concurring.
I agree with the Majority that an insurer does not have the ability to rescind a policy of insurance after the sixty day period immediately following the issuance of the policy. I write separately, however, to note my disagreement with the exception carved into this rule that the insurer can, beyond the statutory sixty day period, rescind the insurance policy with respect to the actual perpetrator of the fraud where the fraud could not reasonably have been discovered within the statutory period.
*376For purposes of this case, this conclusion is mere obiter dictum, as summary judgment was granted against the perpetrators of the fraud and such decision was not appealed. More importantly, this conclusion is contrary to Act 78. As I stated in my concurring opinion in Metropolitan Property and Liability Insurance Co. v. Insurance Commissioner and Miller, 525 Pa. 306, 580 A.2d 300 (1987),
[T]he General Assembly made clear in Act 78 that even if an insurance carrier could establish a material misrepresentation in the procurement of that insurance, the exclusive remedy was cancellation of the automobile insurance policy. Prior to this amendment, material misrepresentation was not included in Act 78 as a basis for termination of the policy. With this amendment, the Legislature clearly preempted and limited the available remedies to an automobile insurance carrier. It also appears that the amendment was in direct response to the judiciary’s refusal to restrict an automobile insurance carrier’s remedies without a clear legislative intent. See Safeguard Mutual Insurance Company v. Huggins, 241 Pa.Super. 382, 361 A.2d 711 (1976).
Id., 525 Pa. at 314-315, 580 A.2d 300 (1990).1
In conclusion, if an insurer fails, for whatever reason, to rescind the policy during the sixty-day period immediately following its issuance, the only remedy remaining to the insurer is that of termination of coverage via the specific prospective provisions for cancellation and non-renewal set forth in the Act. To the extent that Act 78, thus interpreted, may result in insurance companies being required to pay claims arising under fraudulently procured policies, the cure, if such is necessary, lies with the General Assembly.
CASTILLE, J., joins in this Concurring Opinion.. I am also not persuaded by the Majority’s notion that motorists carry insurance for the benefit of third parties. Only the insurer and insured have duties and obligations' arising from the insurance contract. See Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449, 454 n. 3, 664 A.2d 96, 99 n. 3 (1995).