dissenting.
I do not believe it is wise to rewrite the Rules of Criminal Procedure through judicial opinions. The majority’s result is unrequired by our constitution and unsupported by our rules. If the result is otherwise thought to be practical and sensible, a simple rule amendment would be a more direct and candid approach.
The court prefers the pre-1992 version of our Rules of Criminal Procedure, under which a defendant could appeal from a judgment of guilt entered pursuant to a plea.1 *262Indeed, the majority’s opinion is premised on the assumption that a defendant cannot waive the right to appeal contained in art. 2, § 24 of the Arizona Constitution. But this assumption is based on the court’s failure to distinguish the holding in State v. Ethington, 121 Ariz. 572, 592 P.2d 768 (1979) (one cannot contract away the right to appeal) from the formal procedures we adopted in 1992 that allow a defendant to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to appeal in front of a judge. See Rules 17.2(e) and 27.8(e), Ariz. R.Crim.P. Contract is one thing. A formal procedure that allows the waiver of every other right listed in art. 2, § 24 (counsel, confrontation, speedy trial, etc.) is quite another. See People v. Rodriguez, 192 Mich. App. 1, 480 N.W.2d 287, 291 (1991) (holding that a criminal defendant may stand in open court and waive the right to appeal, noting that “[ajlthough it is clear that a court may not properly negotiate a plea with a defendant or ‘place a price’ on his right to appeal, neither situation arises where a defendant, with the participation of his attorney and the prosecutor, makes his own terms, understands them, and thereby brings an end to a prosecution or trial”). This failure to distinguish between the two explains Wilson v. Ellis, 176 Ariz. 121, 859 P.2d 744 (1993), where a majority held that the procedures for the formal waiver of the right to appeal contained in Rule 17.2(e), Ariz.R.Crim.P., and Rule 27.8(e), Ariz.R.Crim.P., mean nothing. See Wilson, 176 Ariz. at 124, 859 P.2d at 747 (Martone, J., dissenting).2 See also State v. Wilson, 174 Ariz. 564, 567, 851 P.2d 863, 866 (App.1993) (“We thus conclude that the right to appeal, like any other constitutional right, may be waived.”).3
What do these rules mean.if not exactly what they say—that by pleading guilty, a defendant waives certain rights, among them, the right to appeal? The majority answers this by defining “waiver” as merely “postponement.” Ante, at 259, n. 2, 889 P.2d at 617, n. 2. But if a defendant merely postpones his appeal rather than waives it, why do we require such rigorous formal waiver procedures? The court says, on the one hand, that it does “not hold today that a pleading defendant cannot waive his right to a direct appeal,” id., and, on the other, “a Rule 32 proceeding is the only means available for exercising this constitutional right to appellate review.” Ante, at 258, 889 P.2d at 616. The majority, thus, feels constitutionally compelled to convert appellate review of the denial of post-conviction relief, which all agree is not waived, and is not constitutionally based, into direct appellate review, which is constitutionally based.
Arizona’s rules are not exceptional. At the time this court considered them, research indicated that only a few states failed to restrict a defendant’s right to appeal after pleading guilty. See the clerk’s record in R-91-0027. In fact, a majority of states recognizes that the right to appeal, like other fundamental constitutional rights, may be waived if the defendant does so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Rodriguez, 480 N.W.2d at 291 (“We agree with the decisions in a majority of jurisdictions that suggest there is no affirmative public policy to be served in fostering appeals or prohibiting their waiver.”); State v. Perkins, 108 Wash.2d 212, 737 P.2d 250, 252 (1987) (criticizing State v. Ethington, 121 Ariz. 572, 592 P.2d 768 (1979) and noting that “ ‘almost all courts have agreed that defendants can waive those rights [to appeal] by pleading guilty, so long as they do so knowingly and voluntarily.’ ”) (quoting J. Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas, § 5.14, at 5-29 (2d ed. 1983)). Because this court’s understanding of the ability to waive the right to appeal is unique, it is difficult to understand its *263statements that it sees no “need when adopting a rule to explicitly disavow an intent to violate the constitution,” and “[i]t may, we think, be taken for granted that we intend to abide by the constitution.” Ante, at 259, 889 P.2d at 617.
Today, the court completes its rejection of the new Rule 32 by adding language that is not there. I believe that if we wanted to accord a defendant who is represented by counsel an absolute right to file a pro per petition we would have said so. We would not have relied upon a “showing of good cause.” Today the court rewrites Rule 32.4(c), Ariz.R.Crim.P., so that it reads, in part, as follows:
In non-capital cases, appointed counsel for the defendant shall have sixty days from the date of appointment to file a petition raising claims under Rule 32.1. IF APPOINTED COUNSEL IN NON-CAPITAL CASES IS OF THE VIEW THAT NO COLORABLE ISSUE IS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE FILING OF A PETITION, HE OR SHE SHALL, WITHIN THE SIXTY DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A PETITION, MOVE TO WITHDRAW.4 THE DEFENDANT SHALL HAVE 30 DAYS AFTER THE ENTRY OF AN ORDER ALLOWING WITHDRAWAL TO FILE A PETITION. OTHERWISE, [a] non-capital defendant proceeding without counsel shall have sixty days to file a petition from the date the notice is filed or from the date the request for counsel is denied. (Capitalized words indicate the court’s addition).
Counsel for the defendants admitted at oral argument that an amendment like this would be acceptable. If that is the case, we should adopt it under Rule 28, Ariz.R.Sup.Ct. While I would quickly vote to adopt such an amendment, I dissent here because the court’s opinion is a reach, unrequired by our constitution and unsupported by our existing rule.
. In 1992, we amended our rules to coincide, in part, with A.R.S. § 13-4033(B) (“In noncapital cases a defendant may not appeal from a judg*262ment or sentence that is entered pursuant to a plea agreement or an admission to a probation violation.”).
. An exhaustive search of the record in the Rule 28 file for each of these rules reveals no support for what the majority characterizes as the "court's intent then or now.” Ante, at 259, n. 3, 889 P.2d at 617, n. 3. See the clerk's record in R-91-0027.
. And neither State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), nor A.R.S. § 13-4035(B) support the court's imposition of an Anders review on the court of appeals. Ante, at 260, n. 5, 889 P.2d at 618, n. 5. Leon and Anders apply to direct appellate review.—not collateral post-conviction relief. A.R.S. § 13-4035(B) refers to "an appeal,” not post-conviction relief. Today, the court ignores the difference. Admittedly this flows naturally from the court’s refusal to acknowledge the right to waive an appeal. Soon the court will be confronted with the argument that the more limited scope of review under Rule *26332, as compared to an appeal, is itself unconstitutional.
. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion that "(a)lthough counsel in these cases did not formally withdraw, for all practical purposes their representation ended,” ante, at 260, 889 P.2d at 618, Rule 6.3(b), Ariz.R.Crim.P., specifically provides that a lawyer "shall continue to represent” the defendant "unless the court permits him or her to withdraw.”