dissenting:
I do not agree with the majority that the State’s Attorney’s question as to whether it would surprise the appellant to know that Miss McCarthy had reported the license tags on the car found in his possession to be stolen, *32and the State’s Attorney’s statements, made in the presence of the jury, to the effect that the report of the theft of the license tags was “a matter of record” which “could be proved,” were not prejudicial because they did not support an inference that the appellant stole the tags. I believe that not only the State’s Attorney’s initial question and assertions, but also his subsequent line of questioning with respect to the ownership and transfer of the tags, which he himself described as designed to discredit the appellant’s testimony “that he had no reason to believe or suspect this car might be stolen,” were highly prejudicial. In my view, the State’s Attorney’s questions, coupled with his statements, not only raised the inference that the appellant had stolen the license tags and was, therefore, lying under oath when he denied the theft, but also supported the further inference that, in fact, he knew that the vehicle found in his possession was stolen property for which he could procure license tags only by illegal means. As a result of the injection of these inferences, based upon facts which were not in evidence, the jury was misled. Under these circumstances, the State’s Attorney’s failure to offer evidence establishing that the appellant had stolen the license tags, or to disclaim any intimation from his questions and assertions that the plates had been stolen, coupled with the trial court’s failure to stop the line of questioning and to give cautionary instructions to the jury indicating that they should disregard the State’s Attorney’s questions and statements, as well as any inferences therefrom, constituted reversible error.
The prosecutor should make no remarks in the presence of the jury calculated to unfairly prejudice the jury against the accused and to deprive him of a fair trial.1 It is unquestionably wrong for the prosecutor at any point in the trial, when in the presence of the jury, to refer to any matter not testified to by a witness or disclosed by the evidence in *33the case, including during an opening statement,2 during the trial,3 and in closing argument.4
Not every improper remark made by counsel during the progress of the trial is cause for challenge or mistrial. What exceeds the limits of permissible comment depends upon the facts in each case. Unless it appears that the jury was actually misled or likely to have been misled or influenced to the prejudice of the accused by the remarks of the State’s Attorney, reversal of a conviction on this ground would not be justified.5 Finally, concerning what may be “prejudicial,” the Court of Appeals, in Wilhelm, supra, quoting from Gaither v. United States, 413 F. 2d 1061 (D. C. Cir. 1969), stated:
“The applicable test for prejudice is whether we can say, ‘with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ The decisive factors are the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” (Citations omitted.)6
In Esterline, supra, where a defense witness testified in support of self-defense, that immediately after the fight the appellant “had finger prints on his throat,” and the State’s Attorney in closing argument stated that had he known such evidence would be produced, he “could have pro*34duced a hundred witnesses to prove that there were no finger prints on his throat at that time,” the argument was held to be improper. There the Court said:
“It was undoubtedly improper for the State’s Attorney to have told the jury that he could have proved by a hundred witnesses the falsity of Mary J. Diehl’s testimony, that the prisoner had finger marks on his throat immediately after the shooting. This remark was objected to as improper, and the Court in the presence of the jury told the State’s Attorney that it was not proper for him to make that statement. The State’s officer then apologized for making it and promptly withdrew the objectionable statement.”7
The conviction was not reversed.
In Meno, supra, the State’s Attorney interrupted a prosecution witness during cross-examination and, by way of answer to a question which had been asked of the witness, injected the statement that the deceased victim had told the witness that the accused had aborted her. Manifestly, the State’s Attorney’s statement consisted of hearsay evidence which would have been inadmissible had the State attempted to introduce it. The Court found that the prosecutor’s attempt to establish the accused’s criminal agency by putting before the jury facts which were not and could not be placed into evidence, constituted improper conduct. There the Court of Appeals said:
“The statement made by the State’s Attorney could not have been admitted in evidence if it had been testified to by the witness, for it was clearly hearsay. For the State’s Attorney to inject it into the case in the manner he did was highly improper, and he should have been checked immediately by the Court, and the jury instructed to totally *35disregard his remark, neither of which things appear to have been done. . ..
“ . . . The remark of the State’s officer was not checked by the Court, nor were the jury cautioned or instructed by the Court to pay no heed to it. In such a condition it seems impossible that the jury should not have been unduly prejudiced against the accused.” 8
The conviction was reversed.
In Newton, supra, remarks by the prosecutor were found to be improper. There, in a dialogue with the court as to whether or not the defendant could testify that an audit had been made, he replied, in the presence of the jury:
“No. Sir, because I have tried this very traverser and heard him swear that he did not.”
The court then said:
“That these remarks on the part of the State’s attorney were exceedingly improper and calculated to unfairly prejudice the jury against the defendant, is scarcely a matter for argument, and the court should have warned the jury to disregard them. But as the remarks were upon motion stricken out, and as the traverser at the time asked for no other action on the part of the court, we do not regard its failure to so warn the jury as reversible error.” 9
In Cook, supra, an accused, in response to a question from the State’s Attorney on cross-examination, stated that he was “pretty sure” he had never been convicted of a crime. Notwithstanding this response, the State’s Attorney repeatedly questioned the accused as to whether he had been convicted on a specified date for a named offense. The *36appellant’s counsel moved for a mistrial. The court there said:
“The State’s Attorney did not then, nor at any subsequent time, proffer to show that the appellant had been convicted of a crime, as was so strongly intimated in his questions, nor did he ask leave of the court to explain to the jury that he desired to disclaim any intimation from his question that the defendant had previously been convicted of a crime.
The questions were, we think, highly improper in the absence of the State being able to establish that the defendant had been convicted in accordance with the statement of the State’s Attorney; and, were it not for the care with which the trial court explained the matter to the jury, would require a reversal of the judgment and a new trial.” 10
In Woodell, supra, the State’s Attorney, after asking the accused about two prior criminal convictions, which he admitted, proceeded to question him concerning convictions of assault by threat, public drunkenness, passing a worthless check, and exceeding the speed limit in a motor vehicle, all of which allegedly occurred in Raleigh, North Carolina. The accused stated that he did not remember the assault and drunkenness convictions, that he had not been convicted of passing a worthless check or of speeding, and that he had never been in Raleigh, North Carolina. The State’s Attorney then alluded to the accused’s F.B.I. record, and asked him whether he thought anyone else had his fingerprints, the clear implication being that the State’s Attorney had access to his F.B.I. record which indicated that he had been convicted of these offenses. The State’s Attorney failed to proffer evidence that the accused had been convicted of these crimes.
The Court of Appeals found the State’s Attorney’s conduct to be a more extreme example of improper conduct than that contained in Cook because the State’s Attorney had sought *37to buttress his intimation that the accused was lying in denying the convictions by referring to his criminal record on file with the F.B.I. The Court there said:
“If the State’s Attorney chooses not to offer appropriate evidence of the prior conviction, he should, under the dictates of Cook, seek leave of court to explain to the jury that he disclaims any intimation from his question that the defendant had previously been convicted of such crime. Failure to do so may result in an appellate reversal of the conviction where the error cannot be deemed harmless, and the point is properly preserved for review on appeal.
“Appellants here entered no objection to the questions propounded by the State’s Attorney, and neither moved for a mistrial nor sought an advisory instruction from the court as they might have done under Cook. Under these circumstances, the matter was not before the trial judge for a ruling and consequently is not properly before us for review. Maryland Rule 1085.” (Citations omitted.)11
In Reidy, supra, where “self-defense was the heart and soul of appellant’s defense,” the prosecutor in closing argument stated:
“It is really no self-defense here. It is a fiction manufactured by the defense counsel.”
The court held the prosecutor’s comment to be improper, and said:
“The prosecutor’s remark to the jury that appellant’s claim of self-defense was ‘a fiction manufactured by the defense counsel’ could have been interpreted by the jury to mean that defense counsel suborned perjury or that he fabricated the *38defense, or that the defendant himself committed perjury in testifying that he committed the homicide in self-defense. And by declining defense counsel’s request that the prosecutor apologize, and in finding nothing ‘improper’ in the prosecutor’s remarks, the court’s action may have been considered by the jury as tantamount to judicial approval of the propriety of such argument. And again, when defense counsel’s statement to the jury that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, and constituted professional misconduct was objected to by the prosecutor, the trial judge did nothing to dispel the fact that the prosecutor’s remarks had indeed been improper. It is against this background that we determine whether appellant’s right to a fair trial was thereby so prejudiced as to constitute a denial of his right to a fair trial.12
“Where, as in the present case, the prosecutor’s remarks had such a clear potential of prejudicing appellant’s right to a fair trial, and objection was immediately made thereto on the ground that they were ‘absolutely improper and out of order,’ we think the situation thus created was one screaming out for the forceful interdiction of the trial judge and, at the least, a directive to the prosecutor to apologize to defense counsel for the remark — this being all that defense counsel had requested be done. But even without the apology sought by the appellant, it is not unlikely that the jury would have considered the prosecutor’s remarks, standing alone, as the practical equivalent of an argument that the claim of self-defense was so far-fetched that it was utterly devoid of any merit. Had not the trial judge, therefore, in referring to the prosecutor’s remarks, instructed the jury that ‘it is *39no improper remark,’ a different case may well have been presented than that now before us.
“We, of course, have no way of knowing whether the jury was actually misled or prejudicially influenced by the remarks in question. We do know, however, that self-defense was the heart and soul of appellant’s defense, and that the prosecutor’s remarks had a clear tendency, particularly when not neutralized by the trial judge, to convey the thought to the jury that defense counsel suborned perjury, or that he fabricated the defense, or that the defendant himself committed perjury in testifying that he committed the homicide in self-defense. With the case in this posture, it went to the jury and while it would appear from the record that appellant’s claim of self-defense had little support in the evidence, nevertheless, . . . ‘[c]onviction should be the result of a fair trial and not of the conclusions which a court of review may reach from a consideration of the evidence contained in the record where there has not been a fair trial.’ ” 13 (Emphasis added.)
Finally, in Howard, supra, where the accused’s identification was central to the defense, the prosecutor in closing argument referred to an out-of-court photographic identification of the accused by the rape victim, which had not been introduced into evidence. The appellant made a prompt motion for mistrial. This Court held the argument improper and extremely prejudicial under the facts of that case, despite the victim’s in-court identification of the accused and evidence of the presence of his fingerprints on the victim’s car. This Court said:
“In the instant case it is true there was an in-court identification but the short time and the conditions under which the observation of the criminal was *40made render the identification more suspect than other identifications which are predicated upon a scrutiny of longer duration and under more favorable conditions. It is true, of course, that the fingerprints on the hood of the car evidence that the appellant’s fingers had at some time come into contact with the hood of the car. With this record, we cannot say the jury would not have accepted the explanation, implausible though it may be, of the sixteen year old appellant that his prints were implanted while he was horseplaying on a parking lot in a shopping center. When the evidence concerning the prior photographic identification was improperly presented to the jury, we cannot say that the error was not prejudicial. Indeed, we find it to be extremely prejudicial and further find that the court’s admonitions to disregard the statement were not sufficient to overcome this prejudice.” 14
The court reversed and ordered a new trial.
These cases unequivocally establish that the questions and assertions of the State’s Attorney here, to which the appellant did initially object, were improper. The only significant question to be determined is whether this conduct was prejudicial in that it actually misled or was likely to have misled the jury or influenced it to the prejudice of the accused so that reversal of the conviction would be justified.
The record here shows that the only evidence to support the appellant’s conviction consisted of his possession of the recently stolen automobile. His conviction hinged entirely upon the inference that, absent a satisfactory explanation, the possessor of recently stolen goods is the thief or the receiver.15 Consequently, the appellant’s only possible *41defense consisted of offering a satisfactory explanation as to how he came into possession of the automobile. The appellant promptly objected to conduct on the part of the State’s Attorney which would place before the jury faets which the State’s Attorney knew he was then unable to prove. Neither the State’s Attorney nor the court took any action to overcome the likelihood of prejudice which had been created hy the State's Attorney's original question and his unnecessary assertions that the report of the theft of the license tags was a matter of record and that it could be proved. The State’s Attorney neither “withdrew” the objectionable question and statements, nor disclaimed any intimation that might be drawn from them, and the court did not inform the jury that the question and the assertions were improper, did not strike them, and did not admonish the jury to disregard them. Indeed, despite the fact that the appellant had objected to the State’s Attorney’s improper conduct, the court thereafter not only permitted but actually encouraged the State’s Attorney to capitalize on the prejudicial effect of his previous improper conduct, by requiring the appellant to answer a persistent series of questions designed to support the inference that the license tags on the car found in the appellant’s possession had, in fact, been stolen by him.
This is not a case in which the State had “overwhelming evidence” of guilt so that the impact of the State’s Attorney’s questions and assertions, even if improperly considered on the merits, was merely cumulative on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. Rather, the conduct of the State’s Attorney affected the central issue of the case, namely, whether or not the appellant had a credible and satisfactory explanation of his possession of the recently stolen automobile. A credible explanation was the heart and soul of the appellant’s defense and the prosecutor’s questions and assertions had a clear tendency, particularly when not neutralized by the trial judge, to convey the thought to the jury that the appellant had committed perjury when he denied the theft of the license tags and, therefore, when he denied knowledge of the fact that the vehicle found in his possession was stolen property.
*42Trial judges have an obligation to afford an accused a fair and impartial trial. Even in the absence of an objection, and/or a request that the court admonish the State’s Attorney, admonish the jury, strike the statements, or declare a mistrial, the trial court should have taken immediate corrective action.16 I think, under the present circumstances, where the prosecutor’s conduct had such a clear potential of prejudicing the appellant’s right to a fair trial, and an objection was immediately made thereto on the ground that facts which the State’s Attorney knew he was then unable to prove were being placed before the jury, the situation here, as in Reidy, supra, was “screaming out” for the forceful interdiction of the trial judge, and, at the least, a directive to the prosecutor that he disclaim to the jury any intimation from his questions and assertions that the appellant had stolen the plates from a Miss McCarthy. I would hold, on the facts of this case, that because of the improper nature of the prosecutor’s questions and statements, the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the trial judge’s failure to take appropriate corrective action to mitigate the effects of the error, the judgment should be reversed.
Manifestly, I do not agree with the majority that the questions of whether certain of the State’s Attorney’s conduct during the trial was improper, prejudicial and, under the circumstances, warranted reversal, were not properly preserved for review. It has been recognized that where a defendant might otherwise be denied due process by the improper conduct of a State’s Attorney during trial, not only is the trial court, even without an objection, obliged to take action, but also the appellate court, even without an objection, may and should on its own motion reverse a conviction.17 Thus, in Holbrook, supra, in considering the *43preservation on appeal of the question of the impropriety and prejudicial effect of statements of a prosecutor, this Court said:
“We note also that there is an obligation on the trial court in certain circumstances even in the absence of objection. In Viereck v. United States, 318 U. S. 236 the accused did not object at the time ‘highly prejudicial’ remarks were made by the prosecutor, but objected during the court’s charge to the jury, which objection was overruled as too late. The Supreme Court said that the trial judge should have stopped counsel’s discourse without waiting for an objection. In Meno v. State, supra, the Court said, regarding the ‘highly improper’ action of the State’s Attorney in injecting an improper statement into the case (not in argument), that ‘he should have been checked immediately by the Court, and the jury instructed to totally disregard his remark.’ And the trial court’s responsibility may not end with overruling [sic] an objection made. ‘[I]n addition to sustaining an objection to an improper remark or misconduct, (the trial court) is also entrusted with further responsibility to caution or reprimand the State’s Attorney as the exigencies of the situation may require and to forthwith instruct the jury to disregard the unwarranted remarks and conduct of the prosecuting attorney.’ Contee v. State, supra, 584. And even absent an objection or action by the trial court, ‘[i]t is, of course, true that in a criminal case where grave error has been committed, and the accused is thereby denied due process, an appellate court may and should on its own motion, reverse the conviction. ’ Apple v. State, supra, 667-668.” 18 (Footnote omitted, emphasis added.)
Here the record shows that there was an objection to the *44State’s Attorney’s conduct so that the question of its propriety and prejudicial effect was brought to the attention of the trial court at a time when it had an opportunity to correct the situation. When read in context, the record shows that the appellant had denied that he had stolen the plates subsequently found on the vehicle in his possession, from his friend, Miss McCarthy. Thereafter, the State’s Attorney asked: “Would it surprise you to know that she reported [the license plates] as stolen to the Alexandria police?” The appellant objected, “[u]nless the State can prove that.” The ground of his objection, while not articulated, when read in context, was plain. He was objecting to conduct on the part of the State’s Attorney which would implant in the minds of the jury facts which were not in evidence and which the State’s Attorney knew full well he was then unable to prove. The State’s Attorney not only indicated that he was then unable to prove that the plates had been reported as stolen, which was all that was necessary to respond to the appellant’s objection, but went further by stating, in the presence of the jury: “It is a matter of record. It could be proved.” While the trial court made no statement on the record that the objection to the State’s Attorney’s initial question was overruled, its subsequent conduct in failing to take action with respect to the State’s Attorney’s improper assertions and in requiring the appellant to answer a persistent series of questions designed to support the inference that the license tags on the car found in the appellant’s possession had, in fact, been stolen by him, makes it obvious that the objection was implicitly overruled. Thereafter, it was not necessary, in my view, for the appellant, in order to preserve the point for review, to repeat his objection or move to strike or move for a mistrial, as the State’s Attorney’s improper conduct continued.19
The simple fact disclosed by this record is that the appellant, at the earliest possible moment, objected to the State’s Attorney’s improper conduct and that that objection *45was not sustained. As a result, the appellant was severely prejudiced. So far as I am concerned, under these circumstances, the questions of whether the State’s Attorney’s conduct was improper, prejudicial and warranted reversal, were properly preserved.
I respectfully dissent.
. Newton v. State, 147 Md. 71, 92, 127 A. 123, 132 (1924); Meno v. State, 117 Md. 435, 440-43, 83 A. 759, 761 (1912).
. Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 412, 326 A. 2d 707, 716 (1974); Clarke v. State, 238 Md. 11, 19-20, 207 A. 2d 456, 460-61 (1965); Ott v. State, 11 Md. App. 259, 266, 273 A. 2d 630, 634-35, cert. denied, 262 Md. 748 (1971).
. Cook v. State, 225 Md. 603, 609, 171 A. 2d 460, 463 (1961); cert. denied, 368 U. S. 970, 82 S. Ct. 455, 7 L.Ed.2d § 98 (1962); Newton, supra, 147 Md. at 92, 127 A. at 132; Meno, supra, 117 Md. at 440-43, 83 A. at 761; Woodell v. State, 2 Md. App. 433, 439, 234 A. 2d 890, 893 (1967).
. Esterline v. State, 105 Md. 629, 637, 66 A. 269, 272 (1907); Howard v. State, 19 Md. App. 673, 676, 313 A. 2d 567, 568 (1974); Reidy v. State, 8 Md. App. 169, 172, 259 A. 2d 66, 68 (1969).
. Wilhelm, supra, 272 Md. at 415, 326 A. 2d at 715-16; Howard, supra, 19 Md. App. at 676, 313 A. 2d at 568.
. Wilhelm, supra, 272 Md. at 416, 326 A. 2d at 716.
. Esterline, supra, 105 Md. at 637, 66 A. at 272.
. Meno, supra, 117 Md. at 442, 83 A. at 761.
. Newton, supra 147 Md. at 92, 127 A. at 132.
. Cook, supra, 225 Md. at 609, 171 A. 2d at 463.
. Woodell, supra, 2 Md. App. at 439, 234 A. 2d at 893-94.
. Reidy, supra, 8 Md. App. at 172, 259 A. 2d at 68.
. Id., at 178-79, 259 A. 2d at 71.
. Howard, supra, 19 Md. App. at 676-77, 313 A. 2d at 569.
. Anglin v. State, 244 Md. 652, 656-57, 224 A. 2d 668, 670 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 947, 87 S. Ct. 984, 17 L.Ed.2d 877 (1967); Debinski v. State, 194 Md. 355, 360, 71 A. 2d 460, 462 (1950); Jordan v. State, 24 Md. App. 267, 274, 330 A. 2d 496, 501 (1975).
. Meno, supra, 117 Md. at 442, 83 A. at 761; Fryson v. State, 17 Md. App. 320, 326, 301 A. 2d 211, 214 (1973); Conway v. State, 7 Md. App. 400, 414, 256 A. 2d 178, 186 (1969); Holbrook v. State, 6 Md. App. 265, 271-72, 250 A. 2d 904, 907-08 (1969); see Cook, supra, 225 Md. at 609, 171 A. 2d at 463 (dictum); Contee v. State, 223 Md. 575, 584, 165 A. 2d 889, 894-95 (1960) (dictum).
. Apple v. State, 190 Md. 661, 667-68, 59 A. 2d 509, 512 (1948).
. Holbrook, supra, 6 Md. App. at 271-72, 250 A. 2d at 907-08.
. Shoemaker v. State, 228 Md. 462, 467. 180 A. 2d 682, 684 (1962); see Contee, supra, 223 Md. at 583, 165 A. 2d at 894 (dictum.