(concurring) :
I concur in the disposition of this appeal with some reluctance, for we are setting aside a conviction which is based upon compelling evidence -because of a single sentence which was added by the trial judge to the standard instruction on self-defense.
In total, the carefully delivered instructions fill 21 pages of transcript. Unchallenged on this appeal was the following deviation from the standardized instruction on reasonable doubt.1
if you find after consideration of the evidence that the Government has proved each element of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt, you are obliged to find the Defendant guilty. If you find on the other hand that the Government has failed to prove any elements of any offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then you are equally obliged to find him not guilty.
Such a reassertion of the sober obligation of each juror was permissible.2 E.g., United States v. Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953, 83 S.Ct. 952, 9 L.Ed.2d 978 (1963); Straughter v. State, 247 A.2d 202 (Del.1968); State v. Devoe, 301 A.2d 541 (Me.1973); State v. Bryant, 375 S.W.2d 107 (Mo.1964).
Subsequent thereto, the trial court delineated the elements of second degree murder and of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the most important of which is that the decedent died of injuries inflicted by the defendant.3 Then came the following instruction on self-defense :
If you find that the Government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did not act in self-defense, you must find the Defendant not guilty. If the Government does prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did not act in self-de*200fense, then you must find the Defendant guilty.
It is well recognized that “jury instructions are to be considered as a whole, rather than as isolated passages.” United States v. Martin, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 359, 363, 475 F.2d 943, 947 (1973). In light of the authorities cited above, I would not find reversible error in the challenged instruction on self-defense but for one evi-dentiary fact: Although he did advance a claim of self-defense, defendant also denied inflicting any injury on the decedent. Hence, the directive that the jury-“must find” the defendant guilty if it rejected the claim of self-defense inevitably ran afoul of the holding in United States v. Hayward, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 420 F.2d 142 (1969), since the jury thereby became free to convict irrespective of whether it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim died as a consequence of injuries inflicted by the defendant.
The defect readily could have been cured, for defense counsel made timely objection to the use of the word “must” in the instruction and the trial judge effectively acknowledged his error.4 However, the trial court concluded: “But I think it will do more harm than good to go over the whole thing.” Defense counsel might have made such a tactical judgment, but he did not. While appellate courts must guard against giving undue weight to an out-of-context portion of a comprehensive set of jury instructions, the defect here leaves me unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.5 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed. 2d 705 (1967).
. Hue Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.09 (2d ed. 1972).
. Under the* oath administered to Superior Court jurors in criminal cases, each solemnly swears that he or she will “a true verdict render according to the law and the evidence”. Cf. Arshack v. United States, D.C.App., 321 A.2d 845 (1974).
.At that point, with reference to the second degree murder charge, the trial court instructed that if the jury found that all elements had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it “may find” the defendant guilty. The court further instructed that if the jury found any element missing, it may” [as opposed to “must”] find the defendant not guilty. No objection was made to the latter deviation from the standard instruction. Of. Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, supra, No. 2.08.
. Although the objection was limited to the use of “must” rather than “may”, the sentence in which it was used would be almost equally objectionable if “may” had been used, since appellant denied causing any injury to the decedent.
. In liglit of our holding on the issue of the self-defense instruction, I would not reach any of the other questions which might arise in a possible retrial.