concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the result reached by the majority; however, I would espouse a further standard of review than that set forth by the majority. Initially, I approve of the majority’s two-pronged approach and agree with the notion that the first prong should encompass the essence test. However, once a reviewing court has found, as required by the majority, that the issue before it falls within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, then the second prong should, in my *157view, include further review to determine if the decision of the arbitrator is manifestly unreasonable.
Indeed, I believe that the majority alludes to this further review but fails to specifically adopt this as an appropriate approach. In its discussion of Leechburg Area School District v. Dale, 492 Pa. 515, 424 A.2d 1309 (1981) (Leechburg II), the majority terms the holding therein as one evidencing “extreme deference” to an arbitrator’s decision. The majority then correctly points out the drawbacks of an extreme deference approach by noting that “it allows an arbitration award to be upheld where the award is so without support or is so illogical, that the parties could not have possibly intended to be so bound.” Op. at 413. I believe that this language is, in essence, an acknowledgment that arbitration decisions are subject to judicial review where they are manifestly unreasonable. To allow review only where the arbitrator’s decision cannot be rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement is too limiting and places unbridled discretion in the hands of individual arbitrators. The majority’s standard of review would allow an arbitrator’s decision to stand if it could be made under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement even if the decision was manifestly unreasonable under the facts of the case. I am in accord with the majority that a straight reasonableness standard permits more judicial review than is desirable. Thus, I would have the second prong of the test include that the arbitrator’s award will be upheld if the arbitrator’s interpretation can be rationally derived from the collective bargaining agreement and the decision is not manifestly unreasonable.
Applying this standard to the matter herein, I would affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court. The arbitrator’s decision below was manifestly unreasonable given the unequivocal language of the collective bargaining agreement. Only through tortured mental gymnastics did the arbitrator “create” an “expectation” of “progressive discipline” where no such language appears in the collective bargaining agreement. Interim Arbitration Award, June 26, 1996 at 10-11. Where the collective bargaining agreement clearly states that it shall *158not apply during an employee’s initial twelve (12) months of employment, the arbitrator’s decision that it does apply is manifestly unreasonable and should be capable of judicial review.
Accordingly, I dissent.