Edward J. Martin and Augustine Sabastionelli (collectively, Objectors) appeal an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County (trial court) which denied Objectors’ appeal from a decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of Fountain Hill (Board). We affirm.
In 1991, Lehigh Valley Coalition Against Addiction (LVCAA) filed a zoning application with the Borough of Fountain Hill (Borough) requesting a special exception to operate a rooming house for women completing Hogar CREA drug rehabilitation treatment and their children under the age of thirteen. The proposed rooming house is presently a five-unit apartment house owned by Hildegarde E. Bradney and Jane L. Washinski.
The subject property is located in a Medium High Density Residential (MHD-R) District. Pursuant to the Zoning Ordinance of the Borough of Fountain Hill (Zoning Ordinance),1 a rooming house is permitted as a special exception , in the MHD-R District. “BOARDING AND ROOMING HOUSE” is defined in Section 902 of the Zoning Ordinance as follows:
a building, other than a hotel or motel, containing a single dwelling unit where lodging is provided with or without meals for three (3) or more persons, who are not members of the operator’s family, and by prearrangement for definite periods of time and for compensation, whether direct or indirect, but not to include rest homes or homes for the aged.
The Borough’s Code Enforcement Officer denied LVCAA’s zoning application. On appeal, the Board granted the special exception, concluding:
Applicant did in fact qualify as a rooming home. All of the residents are there for definite time periods, not to exceed two to three years as they were proceeding through their therapy. They were paying compensation for staying at the facility and their stay was for a prearranged time period, although it could be terminated if they violated the rules *35such as taking drugs or alcohol into the facility. In addition, it was for three or more people that were not related to the operators and it was neither a home for the aged nor the elderly.
Without taking any additional evidence, the trial court denied Objectors’ appeal.
On appeal to this court, the sole issue presented is whether the proposed use of the subject property falls within the Zoning Ordinance’s definition of rooming house.2
Noting that the residents of the subject property will undergo extensive therapy on a daily basis, Objectors argue that the proposed use is not that of a “rooming house” as that term is defined in common parlance or in the Zoning Ordinance. We disagree. Initially, we note that the “therapy” here is in the nature of face-to-face counseling and structured living arrangements, and is not of a medical character as inferred by Objectors.
In Allegheny Valley School v. Zoning Hearing Board of Slippery Rock Borough, 102 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 290, 294, 517 A.2d 1385, 1387 (1986), we stated:
[a] special exception is a conditionally permitted use, legislatively allowed if the standards are met. A permitted use must be afforded the broadest interpretation so that a landowner may have the benefit of the least restrictive use and enjoyment of his land. Ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the landowner.
(Citations omitted.)
In Repko v. Zoning Hearing Board of the City of Greensburg, 102 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 272, 517 A.2d 1028 (1986), we *36held that a proposed shelter, which would provide temporary housing and counseling to abused women and their children, was a rooming house. Although the zoning ordinance in that case did not define “rooming house”, we stated, “[t]he phrase ‘rooming house’ is commonly defined as ‘a house where lodgings are provided and let.’ Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1977). In the broadest sense of the phrase, a structure designed to house domestic violence victims temporarily is a rooming house.” Id. at 275, 517 A.2d at 1029-30. See also Step-By-Step, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of McKees Rocks, 117 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 547, 543 A.2d 1293 (1988), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 522 Pa. 616, 563 A.2d 501 (1989) (Community living arrangements for mentally handicapped residents constituted rooming houses.).
Since the stated definition of rooming house in the present appeal must be given a broad interpretation, Allegheny Valley School, we conclude that, in general, the proposed use of the subject property falls within that definition.
However, Objectors also argue that the proposed use does not meet two specific requirements contained in the Zoning Ordinance’s definition of rooming house. First, Objectors contend that the residents will not be lodging “for definite periods of time”. Second, Objectors contend that four of the ten residents will not be paying “compensation” since they will receive free room and board for their work as staff members at the house.
As to the first contention, the Board concluded, “[a]ll of the residents are there for definite time periods, not to exceed two to three years as they were proceeding through their therapy. They were paying compensation for staying at the facility ...” Although “two to three years” standing alone probably lacks the degree of definiteness required by the Zoning Ordinance, we agree with the trial court that the residents’ “payment of [rent] presupposes periodic stays and renewals thereof.” Trial court’s memorandum opinion at 3. As such, the residents’ lodging will be for sufficiently definite periods of time.
*37As to those four residents/staff members that will receive free room and board for their work at the house, such work constitutes “indirect” compensation, as specified in the definition of rooming house set forth in Section 902 of the Zoning Ordinance.
Since Objectors’ arguments are without merit, we cannot say that the Board erred in concluding that the proposed use qualified as a rooming house. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.
ORDER
AND NOW, July 9,1993, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.
. Borough of Fountain Hill, Pa., Zoning Ordinance § 205.
. Our scope of review in a zoning appeal where no additional evidence was taken by tire trial court is limited to determining whether the zoning hearing board manifestly abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Smith v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Bellevue, 152 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 427, 619 A.2d 399 (1992). Whether a proposed use falls within a particular definition in a zoning ordinance is a question of law subject to our review. See Manor Healthcare Corporation v. Lower Moreland Township Zoning Hearing Board, 139 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 206, 590 A.2d 65 (1991).