The petitioners herein allege that the quarantine order of the San Joaquin Local Health District by which they are imprisoned and restrained without bail is illegal in that (1) the county health officer does not have reasonable cause to believe that either of them is infected with any of the diseases specified in sections 2554 and 2571 of the Health and Safety Code, and therefore there is no justification for their quarantine and to deny them bail; (2) the San Joaquin County jail is an improper place to be designated by the said health officer as a place of isolation, and (3) at the time of their arrest they had no connection with prostitution in any form and neither was in fact infected with any of the diseases mentioned in said sections.
By reason of the stipulation of counsel at the time this matter was argued the transcript of proceedings in the Superior Court of San Joaquin County, where a like application was made and denied, was made a part of the proceedings herein, subject however, to petitioners’ objection to certain testimony of one of the health officers of said county, which testimony had been admitted over their objection in the superior court hearing.
Said transcript discloses that on the evening of September 9, 1947, a robbery was reported as having occurred at the *166De Luxe Booms located in the city of Stockton. The following morning petitioners were arrested by Officer Knight and taken to the police station for questioning. The next day a complaint was filed in the Stockton Police Court charging defendants with vagrancy and bail fixed in the sum of $500 each. However, by reason of subsequent quarantine orders of the local health officer both petitioners were refused their release on bail because of said orders, and were held by the sheriff of said county.
When called as a witness by the respondent sheriff, Officer Knight testified that for more than one year he had been a member of the vice squad, had personally made one arrest for prostitution and knew of three other arrests for the same offense having been made of persons living at the De Luxe Rooms but that none of said arrests involved these petitioners ; that the latest arrest at this place was in February 1947, and since that time no arrest had been made although there were attempts to get investigators into the rooms but the doors were always locked. He also testified that said rooming house had the reputation of being a house of prostitution and that an examination of the premises at the time of the arrests disclosed various articles and paraphernalia usually found in such places but that such things were commonly found in many lodging houses in Stockton. The witness further stated that during a conversation at which he was present between petitioners and the chief of the Stockton Police Department, Kitty Andrews admitted having worked as a prostitute during the last two years and that Dorothy Martin admitted trying to run a house of prostitution but that the police were so active she did not have a chance to do any business; on another occasion she stated to the witness that she was running the De Luxe Rooms. The officer had no knowledge of any prior arrests of either of the petitioners.
The assistant health officer of the district, over the objection of counsel, as previously mentioned, was permitted to testify that since May, 1947, four cases of venereal diseases had been reported as having been contracted at the De Luxe Rooms, and three women who gave their addresses as the De Luxe Rooms had been examined for venereal disease, but with one exception all such examinations were negative. No investigation was made by said officer to ascertain if the women actually did reside there.
By statute (Health and Saf. Code, §§ 2554 et seq.) *167a mandatory duty is imposed upon health officers to take all measures necessary to prevent the transmission of venereal disease and in the enforcement of this legislative mandate such officers are vested with full power of quarantine.
It would seem unnecessary to state that the delegation of such complete authority over one of the most fundamental of our constitutional rights—the right of personal liberty—must of necessity carry with it the obligation to exercise such unusual powers only when, under the facts as brought within the knowledge of the health authorities, “reasonable ground exists to support the belief” that the person so held is infected. (In re Arata, 52 Cal.App. 380, 385 [198 P. 814].) However, that is not to say that in order to warrant the exercise of such powers it is necessary for a health officer to first determine that one is afflicted with such disease before subjecting such person to quarantine, all that is required is that there be probable cause to believe the person so held has an infectious disease mentioned in said statutes. (In re King, 128 Cal.App. 27 [16 P.2d 694].)
In the Arata case the court in discussing what would amount to a sufficient factual showing to justify or warrant quarantine, observed that such facts might consist of a showing that the suspected person had been exposed to contagion or infectious influences or that someone had contracted the disease from him or her; that the one quarantined was one who committed acts of prostitution as shown by a conviction for that offense or was an inmate of a house of ill fame, thereby coming within that group, a majority of whom are diseased, as shown by medical statistics.
This case was followed by In re Dayton, 52 Cal.App. 635 [199 P. 548], wherein oral testimony and affidavits were presented from which the court concluded that the house at which petitioner was residing at the time of her arrest was a house of ill fame, and she being one of the inmates thereof, sufficient showing was made to detain her.
A later case, In re Clemente, 61 Cal.App. 666 [215 P. 698], cited with approval the Dayton and Arata eases. There the court held that testimony that petitioner therein was conducting a house of ill fame in which she was also an inmate and personally participated in the unlawful acts carried on therein, furnished reasonable ground for the health officers to enforce quarantine measures against her.
We do not understand the two eases cited by petitioners *168(In re Arata, supra, and In re Shepard, 51 Cal.App. 49 [195 P. 1077]) as modifying or changing in any way the rule as stated. It is true that in each instance the petitioner therein was discharged. However, in the Arata case it was because the facts relied upon as sufficient to warrant the order appeared only by way of “narration” in the respondent’s return and which statement the court stated could not be taken as “proof of the charge made against petitioner.” In the Shepard ease it was held that the facts shown were insufficient either to establish knowledge that the petitioner was infected or reason to believe so. Both cases reiterate the much repeated rule that whether or not a quarantine order is justified depends upon the facts of each individual case, and the obvious corollary thereof is that what may appear to be sufficient to one person may not appear to be sufficient to another.
The real issues in the present ease, stripped of surrounding circumstances immaterial to such issues and simply stated, are whether or not there was reasonable cause for the health officer to believe that these petitioners were infected with a. venereal disease in an infectious stage at the time the quarantine order was issued, and if so, whether such reasonable cause continued to exist at the time of the hearing before this court as shown by the testimony and affidavits of the health officers or was negated by the affidavits of physicians who examined them subsequent to the quarantine order and reported a partial negative finding.
Under the rules enunciated in the Arata case and cited with approval in In re Dayton and In re Clemente, supra, such belief has sufficient basis in evidence brought to the knowledge of the health officer tending to show that the premises in question was commonly regarded as a house of prostitution; that it contained the usual paraphernalia generally found in such establishments; that within the past few months cases of venereal diseases had been reported as having been contracted there; that several arrests had been made at the premises on charges of prostitution, although not of these petitioners; and further, that the petitioners themselves admitted having been engaged either in prostitution or in operating a house of prostitution, thus placing themselves within that class of persons more likely to be infected than not.
The necessary proof in cases such as this is analogous *169to that required on a preliminary examination before a magistrate prior to commitment on a criminal charge, the extent of the inquiry being merely as to the existence of reasonable cause pending opportunity for further investigation or examination.
Petitioners further contend that the above mentioned affidavits of the physicians who examined them indicate that the reasonable cause essential to warrant quarantine no longer exists. In support thereof they cite a portion of the opinion in the case of In re Johnson, 40 Cal.App. 242, 245 [180 P. 644]. Obviously, if one who is so detained is not and never has been afflicted with such infection he or she would be entitled to a writ. However, this cannot be said of the facts disclosed in the record in the present ease. Prom the testimony of Dr. James C. Malcolm, assistant district health officer, as well as the affidavits of Drs. John J. Sippy and H. D. Chope, district health officer and assistant respectively, to the effect that in order to determine the existence or contamination of a venereal disease in an infectious stage it is necessary that the person quarantined be confined for a period of approximately eight days under circumstances such as would restrict the individual from sexual contact or medication. This, the doctors say, is necessary for the reason that a person by the use of local disinfectants or drugs can temporarily mask or inhibit the growth of the responsible organisms and thus prevent the detection of a venereal disease. The affidavits filed by petitioners are insufficient to overcome this evidence. It is not shown that they could not or-did not mask the presence of such organisms, and further, with respect to Dorothy Martin there is no report on syphilis. If the testimony of the health authorities is predicated upon sound medical knowledge in light of present day drugs and treatment techniques, and we have no cause to believe otherwise, then the conclusion of the court in the King case, supra, that a “person so held may be detained legally until there is sufficient showing that the probable cause no longer exists,” applies.
The final contention made by petitioners, that the San Joaquin County jail is an improper place to be designated as a place of isolation under said quarantine order, is likewise without merit. It does not necessarily follow from the facts alleged by petitioners in relation to the conditions of the San Joaquin County jail, which facts in the main are *170admitted by the sheriff in his return—its overcrowded conditions—its condemnation by a legislative investigating committee, that their confinement at said jail by reason of the quarantine order is improper. From an examination of the applicable sections of the statutes to the question of quarantine generally it would appear that the place of quarantine would be discretionary with the health officers in the absence of any special provision for such persons. “While jails, as public institutions, were established for purposes other than confinement of diseased persons, occasions of emergency or lack of other public facilities for quarantine require that jails be used as places of quarantine.” (4 Ops. Atty. Gen. 146 at p. 148.) Hence, in the absence of special facilities, use of the jail in question, although admittedly unsatisfactory, is proper for such purpose under the facts shown.
We therefore conclude that the quarantine order was proper under the circumstances ■ and showing made by respondent in his return to the petition. The order fixing bail for petitioners’ appearance in this court and requiring them to report to the San Joaquin Health District for examination at such times as that authority may suggest is therefore set aside, the writ discharged, and the petitioners remanded to the custody of the respondent sheriff.
Thompson, J., concurred.