Dissenting Opinion by
Van dee Vooet, J.:The appellant filed in the Court of Common Pleas of the County of Bucks, on October 18,1973, a Motion to Dismiss an Indictment charging him with burglary, larceny and receiving stolen goods, on the grounds that he had not been brought to trial upon the indictment within 180 days after notice had been given to the District Attorney of the County asking for final disposition within that time. The trial court refused to dismiss the indictment and this appeal followed.1 I would *252decide the matter in the interest of bringing about an earlier conclusion to this case.
At a time when the Appellant was serving time in the State Correctional Institution at Dallas, Pennsylvania, he served notice upon the District Attorney of the County of Bucks that he wanted a prompt trial upon three (3) charges of burglary, larceny and receiving stolen goods; one at No. 2162 of 1971, one at No. 2270 of 1972 and one at No. 2271 of 1972. This notice was served on January 23, 1973. Following receipt of the Appellant’s notice, the District Attorney listed the case for trial at No. 2162 of 1971 on March 19, 1973, that being fifty-six (56) days after the notice.2
On the date set, the Defendant elected not to go to trial but instead moved to quash the indictment on the grounds that he had not been afforded a preliminary hearing. The Court granted the motion to quash on March 19, 1973. The Appellant was rearrested upon the same charge, was given a preliminary hearing and re-indicted under a new indictment No. 639 of 1973. Trial upon the second indictment was listed for trial on October 23, 1973.
Before the trial occurred, the Appellant asked for and was granted a rule to show cause why the indictment should not be dismissed on the basis of the notice which had been served relating to the first indictment at No. 2162 of 1971. The trial court, after hearing, discharged the rule.
The Act of Assembly of June 28, 1957, P. L. 428, §1, 19 P.S. 881 establishing the “180 day rule” provides in principal part as follows: “(a) Whenever any person has entered upon any term of imprisonment in any state, county or municipal penal or correctional institution of this Commonwealth, and whenever during the *253continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in this Commonwealth any untried indictment against any such prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the District Attorney of the County in which the indictment is pending and the appropriate court written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment: Provided, That for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. . . .”
The objective of this enactment is to give one imprisoned against whom other charges are pending a way to have his case tried within 180 days after he asks the District Attorney for such opportunity. After receipt of request for trial under the 180 day rule it is customary for the District Attorney to indicate in or on the indictment in some conspicuous way the need for early trial. Where the Defendant chooses to decline his opportunity for early trial and elects to bring about a disposition of the indictment in another manner the notice requesting prompt trial comes to an end. With the myriad of cases handled by the District Attorneys of the Commonwealth, the law cannot rightfully expect the District Attorney to transfer 180 day rule notices from an indictment which has been disposed of to a new indictment as named by a different Grand Jury. In the instant case, after the new indictment was returned at No. 639 of 1973, the Defendant did nothing to notify the District Attorney that he wanted disposition within 180 days.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the indictment against the Appellant was, as is required by the statute, pending “during the continuance of the term of imprisonment.” The record shows *254that the Appellant was released on bond on April 19, 1973 and the new indictment was returned April 6, 1973. From all indications the record shows that the Appellant’s imprisonment ended on April 19, 1973 indicating that the Appellant was not thereafter qualified to call upon the provisions of the “180 day rule.”3
The order below should be affirmed.
Price, J., joins in this dissent.By entertaining this appeal we would not be deciding whether the Order of the lower court is an interlocutory one or a final one.
Disposition of the other two (2) indictments at No. 2270 and No. 2271 of 1972 are not concerned in this appeal.
The Appellant cites the case of Commonwealth v. James Lee Hinton, at Nos. 298, 299 and 2758 of 1972 in the Criminal Division of the Common Pleas Court of Bucks County, affirmed by our Court Per Curiam on November 21, 1973 with certiorari being denied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on April 9, 1974. In Hinton, the Defendant was first indicted at Nos. 298 and 299 of 1972. He served notice of the 180 day demand and while these indictments were pending, the District Attorney secured a new indictment based upon its original complaint at No. 2758 of 1972 containing the identical charges in the indictment at 299 of 1972. The Defendant Hinton never elected to quash any of the indictments. He was in prison all of the time. This clearly distinguishes Hinton from the ease at bar. Reference to Hinton should not be made without pointing out that the Defendant in that case moved to postpone the trial of his case, which action is so contrary to his demand under the 180 day rule as to nullify the request for trial within 180 days. However, the trial court indicates that it regarded the Defendant’s motion merely as a suspension of the running of the 180 day period during the number of days that the case was postponed.