Pashmait, J.
(dissenting). Ronald Valentine was charged in an indictment returned by a Monmouth County Grand Jury with possession of heroin with intent to .distribute and distribution of heroin, both counts in violation of N. J. S. A. 24:21-19(a) (1). In a separate indictment, he was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting in the distribution of heroin, in contravention of N. J. S. A. 24:21-19 (a) (1) and 2A:85-14, respectively. Defendant was convicted by a jury of all four of these offenses as well as other crimes not pertinent to this appeal.
The possession with intent to distribute and distribution charges arose from the same criminal event which occurred on November 8, 1971. On that date, one Robert McCue, an undercover agent for the Narcotics Bureau of the New Jersey State Police, was engaged in a conversation with defendant, during which the agent asked to purchase some heroin. Valentine responded by exhibiting several glassine bags of heroin and handing one of them to McCue in exchange for a $10 bill.
The second possession with intent to distribute and the aiding and abetting charges are likewise the product of a single, continuous criminal transaction which occurred on November 23, 1971. On that date Trooper McCue was talking with one Bobby Sheard in McCue’s automobile when a *213white Cadillac driven by defendant stopped alongside McCue’s car. In response to a request from McCue for another bag of heroin, Sheard alighted from McCue’s car, walked over to the passenger side of defendant’s car, obtained a glassine bag of heroin from defendant and gave it to McCue. After the sale was consummated, Sheard entered the Cadillac and drove away with Valentine.
The Appellate Division, in a decision which resolved a number of issues, affirmed the separate judgments of conviction for possession with intent to distribute and distribution, but vacated the conviction for possession with intent to distribute arising from the November 23 incident, reasoning that this offense merged with the crime of aiding and abetting.
In today’s decision, the majority, finding no merger under either indictment, affirms with regard to the offenses which occurred on November 8, 1971 and reverses with regard to the offenses which were committed two weeks thereafter. I respectfully differ with my Brothers and therefore must dissent from both judgments. The two indictments will be discussed in order.
I
The majority correctly observes that the facts surrounding the November 8 incident are essentially indistinguishable from those involved in State v. Jester, 68 N. J. 87 (1975). Therefore, as in Jester, I would find the two convictions in the instant case to be merged for the reasons set forth at length in my dissent in State v. Ruiz, 68 N. J. 54 (1975). In State v. Davis, 68 N. J. 69 (1975), the companion case to Ruiz and Jester, the majority found in N. J. S. A. 24: 21-19 (a)(1) a legislative intent that whenever the proofs which support convictions for distribution and also for possession with intent to distribute arise from the same sale, the defendant may nevertheless be convicted and punished for both offenses. Contrary to the majority, I found no such intent, express or implied, in either the statutory lan*214guage or its legislative history. 68 N. J. at 62-64. It seems equally plausible to me that the Legislature intended N. J. 8. A. 24:21-19 (a) (1) to provide prosecutors with alternate grounds for convicting persons engaged in trafficking narcotics and did not intend the statute to impose upon persons convicted of distribution an automatic and additional sentence for possession. 68 N. J. at 65. Since the legislative intent is unclear in this regard, I conclude that, under the doctrine of strict construction of criminal statutes and the principle that one may not be punished twice for the same offense, the latter interpretation is to be preferred. As was stated long ago in State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361, 372 (Sup. Ct. 1833) : “If the whole offense, in the eye of reason and philosophy is one . . ., we ought not to presume that the legislature meant to punish it as two.” See also State v. Moran, 136 N. J. Super. 188, 192 (App. Div. 1975); Note, “Twice in Jeopardy,” 75 Tale L. J. 262, 321 (1965). Therefore, as to the November 8 indictment, I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and find that the conviction for possession with intent to distribute merged into the conviction for distribution on the ground that the Legislature did not intend to punish a defendant twice for a single act which encompassed both distribution and possession with intent to distribute under separate clauses of the same statutory provision. N. J. 8. A. 24:21-19.
II
With respect to the indictment for possession with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting in that distribution, I would again find a merger of offenses and would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
Obviously, in the abstract, N. J. 8. A. 24:21-19 and N. J. 8. A. 2A:85-14 were intended to prohibit different types of conduct and hence to authorize separate punishment. However, I reject the majority’s statement that “the same considerations which led to our conclusion regarding the separa*215bility of possession with intent to distribute and distribution are brought to bear on our examination of these offenses.” Ante, at 209. The majority’s conclusion that N. J. S. A. 24:21-19 authorizes separate punishment for possession with intent to distribute and distribution arising out of the same sale rests on the fact that this statute is “part and parcel of a comprehensive strategy to deal with the drug crisis.” State v. Davis, supra, 68 N. J. at 78. Even if I were to accept the majority’s finding of separability with respect to the first indictment (which I do not), I would not apply it here since N. J. S. A. 2A:85-14 is not “part and parcel” of this “comprehensive strategy,” but rather is an entirely independent statute.
While I agree that a criminal defendant can be found guilty of both possession of a controlled dangerous substance and aiding and abetting in the distribution of that substance where the evidence shows that they are distinct offenses, the proofs in the instant case fail to demonstrate this degree of separability. As noted above, both convictions arose from the same criminal episode. In addition, the evidence supporting both convictions is identical. It was through his possession of the drug that defendant was found to have assisted Sheard in distributing the heroin. There is no evidence that he performed any other clearly separable act which could have supported a separate conviction for aiding and abetting. Finally, defendant’s possession of the heroin was actually undertaken in preparation for his effort to aid and abet Sheard in making the sale.
Therefore, I would find that the possessory offense merges into the conviction of aiding and abetting and hence affirm the Appellate Division with respect to this indictment.
For affirmance (Indictment No. 1089-71) and reversal (Indictment No. 1100—71)—-Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Mountain, Sullivan and Clifford and Judge Con-ford—5.
*216For reversal (Indictment No. 1039-71) and affirmance (Indictment No. 1100-71)—Justice Pashmait—1.