(concurring in the result) — This case is not yet ripe for decision. Before a court can apply the law and determine whether liability can be decided on a motion for summary judgment, it must first have an adequate factual basis for doing so. There is no such basis here.
Essentially the only "facts" before the court are each party's answers to the other's interrogatories. We recently held in American Linen Supply Co. v. Nursing Home Bldg. Corp., 15 Wn. App. 757, 551 P.2d 1038 (1976), that although-CR 56 neglects to mention that a court may consider answers' to interrogatories in ruling on motions for summary judgment, such answers may nevertheless be used. We were, however, careful to point out in that case that before such answers can be relied on to supply facts pertinent to a summary judgment proceeding, they must satisfy the other requirements of CR 56 and contain admissible material.
We held in American Linen Supply Co. that answers to interrogatories cannot be considered when they are based on hearsay or on information and belief, nor can conclu-sionary statements of fact be considered in ruling on a summary judgment motion.
In the case before us, we have an unwitnessed, one-vehicle accident in which the driver was killed. The defendant-county's answers to interrogatories relating to the facts of the accident were verified by the prosecuting attorney "to the best of his information and knowledge." Although the plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories were verified by the executrix of the decedent's estate, they *696demonstrate on their face that they are based on hearsay. Furthermore, to the extent that such answers state anything with respect to the "claims" of negligence (which was the language used in the county's interrogatories to the plaintiffs), they are simply conclusory facts or conclusions of law rather than statements made on personal knowledge of facts which would be admissible in evidence.3 CR 56(e). A defendant cannot push a plaintiff out of court by swearing that the plaintiff has no case, nor may a plaintiff remain in court by merely swearing that he or she does have a case.
The court therefore cannot use the parties' answers to interrogatories in this case as a basis on which to determine that pursuant to CR 56(c) "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." American Linen Supply Co. v. Nursing Home Bldg. Corp., supra.
The county was the party moving for summary judgment, therefore, it had the burden of proving that there is no material issue of fact. Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wn.2d 491, 494, 519 P.2d 7 (1974). For the reasons just noted, the county failed in its burden with respect to the liability issues, therefore as to those issues, the cause must be reversed and remanded. With respect to two of the plaintiffs, however, Laura and Leo Babin, they have admitted that they are "unadopted stepchildren" of the deceased. The issue of whether they are beneficiaries of an action brought under the wrongful death statute, RCW 4.20.020, *697or the survival statute, RCW 4.20.060, is therefore an issue which the court may appropriately decide at this point. "Unadopted stepchildren" are not beneficiaries within the terms of the wrongful death and survival statutes, Annot., 68 A.L.R.3d 1220 (1976), therefore, the summary judgment of dismissal as to the plaintiffs Babin must be affirmed.
For example, the county's interrogatory No. 66, together with the plaintiff-executrix' answer thereto, reads as follows:
"No. 66: With regard to Paragraph III (a) of the plaintiffs' Statement of Claim and Paragraph 3.1 (a) of plaintiffs' complaint, state specifically in what manner you claim the defendant was negligent in 'failure to properly design' said accident site.
"Answer: Failure to install guardrails
Failure to post warning signs re: lack of shoulders
Failure to provide adequate shoulder on narrow road
Failure to engineer road so as to support truck
Removal of support and shoulder
Other acts to be disclosed following discovery." (Italics mine.)