dissenting.
I dissent and would affirm on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of the Commonwealth Court, which I reproduce in full as Appendix A, as it was previously unpublished. I note particularly the following straightforward analysis of the issue, which contrasts markedly with the obfuscation employed by the majority:
Article 13 of the Agreement ... provides:
The arbitrator shall neither add to, subtract from, nor modify the provisions of this Agreement. The arbitrator shall confine himself/herself to precise issues submitted *159for arbitration and shall have no authority to determine any issues not submitted to him/her.
The Agreement explicitly provides that the provisions of Article 14 shall not apply during a professional employee’s initial twelve months of employment. Despite this plain language in the Agreement and the undisputed fact that Grievant received a ninety day notice of termination in the tenth month of his employment, the arbitrator found the matter to be arbitrable.
In deciding the precise issue for arbitration, the arbitrator further determined that some form of “progressive discipline” was available for probationary employees, but concluded that the language of the Agreement does not provide any standard nor define this concept. Nonetheless, he imposed a minimal standard of procedural due process and found that the arbitrable issue was whether University acted in an “arbitrary or capricious” manner in discharging Grievant....
[T]he arbitrator’s initial determination violated the plain meaning of the first sentence of Article 14 Section 3. This sentence clearly states that probationary employees cannot grieve under Article 14. Moreover, while it may be that minimal due process provisions should have been incorporated into the Agreement, the arbitrator expressly indicated that no standard or definition existed within the four corners of the parties [sic] Agreement. Finally, ... the arbitrator determined that the issue for arbitration was whether Grievant’s discharge was “arbitrary and capricious,” despite the fact that these terms do not appear in Article 14.
Memorandum Opinion at 421-22.
Justice CASTILLE joins this Dissenting Opinion.APPENDIX A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State System of Higher Education at Cheyney University (University) appeals from an arbitrator’s award which sustained a grievance filed by the State College and Universi*160ty Professional Association (Association) on behalf of Frank Mitchell (Grievant), a probationary employee.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On March 28, 1994, Grievant began employment with the University in the Admissions Office, as a State University Administrator 2, Admissions Counselor/Recruiter responsible for “outreach responsibilities.” On November 8, 1994, while returning from a job fair in Washington, D.C., Grievant was stopped by the Baltimore Police in a University vehicle and issued a ticket for speeding. Because Grievant was unable to produce a valid driver’s license, the University’s vehicle was impounded.
Grievant remained with the vehicle at the Police Barracks overnight and the following morning, Grievant attempted to contact his supervisor, Sharon L. Cannon (Cannon), Director of Admissions. While Grievant was unable to speak directly with Cannon, he did leave her a message that he would be unable to attend work for personal reasons. Grievant further contacted the University Motor Pool in regards to the incident. Later that day, the Director of Facilities at the University became aware of the impounded vehicle, and sent two employees to retrieve it.
At some point on November 9, 1994, Cannon learned of this incident. from the University’s Director of Public Affairs. Without any further confirmation or verification of the allegations and before hearing Grievant’s version of the events, Cannon recommended to the Vice President of Student Affairs that Grievant be terminated. When Grievant returned to his office, Cannon informed Grievant of her recommendation. On November 10, 1994, Cannon assigned Grievant to non-recruiting responsibilities and reassigned Grievant’s recruitment responsibilities to other recruiting staff.
Pursuant to the grievance package, a pre-disciplinary hearing was conducted in November 1994, but, the “record is devoid of any exchanges thereafter until ... January 19, 1995.” Arbitration Award, p. 4. On January 19, 1995, Grievant received a ninety-day notice of termination effective April 21, 1995, but, the notice contained no explanation or basis for *161the University’s actions.1 On February 22, 1995, the Association filed a grievance challenging Grievant’s discharge, in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article 13 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Agreement) between the University and Association. On January 23, 1996, pursuant to those same procedures, the Association issued a Demand for Arbitration and on May 15, 1996, a hearing was conducted to determine the threshold issue of arbitrability.
Before the arbitrator, Grievant argued that his dismissal was arbitrable as a violation of Article 14, Section 3 of the Agreement. Conversely, the University contended that Article 14 could not have been violated, because the provisions of that Article are expressly inapplicable to disciplinary actions affecting probationary employees. Article 14 of the CBA provides:
DISCHARGE, DEMOTION, SUSPENSION AND DISCIPLINE
Section 1. The Employer shall not demote, suspend, discharge, or take any disciplinary action against a professional employee without just cause. A professional employee may appeal a demotion, suspension or discharge beginning at the second step of the grievance procedure. Association shall be notified by the Employer of any demotion, suspension or discharge.
Section 2. Any action instituted by the Employer under Section 1 of the Article shall be implemented within a reasonable period of time after the event giving rise to such disciplinary action of (sic) knowledge thereof.
Section 3. During a professional employees (sic) initial twelve months of employment (sic), the provisions of this Article shall not apply. If at any point during a profession*162al employee’s initial probationary period, the President or their (sic) designee(s) determine that the professional employee will not be retained, the professional employee will be given 90 days notice prior to termination, which notice may include paid or unpaid periods of time. The parties hereto recognize that for some serious offenses, progressive discipline is inappropriate and that immediate removal may be warranted and such 90 days (sic) notice period referred to in this section shall not be applicable.
(Emphasis Added). The arbitrator agreed, in part, with the University that the “just cause” protection afforded by Article 14, Section 1 of the Agreement was inapplicable to probationary employees. The arbitrator further determined:
The language of Section 3 appears on its face, in a negative way, to create an expectation that for at least some “serious” (and all lesser infractions as well), progressive discipline is available for probationary employees. However, the language does not provide any standard nor does it define progressive discipline.
The Parties appear to have agreed during the Hearing that if there is a standard it is that the State System may not be “arbitrary and capricious” in meting out discipline. But even if the Parties had not agreed, the Arbitrator would have concluded that some minimal procedural due process standard applies. The Arbitrator agrees with the Parties that the State System may not act in an “arbitrary or capricious” manner in applying discipline.
(R.R., pp. 10-lla). Thus, the arbitrator concluded that the Association was not foreclosed from claiming a violation of Article 14 Section 3 of the Agreement, and scheduled a hearing on the merits for August 21, 1996. The merits hearing was then held to determine the extent of the notice required before termination and “whether the actions taken were arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 11a.
At the hearing on the merits before the arbitrator, each party was afforded a full and fair opportunity to introduce *163relevant evidence in support of its position and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Based upon the evidence introduced at the hearing, the arbitrator found that Cheyney was required “[a]t a minimum” to provide Grievant with a “investigation and a statement of the reasons why he is being terminated.” Arbitration Award, p. 15. The arbitrator further found that “Ms. Cannon’s precipitous recommendation for termination” had the “appearance of pre-judging the situation and poisoning any further even handed evaluation of what, in fact, transpired.” Id. Because “at the time of the notice of dismissal” Cheyney had not “verified the Baltimore Police Report or the status of his (Grievant’s) driver’s license,” the arbitrator determined that Grievant’s termination was not for contractually permissible reasons and sustained his grievance. Id. at 15-16.2 The University petitions for this Court’s review.
On appeal, the University first challenges the arbitrator’s initial determination of arbitrability. In this respect, the University contends that an arbitrator is confined to interpreting and applying the terms of the Agreement and does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. The University further contends that the plain meaning of the Agreement is unmistakably clear and requires no interpretation, in that “[djuring a professional employees [sic] initial 12 months of employment, the provisions of this Article shall not apply.” The University argues that by holding that the grievance filed under this Article was an arbitrable matter, the arbitrator’s Interim Award violates the express terms of the Agreement, constitutes an unreasonable interpretation that is contrary to the parties expressed intent, and must be vacated as it fails to draw its essence from the Agreement.
Conversely, the Association contends that the intent of the parties as manifested in the provisions of the Agreement is a question of fact, and that this Court cannot second guess an *164arbitrator’s factfinding so long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract. The Association further contends that where, as here, the arbitrator interprets an Agreement in favor of the arbitrability of a dispute, this-Court should be slow to disagree. Because the last sentence of Article 14, Section 3 of the Agreement supports a determination that probationary employees are entitled to minimum due process considerations, the Association argues that this Court should not act as a “superarbitrator” and substitute our judgment for that of the arbitrator on the issue of arbitrability
In-public employment situations, the law is well settled that a reviewing court may not overturn an arbitrator’s award, so long as it draws its essence from the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. Community College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver County, Society of the Faculty (PSEA/NEA), 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977). Under the essence test, the reviewing court is confined to a determination of whether the arbitrator’s decision represents a reasonable or rational interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. County of Centre v. Musser, 519 Pa. 380, 548 A.2d 1194 (1988).
Article 13 of the Agreement, entitled “Grievance and Arbitration,” defines a grievance as “a dispute which may arise concerning the application, meaning or interpretation of this Agreement.” This Article further provides:
The arbitrator shall neither add to, subtract from, nor modify the provisions of this Agreement. The arbitrator shall confine himself/herself to precise issues submitted for arbitration and shall have no authority to determine any issues not submitted to him/her.
In the instant case, the parties dispute whether disciplinary actions affecting probationary employees are arbitrable under Article 14. The Agreement explicitly provides that the provisions of Article 14 shall not apply during a professional employee’s initial twelve months of employment. Despite this plain language in the Agreement and the undisputed fact that *165Grievant received a ninety day notice of termination in the tenth month of his employment, the arbitrator found the matter to be arbitrable.
In deciding the precise issue for arbitration, the arbitrator further determined that some form of “progressive discipline” was available for probationary employees, but concluded that the language of the Agreement does not provide any standard, nor define this concept. Nonetheless, he imposed a minimal standard of procedural due process and found that the arbitrable issue was whether University acted in an “arbitrary or capricious” manner in discharging Grievant.
An arbitrator’s award cannot be said to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, where it violates the express terms of that agreement by “changing the language of the contract or adding new and additional provisions.” American Federation of State County & Municipal Employees, District Council 84 v. City of Beaver Falls, 74 Pa.Cmwlth. 136, 459 A.2d 863, 865 (1983); State System of Higher Educ. v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local Union 509, 149 Pa.Cmwlth. 193, 612 A.2d 645, 647 (1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 613, 618 A.2d 403 (1992). Moreover, where the arbitrator’s words exhibit an infidelity to the agreement, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award. Southern Tioga Educ. Ass’n v. Southern Tioga School Dist., 668 A.2d 260 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 665, 676 A.2d 1203 (1996).
After carefully reviewing Article 14 of the Agreement, we fail to perceive how the arbitrator’s initial determination of arbitrability can be construed as a rational interpretation of the instant agreement between the parties. In the present case, the arbitrator’s initial determination violated the plain meaning of the first sentence of Article 14 Section 3. This sentence clearly states that probationary employees cannot *166grieve under Article 14. Moreover, while it may be that minimal due process provisions should have been incorporated into the Agreement, the arbitrator expressly indicated that no standard or definition existed within the four corners of the parties Agreement. Finally, while Article 13 expressly provides that the arbitrator lacks the requisite authority to “ad to, subtract from, nor modify the provisions of this Agreement,” the arbitrator determined that the issue for arbitration was whether Grievant’s discharge was “arbitrary and capricious,” despite the fact that these terms do not appear in Article 14.
Because the issue of whether the University’s action were “arbitrary and capricious” was not rationally derived from the essence of the Agreement, this Court has no choice but to reverse the arbitrator’s determination of arbitrability.3
ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of September, 1997, the award of the arbitrator in the above-captioned matter is hereby vacated, and the State System of Higher Education’s decision to dismiss Frank Mitchell is reinstated.
. Apparently, Grievant missed a scheduled recruiting appointment at Philadelphia High School for Girls on December 6, 1994. The parties dispute as to whether this incident resulted from the University's failure to reassign this recruitment responsibility, as it had done in November with Grievant's other duties, or Grievant’s failure to notify the University as to the existence of the appointment.
. The arbitrator reinstated Grievant to his prior position with full back pay and benefits less substituted earnings. The arbitrator further defined the time frame to be used for Grievant's probationary evaluation.
. Because we conclude that the instant matter was not arbitrable, we need not address the merits of the grievance.