concurring.
I concur in affirming dismissal. As explained below, I believe that this case should be dismissed based on justiciability grounds, rather than the merits. One of the Secretary’s longstanding positions throughout this lawsuit has been that Plaintiffs’ claims are not justiciable, and I agree. The length and complexity of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (“NCLB” or “Act”) and the multiple and varied parts of our nation’s education machinery affected by the Act warrant our pause and certainly belie Judge Cole’s contention that this case is neither particularly complicated nor inherently political.
I
That said, a majority of the court sees it otherwise and has decided to reach the merits, notwithstanding both Plaintiffs’ failure to seek administrative remedies and the absence of the States from any involvement in this lawsuit. Plaintiffs and the Secretary have set forth their views, albeit views that do not encompass all of the important and relevant interests. Of those expressed views, I believe that the Secretary has the sounder one on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, as I explained in my dissenting opinion at the panel stage. Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y, 512 F.3d 252, 273-84 (6th Cir.2008) (McKeague, J., dissenting) (vacated). Thus, assuming that this dispute is justiciable as a majority of the court has so concluded, I concur in Part II of Judge Sutton’s opinion. I write separately, however, to set forth my concerns as to justiciability.
II
A. Justiciability Principles
In its most recent term, the Supreme Court stressed the need for federal courts to be “keenly mindful of [their] institutional role” under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 2504, 2513, 174 L.Ed.2d 140 (2009). A court should not make a broad, sweeping ruling when a narrower, more limited one will dispose of the case. See id. .This court has been mindful of its institutional role in recent cases. See, e.g., Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321 (6th Cir.2009) (en banc); Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir.2008) (en banc).
One doctrine used by courts to protect their institutional role is justiciability. In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court defined justiciability as the “[a]ppropriateness of *298the subject matter for judicial consideration.” 369 U.S. 186, 198, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The concept is distinct from jurisdiction, which calls into question whether the cause of action is a case or controversy under Article III or is otherwise “described by any jurisdictional statute.” Id. With justiciability, “consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court’s inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded.” Id.
Justiciability covers a number of related, but distinct, “constitutional limitations and prudential considerations,” including exhaustion, ripeness, and standing. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Indian Reservation v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir.1986) (discussing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)). Whether a party is required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 or is otherwise crucial for a full and just adjudication of the case also falls under the justiciability umbrella. Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1076, 1085-86 & n. 34 (11th Cir.1983).
In accordance with its institutional role, after oral argument the en banc court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing several questions, including the following:
Are these claims justiciable — specifically, are they ripe for review, see Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), have plaintiffs exhausted all administrative remedies, see Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 114 S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d 29 (1994), and can the court properly resolve this case without the presence of the relevant States (Michigan, Texas, and Vermont) as parties or at least without knowing the views of the States on the issues presented?
Glancy v. Taubman Ctrs., Inc., 373 F.3d 656, 676 (6th Cir.2004) (explaining that a court can raise justiciability issues on its own motion). As explored below, exhaustion and the absence of the States are particularly important considerations in this appeal.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs have not sought administrative review of any of their claims. Once approved, educational plans under the Act are not set in stone. A school district can craft an amendment to its own local plan or propose one for the statewide plan and submit the proposed amendment for review before the state department of education. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6311(a)(1), (f)(1)(B), 6312(d)(3). The state department of education would review the proposal and, if the department denied it, the school district would have the right to a hearing before the department for a final, written ruling. 20 U.S.C. § 1231b-2(a). If the school district was still dissatisfied, it could appeal the ruling to the Secretary. Id. § 1231b-2(b). The Secretary’s decision could then be challenged in federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (“APA”), as the Secretary conceded in a similar case, Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F.Supp.2d 459, 489 (D.Conn.2006) (“Connecticut I”), as well as in the supplemental brief to this court, Appellee’s Supp. Br. at 4.1
*299In its lawsuit against the Secretary, the State of Connecticut has raised several claims, including statutory and Spending-Clause claims similar to those brought by the Plaintiffs here. In Connecticut I, the district court, Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, set forth in detail a number of sound reasons for requiring the State of Connecticut to seek administrative review prior to bringing its lawsuit. 453 F.Supp.2d at 482-91.
Some of those same prudential reasons are present here. For instance, faced with a concrete proposal and specific facts, the school district, the state education department, and the Secretary would have the opportunity to craft a compromise solution that would avoid the need for a lawsuit. See id. at 485; see also Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C.Cir.2004) (explaining that one of the advantages of administrative review is that the objections of various parties can be worked out without the more dramatic measure of a federal lawsuit). Even if a compromise solution could not be hammered out, the parties’ positions would be crystallized, providing a fuller record for judicial review as well as presenting a relatively narrow, particularized claim for relief. Connecticut I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 485. This would give the school districts the opportunity to present their arguments within the context of a proposed amendment to a particular feature of the educational system, rather than as broad, sweeping claims. Moreover, the federal court would have the benefit of the Secretary’s reasoning on why the proposed amendment violated federal law. Id. Pursuing a claim at the administrative level first would not be a hardship to school districts, as the Act sets forth a detailed process for entertaining these types of concrete claims and complaints. See supra.
Although the claims in Connecticut I mirror those in this case, there is at least one fundamental difference between the two cases. Here, none of the respective States are involved. Given the central role played by States under the regime created by the Act, this is a somewhat startling omission.2 Were this a more narrow, concrete challenge by a school district seeking an amendment to a plan and having exhausted administrative review, the absence of the States might not be a concern. However, rather than bring a particularized challenge, Plaintiffs made the strategic decision to bring a sweeping one. Consider, for instance, a couple of the “mandates” challenged in their complaint: “developing] standardized tests aligned with the curriculum standards to measure the progress of public school students in meeting those standards” and “ensuring] that school staff (teachers and paraprofessionals) meet prescribed qualification requirements.” JA 31-32. By asking for a *300declaration that States and schools not be “required to spend non-NCLB funds to comply with the NCLB mandates,” Plaintiffs seek the authority to determine whether federal funds are sufficient to cover the costs associated with testing and staff qualifications. The breadth of their claims and of their requested relief makes Plaintiffs’ lawsuit a broad challenge to the fundamental tenets of the Act itself, namely, the universal raising of student academic achievement as evidenced by testing and other accountability metrics, rather than a challenge to one or two isolated features of the Act. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 360 F.3d 188, 192 (D.C.Cir.2004). Accordingly, it must be asked whether the absence of the States precludes Plaintiffs from bringing this type of attack at all.
C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19
Whether a person or entity must be involved in a lawsuit naturally brings to mind Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, Required Joinder of Parties. Although neither Plaintiffs nor the Secretary have cited to Rule 19 in them briefs, that provides no grounds for ignoring the rule. It is not surprising that Plaintiffs did not raise the argument, given it is one directly contrary to their position. The Secretary did, in fact, argue on several occasions that this case is not justiciable because the States are not involved in any capacity. See, e.g., Appellee’s Posb-Argument (en banc) Br. at 8-9; Appellee’s Final (panel) Br. at 31-33. In fact, during oral argument before the en banc court, counsel for the Secretary argued that this case was “less fit for review” than the Connecticut v. Spellings case because, unlike in that case, no State is a party here. While the Secretary chose not to present the concerns within the framework of Rule 19, the substance of the arguments is more important than the form, especially given Rule 19’s focus on the weighing of equitable interests. See infra. Of the three justici-ability questions that the court presented to the parties post-argument, the third plainly put both parties on fair notice that the court could consider their responses through the prism of Rule 19. But, even setting aside the Secretary’s earlier voiced concerns and this court’s notice to the parties, justiciability is first and foremost an institutional concern. A court must jealously guard its institutional role to rule only on disputes that are justiciable, including “whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 198, 82 S.Ct. 691.
The States of Michigan, Texas, and Vermont have an obvious interest in the subject of this litigation because each has agreed that it and its public schools will accept federal funds under the Act and be bound by its requirements. The educational program established under Title I of the Act provides funding to the States conditioned on their developing statewide plans approved by the Secretary. The commitments made by the States in their plans are binding on themselves as well as their political subdivisions, including school districts. The States are tasked with ensuring that school districts comply with the Act and statewide plans. 20 U.S.C. § 1232c. While the school districts are themselves interested parties, have rights and duties under the Act independent of the States, and are arguably injured by the Secretary’s interpretation of the unfunded-mandate provision, the absence of the States as parties is a glaring omission given their central role in the educational regime created by the Act.
It is sometimes the case that, though parties who should be involved in a lawsuit are not, the lawsuit can nonetheless continue forward in their absence. Thus, while it is beyond dispute that the States play a central role in primary and secondary edu*301cation, it must be determined whether they are required parties to this lawsuit and, if so, whether the lawsuit can nonetheless proceed in their absence.
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth a three-step test for courts to use in determining whether an absent party must be joined or the case dismissed if that party cannot be joined. The first matter to consider is whether the States are required parties under Rule 19(a). If the States are required, then the next matter is whether their joinder is feasible or if a lack of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction makes joinder impossible. Third, if joinder is not possible, the equities must be weighed pursuant to Rule 19(b) to determine if the lawsuit can continue in the States’ absence or if the case should be dismissed. Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2180, 2188-89, 171 L.Ed.2d 131 (2008); Hooper v. Wolfe, 396 F.3d 744, 747 (6th Cir.2005).
1. Required Parties
A required party under Rule 19(a) is a party whose absence prevents the court from according “complete relief among existing parties” or a party who “claims an interest relating to the subject of the action” and whose absence “as a practical matter impair[s] or impede[s] the [party’s] ability to protect the interest” or “leave[s] an existing party subject to the substantial risk of ... multiple[ ] or otherwise inconsistent obligations.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(1)(A), (B)(i), (ii). In essence, required parties are those “persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it.” 7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1604 (3d ed. 2009) (“FPP ”) (quoting Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139, 15 L.Ed. 158 (1854)).
Plaintiffs have requested declaratory and injunctive relief for “states and school districts.” JA 67. Plaintiffs do not specify whether the term “school districts” means only Plaintiff school districts or rather all school districts across Michigan, Texas, and Vermont or even Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont. It can be inferred that they intended a broad construction, one not limited to just Plaintiff school districts, given that they have also sought relief for “states” even though neither Michigan, Texas, nor Vermont (nor any other State within the Sixth Circuit) is involved in this case.
In Warshak, this court found that the plaintiff’s facial challenge to a provision of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), was not justiciable. 532 F.3d at 525, 534. One of the problems with plaintiffs attack identified by the court stemmed from the fact that relief was granted to persons other than the plaintiff. The court recognized, “ ‘While district courts are not categorically prohibited from granting injunctive relief benefitting an entire class in an individual suit, such broad relief is rarely justified because injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.’ ” Id. at 531 (quoting Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 273 (6th Cir.2003)). Plaintiffs here have not sought class-action status or fashioned this action as one brought on behalf of another person or entity. How the district court could grant the full relief requested in the complaint is a quandary that has never been explained by Plaintiffs.
*302It is the case that Rule 19(a)(1)(A) requires that “complete relief’ be possible only “among existing parties.” So, if the court ignores Plaintiffs’ request for relief on behalf of nonparty school districts and States, then any relief could be limited to Plaintiff school districts. But, this leads to another quandary relevant to Rule 19(a)(1)(B): what would it mean for the Secretary to be enjoined “from withholding from ... school districts any federal funds to which they are entitled under the NCLB because of a failure to comply with the mandates of the NCLB that is attributable to a refusal to spend non-NCLB funds to achieve such compliance”? JA 67.
As Plaintiffs stated during oral argument before the panel, “[Pjrimary responsibility to educate children rests with the States.” Clearly, the States have a strong interest “relating to” the Act in general and in particular whether school districts should have the discretion to opt-out of certain programs and requirements if the federal funds in any given year are somehow deemed insufficient. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(1)(B). The Act requires that the States wield significant oversight authority vis-a-vis school districts. The federal funds at issue in this lawsuit flow through the States in accordance with their statewide plans approved by the Secretary and with the districts’ own plans approved by the States. Under the statewide plans, every public school is required to make AYP and is included in the State’s accountability system. The States must ensure that school districts comply with all of the requirements of the Act, as embodied in their statewide plans. Thus, if Plaintiff school districts were to be granted relief in this case, the States would necessarily fall out of compliance with their own statewide plans in order to accommodate that relief. As a result, the States would have to submit plan amendments to the Secretary seeking either to carve out exceptions for Plaintiff school districts or to make fundamental, wholesale revisions along the lines sought by those school districts, presumably then applying to all school districts within the States. Again, though, without any involvement by the States in this case, the court can only make educated guesses about how the States would react to a favorable outcome for these Plaintiff school districts.
The States play a (if not the) major role in primary and secondary education within their geographic borders. They set educational priorities and direction for all of the public schools. They have a legitimate interest in the funding of education as well as the resources that must be devoted to administering and supervising compliance with their statewide plans. Even if it could be assumed that the States would desire more discretion in how they can spend federal funds, the States’ absence impairs their ability to protect the viability and legality of their plans.
It is suggested that Plaintiffs and the Secretary have adequately argued the legal merits of Plaintiffs’ claims and, as a result, there can be no risk of prejudice to the States’ interests. That, however, is too blinkered a view of this case. Rule 19 is a “creature of equity jurisprudence” and the court must consider not only any legal prejudice, but also any practical prejudice to the States’ interests. FPP § 1602 (citation omitted); see also id. § 1604 (“It should be noted that the prejudicial effect of nonjoinder referred to in [Rule 19(a)(1)(B) ] may be practical rather than legal in character.” (citation omitted)). The court must consider the interests of an absent person, even if that person’s legal claim is “technically unaffected.” Id. § 1602 (citation omitted).
While the court is not faced with a pure contract dispute, the Supreme Court *303has drawn on contract principles when resolving Spending-Clause disputes. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531. It is hornbook law that all parties to a contract are necessary in an action challenging its validity or interpretation. See, e.g., Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir.1975) (“No procedural principle is more deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an action to set aside a lease or a contract, all parties who may be affected by the determination of the action are indispensable.”). This lawsuit is not only missing a party, but arguably the most important party. The Secretary cannot force a State to accept federal funds under the Act. The school districts cannot accept federal funds on their own. Only the States can decide in the first instance whether, after reading the offer sheet (i.e., the Act), to accept the funds and associated requirements for the benefit of the State’s public-school students. The interests of the States in this context are too myriad for a political subdivision to protect. And to think that the Secretary, the party sitting across the bargaining table, can adequately represent the States’ interests in this dispute is simply not realistic.
To illustrate, let’s assume for the moment that Plaintiffs are correct. Section 7907(a) releases recipients from requirements of the Act “if, and only to the extent that, federal funding falls short.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. The federal government cannot require recipients “to comply with the NCLB to the extent that they do not receive sufficient federal funding to do so.” Id. at 23-24. As a result, Plaintiff school districts get an injunction permitting them to avoid compliance with a requirement of the Act to the extent that the costs associated with that requirement are somehow deemed too much.
Even if the States agree with Plaintiffs about the meaning of § 7907(a), does it necessarily follow that the States would therefore not be prejudiced by an injunction favoring these school districts? To take one example, consider the State of Michigan. As part of its statutory provisions governing aid to schools, Michigan mandates, “A district or intermediate district shall comply with all applicable reporting requirements specified in state and federal law.” MCL § 388.1619(3). It is clear from the explicit mention of the “no child left behind act of 2001” in that same section that the State had in mind the reporting requirements of the Act. See id. § 388.1619(1). Now, Michigan does not make provision for school districts to comply with reporting requirements specified in the Act only to the extent paid for by federal funds. If the Pontiac School District determines that it will not comply with the reporting requirements of the Act and nails the court’s injunction on the doors of the Michigan Capitol building, is it really true that the legitimate interests of the State of Michigan have not been prejudiced or that those interests have been adequately protected by the Secretary?
Staying with the State of Michigan, the State requires all school districts to administer the State’s merit examination to students in particular grades. Under state law, the merit examination must meet “all of the ... requirements of the no child left behind act of 2001.” MCL § 388.1704b(3)(d)(ii); see also id. § 388.1704b(2)(d). There is no provision in state law providing that the examination administered by a school district must satisfy the requirements of the Act only if that district deems that the amount of federal funds it receives are sufficient to cover certain costs. One of the requirements of the Act is that all students throughout the state be tested — in Michi*304gan, this would include students of Pontiac School District. Yet, armed with an injunction from this court, could Pontiac School District refuse to participate in Michigan’s merits-examination system even though the State otherwise mandates that the system comply with the Act’s requirements?
Furthermore, one issue that has come up repeatedly in this case is how to determine whether a particular requirement has been “underfunded.” This is an issue that might have benefitted from some development at the administrative level in the context of a more narrow, concrete complaint or proposed plan amendment. Be that as it may, a related issue central to the practical operation of the Act under Plaintiffs’ interpretation is this: which entity should have final authority to make the determination that a particular program or requirement is underfunded? The particular school district? The Secretary? Or the State ? School districts are, after all, political subdivisions of the States. School districts are subrecipients of federal funds under the Act, while States are primary recipients of the funds. It seems at least plausible that between the two, the States would prefer that they have final authority to determine whether any program or requirement is underfunded. On the flip side, although the Act represents an unprecedented extension of federal policy into primary and secondary public education, the States remain the central players in public education by setting priorities, direction, and spending. It seems at least plausible that the States would prefer that they, rather than the Secretary, have final authority to make the determination. This is certainly an important interest of the States related to the subject matter of this case and not an issue anyone could seriously argue has been adequately addressed on behalf of the States by Plaintiffs or the Secretary.
It must be acknowledged that Plaintiffs and the Secretary have presented both of their respective positions with vigor. However, “interests” encompass more than just legal positions. The States are separate players in our nation’s public-education system, or, as Plaintiffs’ counsel described during oral argument, the “three-way deal” of public education. In short, it is clear that neither Plaintiffs nor the Secretary fully share or represent the interests of the States, regardless of the outcome of an interpretation of § 7907(a). Thus, the States of Michigan, Vermont, and Texas should be considered required parties under Rule 19(a)(1)(B).3
2. Feasibility of Joinder
The next matter to consider is whether joinder is feasible. As a sovereign, a State cannot be required by a federal court to join a lawsuit as a party except under certain circumstances not present here. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 572 (6th Cir.2008) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought in federal court against a state and its agencies unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity or consented to be sued in federal court.”); In re Hood, 319 F.3d 755, 762 (6th Cir.2008) (explaining that Congress can sometimes abrogate a State’s sovereign immunity).4 *305Because the States have not voluntarily sought to join this lawsuit, and the court cannot require that they join, the States’ compulsory joinder under Rule 19 is not feasible.
3. Whether Dismissal is Proper
At the final step, Rule 19(b) requires a weighing of the equities. As this court explained in Glancy:
Courts are to consider at least four factors in assessing whether the action should be dismissed, including (but not limited to), first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to the person ...; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; [and] fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
373 F.3d at 672 (internal quotation marks omitted). When, however, the absent party is a sovereign, the weighing of the equities is more circumscribed. Kickapoo Tribe v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1498 (D.C.Cir.1995). This is “because immunity may be viewed as one of those interests compelling by themselves.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Republic of the Philippines, 128 S.Ct. at 2190 (within the Rule 19(b) context, discussing the importance of the “[c]omity and dignity interests” of a foreign sovereign).
As noted above, declaratory or injunc-tive relief in favor of Plaintiff school districts will undoubtedly call into question the viability and legality of the current statewide plans. Although the States will not strictly speaking be bound by the judgment, in practice the judgment will undoubtedly impact the States’ plans. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110, 88 S.Ct. 733, 19 L.Ed.2d 936 (1968) (stating that when considering the “interest of the outsider whom it would have been desirable to join,” the court should consider the “practical” impact of a judgment on that interest). It is certainly plausible that Plaintiffs’ position — that recipients should not have to spend their own money to pay for things mandated by the Act but not fully paid for by the federal government — would be supported by the States. In fact, the State of Vermont has enacted legislation to express that very sentiment. 2005, Adj. Sess., No. 182, § 35 (“[NJeither the State nor any subdivision thereof shall be required to spend any funds or incur any costs not paid for under the Act in order to comply with the Act.”). Taking a step back, though, it might very well be that some of the state officials understood that when they agreed to accept federal funds under the Act, they also agreed to use nonfederal funds to help pay for new programs, testing, etc. These officials might also have understood that were the Act read to mean what Plaintiffs contend it means, it is possible (maybe even probable) that Congress would rewrite the law with even less favorable conditions than the current version. Finally, it is also conceivable that state officials understood that meaningful improvement in the educational levels of their most disadvantaged students should not be left to unilateral decisions by local officials who might decide to forgo testing and assessment only *306after concluding that their students were not in fact making the improvement required by the Act.
The other three enumerated factors clearly weigh in favor of dismissal. Given the sweeping nature of Plaintiffs’ claims, there is little room to fashion the relief in a way that would lessen the prejudice to the States (and their disadvantaged students) or otherwise lessen the impact on their plans. As to whether the relief that could be granted would be adequate, the court must consider this from the public’s interest “in settling disputes by wholes” rather than from Plaintiffs’ particular interest in the lawsuit. Provident, 390 U.S. at 111, 88 S.Ct. 733 (“We read the Rule’s third criterion, whether the judgment issued in the absence of the nonjoined person will be ‘adequate,’ to refer to this public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible, for clearly the plaintiff, who himself chose both the forum and the parties defendant, will not be heard to complain about the sufficiency of the relief obtainable against them.”). The relief that could be granted to Plaintiff school districts would be of little practical value by itself; subsequent changes to the statewide plans would have to be made. The fashioning of these statewide plans are complex and require considerable negotiation; they are not merely ministerial in nature. As Governor Edward G. Rendell (Pa.) explained in his amicus brief, “Educational programming and funding questions are not simply a matter of parroting what Congress has set forth in NCLB.” Amicus Br. at 16. Thus, for the school districts to get any meaningful relief, they would need the States to develop changes to their statewide plans, propose those changes to the Secretary, and negotiate with the Secretary over the appropriateness of those proposals.
As to the fourth factor, Plaintiff school districts have other remedies available to them. As discussed above, the Act allows a school district to propose a plan amendment and pursue administrative and judicial remedies pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1231b-2 and the APA. Nothing in this justiciability analysis would preclude Plaintiff school districts from taking this route.
While this case was filed back in 2005, it is quite young in litigation-terms. The lawsuit is still in its early stages — no answer has been filed, no discovery has been taken, and no trial has occurred. Thus, this is not the case where one party or the court waited until the eleventh hour to raise the absence of the States as a possible ground for dismissal. See Boone v. Warren, 166 Fed.Appx. 818, 819-20 (6th Cir.2006) (in weighing the equities, finding that the defendant’s failure to raise the Rule 19 issue until after the jury trial was completed and judgment entered for the plaintiff weighed against dismissal). Likewise, while the failure to intervene can weigh against dismissal in the normal course, such failure is not a consideration “where intervention would require the absent party to waive sovereign immunity.” Kickapoo Tribe, 43 F.3d at 1498.
It is also true that from the standpoint of efficiency, the court might better just plow ahead regardless of these justiciability concerns, reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ legal claims, and let the chips fall where they may, as a majority of my colleagues would do. But, as this court recognized in Warshak, judicial efficiency must give way in the face of the type of intractable justi-ciability problems presented here. 532 F.3d at 533. Justiciability doctrines, such as ripeness in Warshak and the absence of a party here, “like all limitations on the judicial Power, prevent[] us from doing today what can be done tomorrow.” Id. *307(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Accordingly, regardless of the merits of the parties’ positions, this lawsuit should be dismissed because of the absence of the States of Michigan, Texas, and Vermont. It is true, of course, that in some other cases a political subdivision like a school district has defended against a claim by raising Spending-Clause arguments similar to those of Plaintiffs’, even though the respective States were not parties. See, e.g., Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 127 S.Ct. 1994, 167 L.Ed.2d 904 (2007); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 301, 126 S.Ct. 2455, 165 L.Ed.2d 526 (2006); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005). The Court in those cases issued holdings that were not only binding on the parties, but also, for all practical purposes, binding as precedent on the respective States. Yet, those and other similar cases are distinguishable on several grounds. In those cases, the issue of whether the lawsuit should be dismissed in the absence of the State was not raised and, because the issue is not a jurisdictional one, the Court was not required to reach the matter on its own motion. See FPP § 1603 (“Even if the court is mistaken in its decision to proceed in the absence of an interested person, it does not by that token deprive itself of the power to adjudicate as between the parties already before it through proper service of process.” (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 19 advisory committee’s notes (1966))). In at least one of the cases, moreover, the respective State did participate in the proceeding as amicus curiae. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 169, 125 S.Ct. 1497 (listing the State of Alabama as ami-cus curiae).
More importantly, the controversies in those and similar cases were narrower in scope than those presented in this lawsuit. Winkelman resolved whether parents could pursue claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) on their own without the assistance of legal counsel. 550 U.S. at 535, 127 S.Ct. 1994. The Court specifically noted that its ruling did “not impose any substantive condition or obligation on States they would not otherwise be required by law to observe.” Id. at 534, 127 S.Ct. 1994. In Arlington School District, the Court considered whether expert fees were “costs” under the IDEA and thereby recoverable under the act’s fee-shifting provision. 548 U.S. at 304, 126 S.Ct. 2455. Even Jackson, arguably the most far-reaching of the decisions listed above, involved the rather isolated question of whether recipients of federal funds could be held liable for intentional sex discrimination in the form of retaliation under Title IX. 544 U.S. at 183—84, 125 S.Ct. 1497.
In contrast, Plaintiffs here pursue a challenge to the fundamental tenets of the Act itself. It cannot be seriously questioned that the Act is markedly different under the parties’ respective views. According to Plaintiffs’ view, after the federal government appropriates funds, after the Department of Education sets its priorities, after the States set their own priorities and spending, then someone gets to decide whether a particular program or requirement is or becomes “underfunded” and, if so, then the district need not spend any funds on that program or requirement. According to the Secretary’s view, though, the federal government offers the States an all-or-nothing proposition — accept the funds and all of the duties, or go it alone without the funds or any of the duties. Every “shall” means “may,” every command simply an option, funding permitting — versus—“shall” means “shall” regardless of funding. It is hard to fathom a *308more divergent set of views of how a federal-funding statute is supposed to work.
This is not a case brought by a recipient or other interested party involving a concrete proposal within a specific factual context. As explained earlier, Plaintiffs could have brought that type of claim after first pursuing their administrative remedies. Having decided to go a different route, they should be confronted with the question of whether they can travel that route alone. I believe that they cannot.
D. Crucial for a Fair and Just Resolution
Even if the States were not “required” parties under Rule 19(a), dismissal of this lawsuit without reaching the merits would still be proper. A court can dismiss a case for a myriad of prudential reasons, including the absence of a party who is crucial to a fair and just resolution of the dispute but who would not fit squarely within Rule 19’s framework. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 155, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (“And courts may even refuse declaratory relief for the nonjoinder of interested parties who are not, technically speaking, indispensible.”); Emery v. Adams, 179 F.2d 586, 589 (6th Cir.1950) (“Even if [the corporation] were not an indispensible party, the court could proceed, in any event against Adams, individually, in its discretion, Rule 19, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., and it was no abuse of judicial discretion to decline to do so.”).
The States’ interests in the subject of this lawsuit, as well as the equitable factors weighing in favor of dismissal under Rule 19(b) set forth above, likewise weigh in favor of dismissal under general prudential principles. Furthermore, while parents are not required parties under Rule 19(a), it must be acknowledged that they have little voice in the current lawsuit even though they have arguably the second most important interest in the outcome, next to their children’s own interest. While parents are consulted when a school district develops a local plan, 20 U.S.C. § 6312(d)(1), the scope of that plan is narrower than a State’s own plan. Were the States involved, the broader interests embodied in the statewide plans would be represented. Id. § 6311(a)(1).
It is also undisputed that, whatever the merits of the parties’ respective arguments, the Act is a lengthy, intricate statutory scheme. It is much more likely that the court would arrive at the correct resolution were Plaintiffs to pursue a claim involving a proposed amendment to a plan that could be considered first at the administrative level where state and federal education officials could bring their professional expertise to bear. Alternatively, faced with a broad claim aimed directly at the meaning and operation of the Act, it can hardly be doubted that the court’s decision would be aided by input from the States.
Apart from these concerns, the involvement of the school districts from Vermont and Texas poses its own unique justiciability concerns. The State of Connecticut has brought a similar case against the Secretary raising, inter alia, the same two legal claims at issue in the present case: (a) the unfunded mandate provision prohibits school districts and States from spending nonfederal funds on activities required under the Act but not fully paid for by the federal government; and (b) the unfunded mandate provision violates the Spending Clause. Connecticut I, 453 F.Supp.2d at 480, 491. The case is now on appeal before the Second Circuit. Connecticut v. Duncan, No. 08-2437 (2d Cir.).
Assume for a moment that the Second Circuit were to find in favor of the Secretary on the merits, but this court were to *309find in favor of Plaintiffs. As noted above, Plaintiffs have requested declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of the States and school districts. Yet, the State of Vermont is within the geographic jurisdiction of the Second Circuit. Although not a party to the Connecticut v. Spellings lawsuit, a decision by the Second Circuit in favor of the Secretary would surely reverberate throughout that circuit and embolden the Secretary to continue applying his interpretation of the unfunded-mandate provision to the other States within that circuit. Thus, the State of Vermont could be faced with deciding how to reconcile contrary decisions from two federal circuits, one (the Sixth Circuit) in which a political subdivision of the State is a party to the lawsuit and the other (the Second Circuit) in which the State is geographically encompassed.
Again, though, it is possible that any relief in the present lawsuit could be strictly limited to Plaintiff school districts — i.e., they could be granted greater discretion in how they spend federal funds under the Act without also affording similar relief to the three States or any other school district within those States. Doing so would, at least at first blush, appear to avoid thrusting the State of Vermont into an intercircuit conflict. Yet, now consider the position in which the State of Vermont would find itself. Several of its school districts could unilaterally decide to forgo the programs and requirements set forth in the applicable plans and the Act, yet the remaining school districts that are nonparties to this lawsuit as well as the State of Vermont itself would be required to comply with the mandates of the Act, as interpreted by the Secretary. And, under this scenario, the Secretary’s interpretation would have the backing of the Second Circuit. Were this lawsuit to go forward and were Plaintiff school districts to be awarded relief, the State of Vermont’s education system would, in effect, be balkanized by conflicting circuit decisions. Moreover, even without a similar lawsuit winding through the Fifth Circuit, the State of Texas would be in the same situation as the State of Vermont because the State of Texas is currently subject to the Secretary’s interpretation of the Act. By granting relief to the Vermont and Texas school districts, the court would be requiring that those States treat some of its political subdivisions in one manner, while at the same time they would be required by the Secretary to treat other parallel subdivisions in a diametrically different manner. This balkanization of the States’ educational systems undermines the dignity interest of the sovereign States. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (The States “are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.”).
Moreover, this balkanization could have serious repercussions on the delivery of education services in the affected districts. Under Plaintiffs’ view of the Act, Congress relieved them from complying with the Act’s requirements whenever the cost of compliance exceeds federal appropriations. However, States and school districts ultimately control the costs of compliance, not the federal government. Thus, a Plaintiff school district itself would determine whether, in its opinion, a particular program was being sufficiently funded by the federal government. The district could then decide to spend its funds on something else because, in the district’s judgment, the federal government has not fully funded that program. The parents of economically disadvantaged students, of course, have the least opportunity to choose another school for their children, a school that would fulfill the requirements *310of the Act. Given that the Act’s programs and requirements are specifically intended to help the nation’s most disadvantaged students, those left-behind students are precisely the ones to whom the Act attempts to bring long-neglected relief but who would be hurt most by that district’s decision. Permitting school districts to pick-and-choose which programs they will comply with and which they will not would, as the NAACP predicted in this case, “sound the death knell for NCLB.” Amicus Br. at 17.
Ill
Appellate courts are often required to ignore the proverbial “elephant in the room.” Sometimes a party will not bring a particular claim that appears to the court to be a viable one or the party will waive an issue by failing to preserve it below. Appellate courts are bound in almost all cases to consider only the administrative or lower court record, so sometimes important factual developments can have no impact on the case’s resolution. Because the rules and limitations of appellate review are fairly well established, justice is still meted out even when an otherwise viable claim, issue, or fact has to be ignored by the reviewing court.
On occasion, however, there are just too many elephants in the room to ignore. Plaintiff school districts argue that the Secretary’s interpretation and implementation of the provision violates the plain meaning of the Act as well as the U.S. Constitution’s Spending Clause. While the merits of their claims raise interesting questions about the role of the various levels of government in primary and secondary education, the interpretation of a lengthy and complex statute, and the role of legislative history in cases like this, the absence of any of the States as parties creates serious justiciability concerns. Moreover, the involvement of the Texas and Vermont school districts raises serious intercircuit and intrastate problems— problems that are avoided only because the court has decided, in essence, to maintain the status quo with its judgment today. Together these realities constitute a parade of elephants that the court should not ignore or dismiss so breezily.
Accordingly, I would find Plaintiffs’ claims, as presented, nonjusticiable. Inasmuch as a majority of my colleagues have seen fit to reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, however, I concur in the analysis set forth in Part II of Judge Sutton’s opinion and concur in the judgment affirming dismissal of the claims.
. There is a separate administrative-review process for appealing the Secretary’s withholding of funds, recovery of funds, or issuance of a cease-and-desist order. See 20 *299U.S.C. §§ 1234-1234Í. Under §§ 1234-1234i, a school district can challenge the punitive measure before an AU (complete with discovery and trial-like proceedings), subject to administrative review by the Secretary and judicial review before a federal court of appeals. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1234d(c),(f), 1234(g). This separate process is not applicable to the present lawsuit, however, as Plaintiff school districts have not been penalized by the Secretary for any improper use of federal funds, nor has the Secretary discussed this process in any of the briefs submitted here. See Pontiac Sch. Dist., 512 F.3d at 260 n. 2 (vacated) (noting that the Secretary had not addressed the exhaustion of administrative remedies and citing to 20 U.S.C. § 1234d).
. As an aside, I note that some States did participate in this lawsuit as amici curiae. Tellingly, however, none of the States were those with school districts involved in this lawsuit. See Amici Curiae Br. of the States of Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia (filed Apr. 3, 2006); Amicus Curiae Br. of the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (filed Apr. 6, 2006).
. Despite Judge Sutton's contention that one of my "primary disagreements” with him centers "on whether we can grant 'complete relief without the States” under Rule 19(a)(1)(A), it should be clear from the preceding analysis that my primary emphasis is that the States have important interests in the subject of this litigation that are not adequately represented by Plaintiff school districts or the Secretary, a consideration that is sufficient by itself under Rule 19(a)(1)(B) to find that the States are required parties.
. A state official can be sued in an official capacity in federal court under Ex parte *305Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), again, though, only under certain circumstances, including that the lawsuit not "implicate[] special sovereignty issues.” Idaho v. Coeur d’Arlene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997). Plaintiffs chose not to sue any state officials in their official capacities.