which I shall discuss at length, I cannot agree.
In Commonwealth v. Slaton, supra, this author examined the relevant law of consent, at length, as follows:
Early cases involving consent to search contained language which suggested that consent must be knowing and intelligent, i.e. made with full and express knowledge of the right to refuse consent. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). However, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854. (1973), our Supreme Court held that valid consent is established by demonstrating that it was given voluntarily, i.e. without coercion express or implied. Subsequent decisions have reinforced the ruling in Schneckloth that *45the prosecution need not establish that the party giving consent knew that consent could be refused. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974).
Early cases were also construed to provide that consent obtained by stealth, deceit, or misrepresentation was invalid. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709 (1963), citing Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 S.Ct. 266, 65 L.Ed. 654 (1921), Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921), and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). The Wright dictum was followed by this Court in the more recent cases of Commonwealth v. Poteete, 274 Pa.Super. 490, 418 A.2d 513 (1980) and Commonwealth v. Morgan, 353 Pa.Super. 463, 510 A.2d 754 (1986) (citing Poteete). The majority herein would also rely on the Wright dictum as stated in Poteete. Their reliance is misplaced.
Subsequent to Amos, Gouled, and Weeks, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld consensual searches as valid despite deception as to the identity and/or the purpose of the person conducting the “search.” See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971) (plurality); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 87 S.Ct. 429, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963); Rathburn v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 78 S.Ct. 161, 2 L.Ed.2d 134 (1957); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967, 96 L.Ed. 1270 (1952). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized that deception does not invariably vitiate consent.
*46Likewise, more recent cases of our Supreme Court demonstrate that the broad Wright dictum (that consent acquired by deception is invalid) does not accurately state the law of consent as it is currently understood in Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Morgan, 517 Pa. 93, 534 A.2d 1054 (1987), our Supreme Court reversed the decision of a divided panel of this Court which had held that a suspect’s consent for a police officer to enter (by stating “come on in”) was rendered invalid by the officer’s deception as to his identity (by answering “Joe” to the suspect’s question “who’s there”). In Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 510 Pa. 604, 603, 511 A.2d 764 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1617, 94 L.Ed.2d 801 (1987), our Supreme Court held that a suspect’s consent to search the trunk of his car was valid despite the fact that the uniformed officers did not inform the suspect that they knew from prior lawful observations that incriminating evidence was located in the trunk. Finally, in Commonwealth v. Brown, 437 Pa. 1, 261 A.2d 879 (1970), our Supreme Court held that a uniformed police officer’s deception as to the reason for wanting the suspect’s gun did not render the suspect’s consensual relinquishment of the gun invalid. In Brown, after citing Wright and acknowledging subsequent federal Supreme Court cases eroding the basis for the broad dictum set forth in Wright, our Supreme Court concluded:
It is not necessary for this Court to determine what deceptive devices are improper in light of Lewis, Hoffa and Lopez although that is a very difficult question as the United States Supreme Court seems to have granted broad powers to the police. The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 112, 191-4 (1957). It is enough to state that in light of those three United States Supreme Court decisions, the police officer’s (Petrovich) tactics were constitutional, and the court below properly refused to suppress evidence of the gun, holster and bullets.
*47261 A.2d at 883. Thus, our Supreme Court has expressly recognized that deception does not invariably vitiate consent.
This Court, too, has retreated from the broad proscription in Wright, and has recognized that consent may be valid despite deception as to an officer’s identity and/or motivation in obtaining a suspect’s consensual relinquishment of privacy with respect to statements, contraband or other inculpatory facts or evidence.
Subsequent to our Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, this Court stated in Commonwealth v. Weimer, 262 Pa.Super. 69, 396 A.2d 649 (1978), that, “stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer.” We found in Weimer that consent to enter a private hunting club was not invalid despite the officer’s deception as to their identities and their reasons for seeking entry. In Commonwealth v. Poteete, supra, this Court citing Wright but not Brown, held that consent to enter the suspect’s home was invalid when the officer deceived the suspect by letting the suspect think that the officer was there to follow-up on the suspect’s stolen car report, when the officer was actually there to confirm his suspicion that property lawfully observed on a prior visit was in fact recently stolen property.
However, two months later in Commonwealth v. Morrison, 275 Pa.Super. 454, 418 A.2d 1378 (1980), cert. denied sub nom. Morrison v. Pennsylvania, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S.Ct. 863, 66 L.Ed.2d 804 (1981), an en banc panel of this Court held that a landowner’s consent to enter a barn in which large quantities of marijuana were suspected to have been stored was not rendered invalid by the officer’s deception as to both his identity and his reason for wanting to see the barn. The en banc panel, without citing Brown or Poteete, expressly distinguished Wright as having been decided on the basis of federal precedent which had subsequently been substantially modified. 418 A.2d at 1381.
*48In Commonwealth v. Schaszberger, 285 Pa.Super. 586, 428 A.2d 200 (1981), consent to enter was deemed valid despite the fact that it was obtained by deception as to the officers’ identity and reason for seeking entry, i.e. in order to facilitate the safe and effective execution of a lawful search warrant. In Commonwealth v. Ginter, 289 Pa.Super. 9, 432 A.2d 1024 (1981), consent to enter was deemed valid despite the officers’ deception as to their identities and their reason for seeking entry, i.e. to confirm suspicions of liquor law violations. In Commonwealth v. Markman, 320 Pa.Super. 304, 467 A.2d 336 (1983), a panel of this Court stated unequivocally, “[consent may be deemed voluntary even when procured by a police officer who misrepresents both his identity and purpose for making the search.” As noted previously, this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Morgan, which ignored Morrison, Schaszberger, and Ginter and instead relied on Poteete, was reversed by our Supreme Court Finally, in Commonwealth v. Carelli, 377 Pa.Super. 117, 546 A.2d 1185 (1988), following a review of a majority of the foregoing cases, this Court held that neither Wright nor Poteete correctly stated the law regarding the effect of deception on consent as it is currently understood in Pennsylvania. I remain of that opinion.
In resurrecting Poteete, the majority herein offer three distinct justifications. I find each fatally flawed.
First, the majority attempts to distinguish Carelli based upon the presence in this case of a statutory duty on the part of the officers to state the purpose of their inspections. As explained above, I find that the statute requires no more than a statement of the type of authorized administrative inspection the officer intends or requests consent to conduct. Because the officer is not required by statute to disclose the reasons for seeking the inspection, this case is not distinguishable in that respect. Second, the majority attempts to distinguish this case based upon their conclusion that the cases cited in Carelli, “were primarily cases involving undercover agents in *49fact situations uniquely suited to such police tactics; e.g. illegal narcotics dealings and illegal gambling operations.” Majority Opinion, supra, 383 Pa.Super. at 311, 556 A.2d at 1347 n. 6. While Morgan, Ginter, Schaszberger, Morrison, and Weimer arguably fit the restriction on the permissible use of deception which the majority suggests; Albrecht, Brown, and Carelli do not. Albrecht involved an uniformed officer investigating, an arson case. Brown involved an uniformed officer investigating a murder case. Carelli involved an uniformed officer investigating a stolen truck case. Significantly, our Supreme Court explained in Brown:
The problem for this Court is to determine the permissible extent of police power in light of these United States Supreme Court decisions. Lewis (involving sales of marijuana to a federal narcotics agent), Hoffa (involving the planting of a government informer in defendant’s hotel room to overhear conversations), and Lopez (involving an attempted bribe of an Internal Revenue agent) clearly do not Require the police to be completely open and truthful as to their identity and purpose when dealing with suspects. They recognize that undercover work is an essential weapon in the police arsenal. In this case the ‘undercover’ work was not as to Petrovich’s identity as a policeman but rather as to his motives in offering to sell the gun. It appears to us that there is no real difference between this deception and those found permissible in Lewis, Hoffa and Lopez.
261 A.2d at 881-82. (Emphasis added). Thus, this case is not distinguishable from Albrecht, Brown or Carelli based upon the fact that the officers involved here were not working undercover, nor is this case distinguishable based upon the type of crime under investigation.
Third and finally, the majority suggest that because Wright has never been expressly overruled, Poteete and not Carelli correctly states the law with respect to the effect of deception upon consent in Pennsylvania. As *50explained in Carelli, however, Wright was decided by our Supreme Court based solely on federal law which was subsequently substantially modified. Moreover, subsequent decisions of our Supreme Court, while not overruling Wright expressly, have nonetheless expressly recognized this change in the law. See Commonwealth v. Morgan, supra; Commonwealth v. Albrecht, supra; Commonwealth v. Brown, supra. Thus, I remain of the opinion that Wright and Poteete no longer correctly state the controlling law, and that they were properly distinguished in Morrison and Carelli.
Of course, consent remains invalid if it is given in response to a false or invalid claim of authority. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979); Bumper v. North Carolina 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States 282 U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). Likewise, consent is exceeded when the scope of the search actually conducted is broader than that to which the individual has consented. See Gouled v. United States, supra; Commonwealth v. Shaw, 467 Pa. 543, 383 A.2d 496 (1978); see generally III FaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c), at 160-174 & nn. 48-108. Whether other types of deception vitiate consent must depend upon a case by case determination of the voluntariness of the consent in light of the totality of the circumstances, including the challenged deception. See Commonwealth v. Brown, supra, 261 A.2d at 882; Commonwealth v. Morrison, supra, 418 A.2d at 1380-81. The voluntariness of consent need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2779, 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 153 (1987); United States v. Matlock, supra.
556 A.2d at 1358-61 (footnotes omitted).
In the instant case, appellant was involved in an auto accident. Appellant had driven her car into a telephone pole at a high rate of speed; her passenger was killed in the crash. When interviewed by the officer, appellant ex*51plained that she had met her passenger earlier that evening at an Inn, and that the accident was caused by her passenger’s sudden attempt to sexually assault her while she was driving. The investigating officer asked if she would consent to a blood alcohol test. He informed her that the result of that test would be used in his investigation of the accident. He further informed her that she was not under arrest, and that he was not charging her with any crime at that time.
The majority finds that appellant’s consent was not “voluntary ” because it was not “knowingly and intelligently ” given. The majority reaches that conclusion based upon its determination that, “appellant had no reason to believe that the investigation was any different from a routine accident investigation,” and “appellant was not put on notice of the possible criminal ramifications” of her consent. Majority Opinion, supra, at 21. Neither, however, had the defendants in Morgan, Albrecht, Brown, Carelli, Morrison, Ginter, Schaszberger, or Weimer been “put on notice of the possible criminal ramifications” of their consent to search; yet, consent was deemed voluntary and valid in each of those cases.
Here, there was no coercion and no deception. Appellant voluntarily consented to take the test, and the voluntarily submitted to the test. There is no semblance of official coercion express or implied; consequently, I see no grounds to deem the consent invalid. There is no requirement that consent to search be “knowing and intelligent” as well as “voluntary.” See United States v. Watson, supra; United States v. Matlock, supra; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra.
IV. “Intelligent” Waivers
In point of fact, the majority has improperly injected Fifth Amendment “knowing and intelligent” waiver analysis into a Fourth Amendment “voluntary” consent case. Moreover, in doing so, they fail to observe the existing limitations on that waiver analysis generally, and on the intelligent waiver component particularly.
*52The prophylactic Miranda warnings are only deemed to be required to protect Fifth Amendment rights when the suspect is subjected to presumptively coercive interrogation while in police custody. See Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 109 S.Ct. 205, 102 L.Ed.2d 172 (1988); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 519 Pa. 116, 546 A.2d 26 (1988); Commonwealth v. Britcher, 386 Pa.Super. 515, 563 A.2d 502 (1989); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 379 Pa.Super. 337, 549 A.2d 1323 (1988). Though the majority are willing to import the “intelligent choice” waiver approach from Fifth Amendment, custodial interrogation, confession cases into this Fourth Amendment, non-custodial, consent to search case, they are apparently unwilling, however, to import as well the limitation that voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waivers are only required when the suspect is in the presumptively coercive setting of police custody. It is entirely undisputed in this case that appellant was not in custody when she consented to take the blood test. Thus, the very application of voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver analysis in this non-custodial context is a significant expansion of Miranda's progeny. I find no legitimate basis for that expansion, as there is no history of third degree type coercion by police to secure consent to blood test during non-custodial investigative detentions following auto accidents, which would warrant the requirement of Miranda -type prophylactic warnings regarding Fourth Amendment rights. Cf. Commonwealth v. Slaton, supra, 556 A.2d at 1363-64.1
*53Moreover, in applying the “knowing and intelligent” waiver analysis, the majority have given the “intelligent” waiver component broader construction that is permissible is even true Fifth Amendment/Miranda cases. Concededly, the majority applies an “intelligent choice” approach which had been applied to cases involving Miranda waivers in this Commonwealth is varied forms since our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Collins, 436 Pa. 114, 259 A.2d 160 (1969). Notwithstanding the line of Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases from Collins to Commonwealth v. Moss, 518 Pa. 337, 543 A.2d 514 (1988) applying some form of that approach, I nonetheless conclude that the “intelligent choice” approach to Miranda waivers of the right against compulsory self-incrimination in contrary to controlling United States Supreme Court precedent on this issue of federal constitutional law (and is even more contrary to such precedent when extended improperly to consent to search “waivers”).
*54There can be no doubt that the “intelligent choice” approach to Fifth Amendment/Mrcmcia waivers which was applied in varied forms by our Supreme Court rested exclusively on federal rather than state constitutional law grounds. Prior to Miranda, our Supreme Court, applying state law, uniformly held that no prophylactic Miranda -type warnings were required, and that even confessions gained by artifice or deception were admissible unless the artifice or deception employed was of a type likely to induce a false confession. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727 (1962); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 372 Pa. 266, 93 A.2d 691 (1953); Commonwealth v. Hipple, 333 Pa. 33, 3 A.2d 353 (1939); Commonwealth v. Spardute 278 Pa. 37, 122 A. 161 (1923); Commonwealth v. Cressinger, 193 Pa. 326, 44 A. 433 (1899); Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 186 Pa. 218, 40 A. 412 (1898); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 186 Pa. 1, 40 A. 283 (1898).
A. PENNSYL VANIA CASES
In Commonwealth v. Collins, supra, a plurality of our Supreme Court first adopted the “intelligent choice” approach, stating:
Appellant urges that the court erred in failing to suppress his oral statement, which he claims was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966). The Commonwealth points tosa ‘waiver’ appellant signed, setting forth the Miranda warnings and stating that he had read the catalogue of his rights and was willing to make a statement. Appellant replies that this ‘waiver’ was ineffective because it is undisputed that at the time he signed it, he had not been informed of the nature of the crime for which he was to be questioned.
In Miranda itself, the Court stated, at page 475, 86 S.Ct. at page 1628, ‘The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.’ (Emphasis added). High standards of proof are always re*55quired where a waiver of constitutional rights is involved. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938). We agree with appellant that an intelligent and understanding waiver of the right to counsel is impossible where the defendant has not been informed of the crime which is being investigated. It is a far different thing to forgo a lawyer where a traffic offense is involved than to waive counsel where first degree murder is at stake.
259 A.2d at 162 (per O’Brian, J.; Jones and Cohen, JJ., join; Bell, C.J. and Eagen, Roberts and Pomeroy, JJ., concur in the result). (Emphasis added).
In Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974), Chief Justice Nix (then Justice Nix) stated in another plurality opinion:
The Commonwealth argues that even if appellant had a right to counsel at the line-up, his oral and written declarations establish that he waived that right. Appellant counters by asserting that such waiver was made without knowledge of the crime under investigation and was therefore not knowing and intelligent.
This Court has dealt with similar challenges to waivers of the right to counsel under Miranda on several occasions. See, Commonwealth v. McKinney, 453 Pa. 10, 306 A.2d 305 (1973); Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 451 Pa. 42, 301 A.2d 832 (1973); Commonwealth v. Swint, 450 Pa. 54, 296 A.2d 777 (1972); Commonwealth v. Boykin, 450 Pa. 25, 298 A.2d 258 (1972); Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 445 Pa. 364, 284 A.2d 717 (1971); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 444 Pa. 122, 297 A.2d 108 (1971). In each of these cases, we alluded to the decision of three members of this Court in Commonwealth v. Collins, 436 Pa. 114, 121, 259 A.2d 160, 163 (1969) which held that ‘an intelligent and understanding waiver of the right to counsel is impossible where the defendant has not been informed of the crime which is being investigated.’ However, in each case we determined that the suspect had been adequately informed of the general nature of the charges against *56him. These cases teach that while there is no need for the police to explain in detail all of the technicalities of the charges at issue, the accused should at least know the general nature of the transaction giving rise to the charges.
320 A.2d at 354-55 (the plurality aspect of the decision appears, however, to have been limited solely to a different issue than the one considered here). (Emphasis added).
In Commonwealth v. Dixon, 475 . Pa. 17, 379 A.2d 553 (1977), Justice Pomeroy, speaking for a majority of the Court, explained:
Appellant’s primary contention before us is that she did not ‘knowingly and intelligently’ waive her constitutional rights to remain silent and to have a lawyer present during the police interrogation, and that it was therefore error to refuse her request to suppress her oral confession. On the basis of this record, we must agree.
In Commonwealth v. Richman, this Court held that a valid waiver of Miranda rights requires that the suspect have an awareness of the general nature of the transaction giving rise to the investigation. The rationale of this holding was that it is only when such knowledge is possessed by a suspect that he can be said to understand the consequences of yielding the right to counsel. ‘It is far different thing to forego a lawyer where a traffic offense is involved than to waive counsel where first degree murder is at stake.’ It is clear from Richman, however, that the suspect need not have knowledge of the ‘technicalities’ of the criminal offense involved; rather, it is necessary only that he be aware of the ‘transaction’ involved. Neither does the Richman holding establish a ‘fifth Miranda warning’; that is, there is no prophylactic requirement that the interrogating officers affirmatively provide information to the suspect as to the crime under investigation. Where, however, the defendant has not been furnished with such information and a pre-trial challenge concerning the validity of a confession is made on this ground, the Common*57wealth must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knew of the occasion for the interrogation. This burden may sometimes be satisfied by the establishment of circumstances attending the interrogation, such as the prior statements of the suspect, or the fact that interrogation follows hard upon the criminal episode and there is no circumstance lending ambiguity to the direction and purpose of the questioning.
379 A.2d at 566 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
In Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983), Justice Zappala, speaking for a majority of the Court stated:
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) does not require that in addition to the various rights enumerated a suspect must be provided information as to the crime under investigation. This Court has held, however, that a suspect must have ‘an awareness of the general nature of the transaction giving rise to the investigation,’ in order to make an intelligent and understanding waiver of his rights. Commonwealth v. Dixon, 475 Pa. 17, 22, 379 A.2d 553, 556 (1977). See also Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974). It was stated in Dixon that where ‘the defendant has not been furnished with such information [so as to make him aware of the transaction involved] and a pre-trial challenge concerning the validity of a confession is made on this ground, the Commonwealth must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knew of the occasion for the interrogation.’ 475 Pa. at 23, 379 A.2d at 556.
467 A.2d at 293. (Emphasis added).
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Moss, supra, Justice Zappa-la, again speaking for a majority of the Court, in rejecting a claim that the Miranda warnings should have been repeated when the police questioned the suspect regarding a second burglary, noted:
It would appear, however, that the approach suggested would greatly expand the rule of the case on which it is *58premised, Commonwealth v. Dixon, 475 Pa. 17, 379 A.2d 553 (1977). There we invalidated a confession as the product of a waiver of rights not knowingly and intelligently given. Dixon was arrested for failure to abide by a restitution order imposed for a summary conviction, but questioned about the death of her son. Given the ambiguity of the situation, we held that the Commonwealth had not proven she had sufficient ‘awareness of the general nature of the transaction giving rise to the investigation,’ citing Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974). We did not hold in Dixon, and we have never held, that a suspect must be informed of each and every crime under investigation. On the contrary, we have consistently held that the Commonwealth, in meeting its burden of proving a waiver was knowing and intelligent, may establish the circumstances attending the interrogation and the lack of ambiguity as to the questioning’s direction and purpose.
543 A.2d at 519 n. 1. (Emphasis added).
The underlying premise of the “intelligent choice” approach to Miranda waivers is that a waiver may not be deemed “intelligent” in a constitutional sense if the police have knowingly withheld information which might materially impact on the wisdom or intelligence of the choice to waive the right against compulsory self-incrimination in a tactical sense. I note that our Supreme Court’s more recent cases reflect a distinct trend away from strict application of the intelligent choice approach, substituting instead a lesser requirement that, in the circumstances of the individual case, the suspect be adequately informed of “the general nature or the transaction under investigation,” and not that the suspect be “put on notice of possible criminal ramifications.” Compare Commonwealth v. Travaglia, supra, 467 A.2d at 293, and Majority Opinion, supra, at 21. I note further that in a cases which involved the failure of the police to inform a suspect that an individual injured in an automobile accident had died, this Court none*59theless found the suspect’s Miranda waiver voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and therefore valid; notwithstanding the fact that the suspect was not informed of the full potential criminal consequences of his confession. See Commonwealth v. Gotto, 306 Pa.Super. 434, 443, 452 A.2d 803, 807 (1982); compare Commonwealth v. Collins, supra (plurality).
B. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
The underlying premise of the “intelligent choice” approach to Miranda waivers has been traced to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). See generally Medalie, From Escobedo to Miranda, passim (Inst. Crim.L. & Pro.1966). Professor Joseph D. Grano has cogently, albeit critically, summarized the impact of Escobedo on the law of confessions as follows:
A. Police Interrogation and Intelligent Choice
Although Escobedo v. Illinois has little vitality today as a Sixth Amendment case, its reasoning, which illustrates the first strand of modern confessions thinking, still exerts influence. After the police confronted Escobedo with an accomplice who accused him of the fatal shooting, Escobedo responded that the accomplice, not he, had fired the shots. The Supreme Court sympathetically observed that Escobedo as a layman undoubtedly was unaware that his admission of complicity was as damaging as an admission that he had fired the fatal shots. The Court stated that Escobedo needed counsel’s legal aid and advice, because what resulted during the interrogation could affect the later trial. Absent the right to counsel’s advice, the trial would be ‘no more than an appeal from the interrogation, ’ with conviction virtually assured by the suspect’s confession.
We can appreciate how remarkable this reasoning is only by focusing clearly on the evils the court identified as warranting relief. The primary evil is the suspect making an uninformed and unintelligent decision to confess. To assure an informed and intelligent decision, *60one that comports with the suspect’s best interests, counsel should be present to provide aid and advice. A second evil is the police obtaining evidence from the suspect that will help assure his conviction. The suspect will not have much chance of mounting an effective defense at trial—that is, of winning an acquittal— if he confesses, and for some reason, not articulated, this is undesirable even when the suspect is guilty. If these concerns are legitimate, the tactics the authors advocate should have no place in our law. Indeed, if one takes Escobedo’s reasoning seriously, all police interrogation should be prohibited until the defendant has had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer. Under Escobedo’s constitutional vision, we cannot rest comfortably with a system that permits the availability of legal assistance to turn on the suspect’s hurried response to a less than enthusiastic police warning. Indeed, the procurement of legal advice must depend in such a system more on chance than on a reasoned exercise of judgment. Of course, as the authors and others know, provision of counsel to all defendants before interrogation would facilitate intelligent choice only by virtually eliminating the possibility of confessions, for the only advice a competent lawyer typically will give, particularly if the suspect is guilty, is not to make a statement. This, however, is the necessary price of taking Escobedo seriously.
Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth, 84 Mich.L.Rev. 662, 666-67 (1986) (footnotes omitted, emphasis added), reviewing Inbau, Reed, & Buckley, Criminal Interrogations and Confessions (3rd Ed.1986). .
Professor Yale Kamisar, however, had provided a forceful justification of the very results Professor Grano criticized, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda:
I do not claim that the state has an obligation to prevent a suspect from incriminating himself. I do contend that it must ensure that the suspect is aware that he need not, and cannot be made to, incriminate himself. I do not claim that the state should, or even that it can, eliminate *61all the subtle and personal ‘inequalities’ which ‘disadvantage’ some subjects of police interrogation more than others. I do contend that so far as it is reasonably possible the state can and should ensure that the choice of the weak and the ignorant and the poor to speak or not to speak is as free and as informed as that of their more fortunately endowed brethren.
!}{ 5¡C % S& Sj« *
Suspects there are who feel in a ‘pleading guilty’ mood, for some of the many reasons most defendants do plead guilty. Suspects there are who would intentionally relinquish their rights for some hoped-for favor from the state. I do not deny this. I do deny that such suspects do not need a lawyer.
Surely the man who, in effect, is pleading guilty in the gatehouse needs a lawyer no less than one who arrives at the same decision only after surviving the perilous journey through that structure. Both needs are substantial:
An attorney is in a better position than defendant to evaluate and discuss any plea agreement. Moreover, the attorney will want to inquire about the court’s sentencing practice and thus better assess the value of any proposition made by the prosecuting attorney. Under these circumstances, a defendant will have a sympathetic legal expert helping him analyze all relevant factors in arriving at the ultimáte conclusion of whether to plead guilty.
One can seriously question whether a defendant who pleads guilty should ever be admitted to waive counsel.
* * * jfc * *
Logical radiations from Massiah and Escobedo carry far. Their force may not be spent unless and until all police questioning in the absence of counsel is barred.
Kamisar, “Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure,” in Criminal Justice in Our *62Time at 10, 36 & 61 (Howard ed. 1965) (footnote omitted, emphasis added).2
In light of the broad constructions made by both supporters and critics of the Escobedo decision, it is hardly surprising that our Supreme Court construed Miranda to require that the suspect have at least a general awareness of the subject matter of the interrogation to be conducted before waiving his Fifth Amendment rights. Nonetheless, whether the sign posts were misread, or the United States Supreme Court simply decided that it was following the wrong path,3 the fact remains that recent United States Supreme Court cases clearly indicate that the “intelligent choice” approach is not the correct path to follow in analyzing Miranda waivers under federal constitutional law.
Indeed, recent United States Supreme Court decisions involving the Fifth Amendment generally and Miranda waiversparticularly have significantly refined and in some cases altered entirely our understanding of the nature and operation of the federal constitutional proscription against compulsory self-incrimination.4 Of particular significance *63to the issue presented in this case are a series of cases relating to Miranda waivers. These cases lead me to the conclusion that Collins, Rickman, Dixon, Travaglia and Moss no longer correctly state the controlling law with respect to Miranda warnings and waivers of Fifth Amendment rights, thus undermining the majority’s “intelligent” waiver approach as applied to Fifth Amendment Miranda cases and even more so as to Fourth Amendment consent cases.
In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986), the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the proposition that a Miranda waiver could not be deemed “knowing and intelligent” when the police had prevented counsel from contacting the suspect, and had falsely told counsel that the suspect would not be questioned. The Supreme Court explained:
... Miranda holds that ‘[t]he defendant may waive effectuation’ of the rights conveyed in the warnings ‘provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently-’
... the Court of Appeals believe that the ‘[deliberate or reckless’ conduct of the police, in particular their failure to inform respondent of the telephone call, fatally undermined the validity of the otherwise proper waiver. We find this conclusion untenable as a matter of both logic and precedent.
Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and'knowingly relinquish a constitutional right. Under the analysis of the Court of Appeals, the same defendant, armed with the same information and confronted with precisely the same police conduct, would have knowingly waived his Miranda rights had a lawyer not telephoned the police *64station to inquire about his status. Nothing in any. of our waiver decisions or in our understanding of the essential components of a valid waiver requires so incongruous a result. No doubt the additional information would have been useful to respondent; perhaps even it might have affected his decision to confess. But we have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.
Once it is determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.
475 U.S. at 421-23, 106 S.Ct. at 1140-41, 89 L.Ed.2d at 420-22 (citations and footnotes omitted, emphasis added). Despite the fact that information material to the tactical wisdom or intelligence of the waiver had been intentionally, even fraudulently, withheld from the suspect, the Miranda waiver was nonetheless deemed voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 471 Pa. 318, 370 A.2d 322 (1977) (a plurality of our Supreme Court had previously reached a contrary conclusion applying their construction of the federal law in similar circumstances).
In Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that the suspect’s partial invocation of Fifth Amendment rights (i.e. stating that he was willing to talk, but not to sign a written statement) did not require cessation of all questioning. The Supreme Court specifically rejected a contention that the partial invocation of Fifth Amendment protections demonstrated such defects in the suspect’s understanding of the consequences of the Miranda waiver as to preclude a finding that the partial waiver was made knowingly and intelligently. The Supreme Court explained:
*65We also reject the contention that the distinction drawn by Barrett between oral and written statements indicates an understanding of the consequences so incomplete that we should deem his limited invocation of the right to counsel effective for all purposes. This suggestion ignores Barrett’s testimony—and the finding of the trial court not questioned by the Connecticut Supreme Court—that respondent fully understood the Miranda warnings. These warnings, of course, made clear to Barrett that ‘[i]f you talk to any police officers, anything you say can and will be used against you in court.’ App at 48A. The fact that some might find Barrett’s decision illogical is irrelevant, for we have never ‘embraced the theory that a defendant’s ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates their voluntariness.’
479 U.S. at 530, 107 S.Ct. at 832-33, 93 L.Ed.2d at 928-29 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). Here again, the fact that the suspect was unaware of, or misunderstood, information which might have materially affected the tactical wisdom or intelligence of his decision to waive his right against compulsory self-incrimination did not foreclose a finding that the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Finally, and most significantly, in Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987), the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected a contention that a suspect’s Miranda waiver could not be deemed to have been made “intelligently” even if the police intentionally failed to inform a suspect, who had been arrested for illegal sales of firearms, that they suspected him in an entirely unrelated murder and that questions relating to that incident would also be included in the questioning to be conducted if the suspect chose to waive his Fifth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court stated bluntly that, “Spring’s argument strains the meaning of compulsion beyond the breaking point.” 479 U.S. at 572, 107 S.Ct. at 857, 93 L.Ed.2d at 965.
The Supreme Court then explained:
*66A statement is not ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment if an individual ‘voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently’ waives his constitutional privilege.
‡ sfc $ sjc 9j( 3):
There also is no doubt that Spring’s waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege was knowingly and intelligently made: that is, that Spring understood that he had the right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used as evidence against him. The constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee is both simpler and more fundamental: a defendant may not be compelled to be a witness against himself in any respect. The Miranda warnings protect this privilege by ensuring that a suspect knows that he may choose not to talk to law enforcement officers, to talk only with counsel present, or to discontinue talking at any time. The Miranda warnings ensure that a waiver of these rights is knowing and intelligent by requiring that the suspect be fully advised of this constitutional privilege, including the critical advice that whatever he chooses to say may be used as evidence against him.
In this case there is no allegation that Spring failed to understand the basic privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Nor is there any allegation that he misunderstood the consequences of speaking freely to the law enforcement officials. In sum, we think that the trial court was indisputably correct in finding that Spring’s waiver was made knowingly and intelligently within the meaning of Miranda.
479 U.S. at 573-75, 107 S.Ct. at 857, 93 L.Ed.2d at 965-66 (citations and footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
Spring further contended that even if his statements were not “compelled” in a Fifth Amendment sense, they were nonetheless the fruits of police deception in violation of the dictum in Miranda that “any evidence that the accused *67was threatened, tricked or cajoled into a waiver will ... show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.” 384 U.S. at 746, 86 S.Ct. at 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d at 725. (Emphasis added).5 In rejecting this claim, the Supreme Court stated:
Even assuming that Spring’s proposed distinction has merit, we reject his conclusion. This Court has never held that mere silence by law enforcement officials as to the subject matter of an interrogation is ‘trickery’ sufficient to invalidate a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights, and we expressly decline so to hold today. Once Miranda warnings are given, it is difficult to see how official silence could cause a suspect to misunderstand the nature of his constitutional right—‘his right to refuse to answer any question which might incriminate him.’ ‘Indeed, it seems self-evident that one who is told he is free to refuse to answer questions is in a curious posture to later complain that his answers were compelled.’ We have held that a valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all information ‘useful ’ in making his decision or all information that ‘might ... affec[t] his decision to confess.’ ‘[W]e have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or standby his rights.’ Here, the additional information could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing nature. Accordingly, the failure of the law enforcement officials to inform Spring of the subject matter of the interrogation could not affect Spring’s decision to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege in a constitutionally significant manner.
*68479 U.S. at 576-77, 107 S.Ct. at 859, 93 L.Ed.2d at 967-68 (citations and footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
Though the “intelligent choice” approach was stoutly defended and extolled in Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion, the joinder of only Justice Brennan in that dissent demonstrates that the “intelligent choice” approach has been plainly and expressly rejected by a clear majority of the body which is, under our system of government, the final expositor of the federal Constitution. As the federal constitutional premise upon which Collins, Rickman, Dixon, Travaglia, and Moss are built has collapsed, so too must the precedential authority of those decisions be deemed to be collapsed.6 Finally, I note that this Court followed Moran, Barrett, and Spring in Commonwealth v. Britcher, supra, 563 A.2d at 507 (emphasizing that “knowing and intelligent” refer solely to the suspect’s understanding of the Miranda warnings, and not the suspect’s understanding of his or her tactical interests).
III. COULD TRICKERY INVALIDATE THE WAIVER?
The “intelligent choice” approach has been plainly rejected. Moreover, while the Supreme Court expressly left undecided the question of what effect an affirmative misrepresentation by the police might have on the validity of a Miranda waiver, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the suggestion that the officer’s arguably deceptive silence constituted waiver vitiating deception. Colorado v. Spring, supra, 479 U.S. at 576 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. at 858 n. 8, 93 L.Ed.2d at 967 n. 8. (Emphasis added).
I would hold that even when a suspect is in the presumptively coercive setting of custodial interrogation, so long as the suspect’s rights are clearly explained by adequate Mi*69randa warnings7 and scrupulously honored by the police, I see no possible “compulsion” arising from deception by police as to facts known or suspicions entertained. If the suspect is “tricked” into thinking that denial of guilt would be futile or that the police could be outwitted and thrown off the scent, and in the process the suspect unwittingly provides the police with inculpatory evidence, I see no legitimate Fifth Amendment interest violated. Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494, 97 S.Ct. 711, 713, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 718 (1977) (suspect confessed after falsely being told his finger prints were found); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 98 & n. 3, 96 S.Ct. 321, 324 & n. 3, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 318 & n. 3 (1975) (suspect confessed after falsely being told that another suspect had confessed and implicated him as the trigger-man); accord Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 442 n. 8, 555 A.2d 1264, 1274 n. 8 (1989) (the deception alleged would not invalidate the Miranda waiver, even if established). Indeed, as Professor H. Richard UViller has cogently observed, “Only the purest idealists would argue that all police deception is unacceptable and the suspect under interrogation must have a factually true and complete account of the state of the case against him to allow him to make an informed, and therefore free, choice to cooperate.” UViller, Tempered Zeal, at 190 (1988).
When a suspect legally taken into custody, is given constitutionally adequate Miranda warnings and has sufficient mental capacity to understand the warnings, the suspect’s election to voluntarily waive Fifth Amendment rights, in whole or in part, may not be deemed to have been “compelled” merely because the suspect was tricked by the police into miscalculating the tactical wisdom of his election to waive known and understood Fifth Amendment rights. Succinctly, there is a fundamental and constitutionally significant difference between a compelled statement and an unwise one. Cf. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. *70544, 555-56 & 559, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1878 & 1880, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 510 & 513 (1980) (“It may happen that a person makes statements to law enforcement that [the person] later regrets, but the issue in such cases is not whether the statement was self-protective, but rather whether it was made voluntarily,” and again, “the question is not whether the [person] acted in [their] ultimate self-interest, but whether [the person] acted voluntarily”).
Under United States v. Watson, United States v. Matlock, and Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, no prophylactic Miranda -type warnings are required when an officer requests a suspect to consent to a search, regardless of whether the suspect is in police custody at the time of the request. As a corollary to the reasoning set forth above, I see no reason why police deception should vitiate consent to search, unless the police deception went to the suspect’s right to deny consent to search, or the right to deny consent to search without penalty. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, supra; Bumper v. North Carolina, supra; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, supra; Commonwealth v. Wright, supra. If the police deception went only to the purpose of consent, for example by acting undercover, by withholding information as to existing knowledge or suspicions, or by affirmatively misleading the suspect as to the purpose of the search, and not to the suspect’s right to decline consent without penalty, the consent would remain uncoerced, hence, voluntary and valid. See United States v. Caceres, supra; United States v. White, supra; Osborn v. United States, supra; Hoffa v. United States, supra; Commonwealth v. Morgan, supra; Commonwealth v. Albrecht, supra; Commonwealth v. Brown, supra; Commonwealth v. Slaton, supra (Kelly, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Carelli, supra; Commonwealth v. Ginter, supra; Commonwealth v. Schaszberger, supra; Commonwealth v. Morrison, supra.
Moreover, even applying the entirely inapplicable Fifth Amendment, presumptively coercive custodial interrogation, Miranda waiver analysis to this Fourth Amendment, non-*71coercive non-custodial, consent to search (by submitting to a blood alcohol test) case, the consent was still made “intelligently” as that term is used in Miranda waiver analysis. Succinctly, the “intelligent” component in the Miranda waiver rule refers to knowledge of the rights, and not to knowledge of the consequences which may flow from waiver of the rights.
Here, there is absolutely no evidence that appellant, a reasonably intelligent United States citizen, was not aware that she had a right to decline to give express consent for the blood test. The officer requested consent; there is no suggestion in this record that he made a claim of right or authority at the time consent was given. Moreover, there is no history of abusive third degree tactics being employed to coerce consent to submit blood tests from drivers involved in serious auto accidents who are not in custody when consent is requested, so as to justify imposition of prophylactic Miranda -type warnings outlining Fourth Amendment rights. Commonwealth v. Williams, supra at n. 1; Commonwealth v. Slaton, supra, 556 A.2d at 1364. Furthermore, even if there were cause to require such warnings, they still would have to be addressed to the nature of appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights, and not the nature of the “criminal ramifications” and tactical disadvantages which might arise from a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights by giving police express consent to search.
Finally, assuming, arguendo, that Fifth Amendment custodial interrogation, Miranda waiver analysis could apply, that the custody limitation to that analysis would not apply, and that some aspect of the “intelligent choice” approach rejected by the Supreme Court in the custodial interrogation, Fifth Amendment Miranda waiver context, could nonetheless apply in this non-custodial, Fourth Amendment, voluntary consent to search (by submitting to a blood alcohol test) case, I still could not agree with the majority’s assessment of the adequacy of the notice of possible criminal ramification provided by the officer.
*72Can it reasonably be believed that appellant, who was a driver involved in a fatality causing accident, did not know that it was a crime to drive drunk, or that if the blood test requested by the police officer revealed significant levels of alcohol in her blood that criminal charges might be filed against her? Has the Commonwealth’s campaign against drunk driving been that ineffective? I think not.
Rather, I would find that, absent evidence of serious mental defect on the part of the suspect, when an officer at the scene of a serious accident asks a driver involved in the accident to consent to take a blood alcohol test (especially when the suspect is informed that the results of the blood alcohol test would be used in the accident investigation) the suspect has been more than sufficiently put on notice of the potential criminal ramifications of consent by the very circumstances in which the consent to take a blood alcohol test was requested. Cf. Commonwealth v. Dixon, supra, 379 A.2d at 556 (the circumstances of the request may alone provide adequate notice).
IV. Conclusion
In the instant case, appellant was a driver involved in a fatality causing auto accident. The investigating officer asked if she would consent to a blood alcohol test. He informed her that the result of that test would be used in his investigation of the accident. He further informed her that she was not under arrest, and that he was not charging her with any crime at that time.
There was no coercion and no deception. Appellant voluntarily consented to take the test, and then voluntarily submitted to the test. I see no grounds to deem the consent invalid.
Neither the United States Constitution, nor the Pennsylvania Constitution, require police officers to talk suspects out of taking blood alcohol tests in the course of gaining their voluntary consent to take such tests. That is precisely *73what the majority’s analysis will require, and that is precisely why I dissent
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully Dissent.
. I explained this position in Commonwealth v. Slaton, supra, as follows:
Whether and to what extent there may be a state exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania arising from the Pennsylvania Constitution is uncertain in Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 513 Pa. 138, 142-43, 518 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1986); Commonwealth v. Shaeffer, 370 Pa.Super. 179, 265-71, 536 A.2d 354, 398-400 (1988) (Kelly, J., concurring and dissenting. In Commonwealth v. Morgan, supra, our Supreme Court noted:
[E]xclusion/suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for every violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning searches and seizures. It is only where the violation also implicates fundamental, constitutional concerns, is conducted *53in bad-faith or has substantially prejudiced the defendant that exclusion may be an appropriate remedy.
534 A.2d at 1056 n. 2, quoting Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 406-07, 490 A.2d 421, 426 (1985) (emphasis in original). In light of our Supreme Court's resolute resistance to the federal exclusionary rule prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), I find that recognition and application of an independent state exclusionary rule by this Court would be inappropriate absent a clear command by our Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Shaeffer, supra, 536 A.2d at 399 (Kelly, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing the prospect of a state constitutional exclusionary rule). I note that our Supreme Court has applied the federal exclusionary rule cautiously. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 312 A.2d 597 (1973), they explained:
A prophylactic exclusionary rule is applied only in extreme cases where all other attempts to secure compliance have proven unsuccessful. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). In this area there has been no showing of widespread flagrant disregard to justify formulation of such a rule at this time.
454 Pa. at 372, 312 A.2d at 600; see also Commonwealth v. Musi, 486 Pa. 102, 115-16, 404 A.2d 378, 384 (1979).
The same may be said here.
556 A.2d at 1363-64. (Emphasis in original). Likewise, the same may be said here.
. The "Massiah ” case referred to by Professor Kamisar is Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964).
. Cf. Frey, Modern Police Interrogation Law: The Wrong Road Taken, 42 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 731-36 (1981).
. See generally Balt. Dept. Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 900, 107 L.Ed.2d 992 (1990) (5th Amendment did not preclude enforcement of order directing mother to produce child in her custody under an “act of production” theory); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989) (warnings in their totality fulfilled the mandate of Miranda despite differences from the traditional phrasing of the warnings); Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 109 S.Ct. 205, 102 L.Ed.2d 172 (1988) (ordinary traffic stops are not "custodial” for Miranda purposes); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108 S.Ct. 2284, 101 L.Ed.2d 98 (1988) (custodians of corporate records are not privileged from the "act of production” under the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (when defense counsel argued that the government had denied the defendant a chance to explain his conduct, the prosecutor's comment on the defendant’s failure to testify was a “fair response”); Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (an isolated comment on post-arrest silence was not prejudicial error when question was not answered, an objection to it was sustained, the jury was instructed to ignore the question, and the comment was not exploited further); Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. *63520, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987) (permitting the suspect’s wife to speak to the accused within sight and earshot of a police officer did not constitute police “interrogation”).
. I note that even in Miranda the focus of the deception/trickery issue was on whether it vitiated the voluntary character of the waiver. So long as the deception/trickery does not relate to the warnings or the constitutional right itself, the knowing and intelligent aspect of the waiver is not effected.
. Though Moss was decided after Spring, it is nonetheless without precedential weight because a United States Supreme Court construction of the federal constitution supercedes all contrary constructions, and because the note in Moss was casual dictum which simply explained that even the Dixon and Rickman decision would not have sustained the appellant’s meritless claim in that case. There is no hint or suggestion in Moss that Spring had even been considered.
. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989) (the language of the traditional Miranda warnings is not to be treated as a required talismanic incantation).