(dissenting). I disagree with the result reached by the majority of the Court. The appeal involves the scope of the Attorney General’s power under 29 Del. C. § 2505, which we held in In re Hawkins, 11 Terry (50, Del.) 61, 123 A. 2d 113, gave him authority to issue both subpoenas ad testificandum and duces tecum in aid of his investigation of suspected violations of law. We pointed out, however, in that case that the statute does not give him the poxver in aid of making a general investigation. His power is confined to investigation of suspected crime. We held in the Hawkins case that the courts would shield a witness from the gross abuse of the statutory power upon a timely application to quash the process.
It follows, therefore, that the power of the Attorney General under the statute is not unrestrained. When timely resistance is made, the Attorney General has the burden of disclosing sufficient facts to satisfy the court of the propriety of his action.
I do not suggest that the record in this appeal demonstrates a gross abuse of the power. I do suggest, however, that sufficient has been shown hy Eastburn to place the burden of justification on the Attorney General. To my mind, no such justification is shown in this record. However, I do not suggest that it could not have been discharged. I think no attempt to do so has been made.
The record shows no actual factual dispute as to what took place. A Deputy Attorney General called on Eastburn explaining that a suspected crime was being investigated, and inquired as to any political contributions made by Eastburn or any cor*456poration of which he was an officer.1 Eastburn answered freely all questions about the “size and extent and purpose” of such contributions, but stated that for personal reasons he desired that the facts not be made public. Toward the end of the interview, under threat of subpoena, Eastburn agreed to reduce his answers to writing and file them with the Attorney General.
Later, on the same evening, Eastburn concluded from the discussion and from certain newspaper stories then current, that the motives of the Attorney General grew out of a controversy he was then having with officials of the Democratic Party over his renomination. Eastburn thereupon consulted counsel and determined to refuse to supply the written statement. This proceeding followed.
The showing made hy Eastburn in opposition to the subpoena is that he has fully answered the questions asked him, but has refused to repeat those answers under oath. It is also the fact that he had committed no crime under Delaware law in contributing funds to a political party. From the newspaper accounts it is quite apparent that an acrimonious struggle was then going on between the Attorney General and the Democratic State Chairman over the farmer’s renomination, in the course of which bitter charges were made by both sides, including an implication, at least, of the misuse of party funds to defeat the incumbent’s bid for renomination.
The foregoing are the circumstances in which the subpoenas were issued. It seems to me that one permissive inference from them is the assumption, actually made by Eastburn, that the questioning of him was prompted not by an investigation of a suspected violation of law, but by the purely personal motive of the desire of the Attorney General to be renominated and to discredit the party official opposed to his renomination. This, of course, is only an inference — perhaps the wrong one — but it is, *457to my mind, sufficiently permissive from the circumstances to require rebuttal on the part of the Attorney General. No rebuttal was made except for the statement that the subpoenas were issued as part of an investigation of undisclosed crime.
I do not think this is sufficient. Admittedly, the Attorney General had possession of all the facts. The matter thus comes down to his demand that the facts be given under oath. To what purpose? The veiled hint in the State’s affidavit, that the facts would become public knowledge if the issuance of subpoenas became necessary, inferentially supplies one possible purpose, which, I assume, would be characterized by the majority as an abuse of power. But, the majority suggests the right to require testimony under oath may not be questioned under the statute. I cannot agree with this, for all such statutory powers of the Attorney General are subject to judicial restraint on the ground of unreasonable or arbitrary action. Cf. In re Shelley, 332 Pa. 358, 2 A. 2d 809.
Absent some showing of a tendency on the part of East-burn to change his testimony, or forget it — an unlikely contingency in this case — it is difficult to conceive a useful purpose in reducing the testimony to sworn statement. In point of fact, the normal course would seem to have been the presentment of an indictment to the Grand Jury and the summoning of Eastburn before it. Under the circumstances, the departure from the normal would seem to require some explanation before the aid of a court is sought.
I would reverse the order of the Superior Court and remand with instructions to permit the Attorney General by further affidavit to discharge the burden of demonstrating the propriety of the process.
Contributions to political parties by either individuals or corporations are not illegal in Delaware. Nor is there any requirement of law that the facts be made public.