I dissent.
The majority opinion rightly concludes that matters of criminal discovery do not fall within the scope of the Proposition 8 mandate that California law on the exclusion of evidence not exceed federal constitutional protections. The majority further conclude correctly that even if Proposition 8 did apply, the liberal rule for discovering information about confidential informants announced in People v. Rivas (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 312 [216 Cal.Rptr. 477], does not conflict with the standards for obtaining an evidentiary hearing to challenge a warrant set forth in Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [57 L.Ed.2d 667, 98 S.Ct. 2674]. But the majority’s modification of Rivas, particularly its proposed requirement of a showing of “reasonable doubt” by defendants, is unsupported by our previous holdings and is unrealistic in its view of a criminal defendant’s ability to make that showing.
The majority basically approve of the Rivas procedure, which allows the defendant to discover information in police files on confidential informants after the court prescreens the requested documents to edit out the informant’s identity. In order to obtain discovery, however, the majority would now have the defendant make a substantial three-step preliminary showing: (1) the defendant must shoulder the burden of casting “reasonable doubt” on the veracity of statements made by the affiant; (2) the defendant must specify “if possible” the basis of his belief that the information exists and the purpose for which he seeks it; and (3) he must raise a substantial possibility that the allegedly untrue statements were material to the probable cause determinations. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 22-23.) The majority would also place an additional barrier between the defendant and the information to be discovered: the court must satisfy itself that the requested documents support the defendant’s allegations of material omission or misrepresentation, and only then turn the documents over to the defendant.
The majority’s rationale for these new requirements is ill defined. The opinion declares that to allow discovery based on “conclusory” statements of police misrepresentation “would impose an unjustifiable burden on our trial courts and an unwarranted invasion of police files.” (Maj. opn., ante, at *27p. 20.) The showing is said to be needed to prevent the defendant from embarking on a “fishing expedition.” (Id at p. 21.) The opinion also reiterates language in Franks, supra, 438 U.S. 154, that a warrant is presumed to be true. As discussed below, in my view none of these concerns justifies the proposed new requirements.
We have held that discovery will be allowed to a criminal defendant who can demonstrate that “the requested information will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial.” (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 536 [113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305].) Criminal discovery can take the form of “general allegations which establish some cause for discovery,” provided that the requests have sufficient specificity to constitute something more than a “fishing expedition.” (Id. at pp. 537-538.)
We recently reaffirmed the broad scope of criminal discovery in City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74 [260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222]. That case interpreted Evidence Code sections 1043 to 1045, part of the statutory scheme that codified Pitchess. We held that a defendant charged with resisting arrest may discover police records regarding the use of excessive force by the arresting officers on the basis of an affidavit alleging on information and belief that the officers had used excessive force in the past. In so holding, we rejected the requirement of the Court of Appeal in that case that the affidavit supporting the request be based solely on personal knowledge. City of Santa Cruz recognized the dilemma inherent in requiring too detailed a showing as a prerequisite to discovery, quoting from the legislative history of Evidence Code section 1043: “ ‘The purpose of discovery is to find detail. If the petitioner already had the particulars of the records he would not need to use discovery.’ ” (City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 89, italics deleted.)
This “Catch-22” predicament of requiring a substantial showing as a preliminary to discovery has been underscored by other courts, which observe that the defendant is placed in the position of “being required to prove that which he is attempting to prove.” (People v. Broome (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1479, 1489 [247 Cal.Rptr. 854].) “[W]hen an affidavit relies for its assertion of probable cause upon facts attributed to confidential informants, defendants have no way to obtain the very information they need to assert their entitlement to a Franks hearing.” (United States v. Brian (D.R.I. 1981) 507 F.Supp. 761, 765.) Both Broome and Brian permitted discovery or in camera examination of the informant on “general allegations” of police misconduct. (Broome, supra, at p. 1489, italics deleted; see Brian, supra, at p. 766.) The majority are sensitive to these difficulties and for that reason rejects the position that a “substantial showing of material falsity” required for a Franks hearing should be employed at the discovery *28stage. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.) The majority also reject the Franks requirement that the statements of the affiant be shown to be in bad faith. (Id. at p. 23.) Yet the “reasonable doubt” standard is hardly more capable of addressing the dilemma. This point can be illustrated by trying to imagine how a defendant would meet the reasonable doubt standard.
The majority contemplate a defendant raising a reasonable doubt concerning the affiant’s veracity by pointing to factual inaccuracies on the face of the warrant or inconsistencies on the face of the affidavit. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.) But this suggestion fails to come to grips with the grim reality of possible police inaccuracy, exaggeration or even falsehood. Neither of the two devices will be effective when a law enforcement officer, in misguided pursuit of a conviction, is committed to a course of fabrication as to either the existence or the communications of an informant. In such cases, the officer would be tempted to make the alleged informant’s tip consistent with the “corroborating” information. (See 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d ed. 1987) pp. 706-707.) Although police falsehood is certainly not widespread, it is on rare occasions part of that overzealousness in pursuit of worthy ends that the Fourth Amendment is designed to curb. (See Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search Warrants and the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U.Ill.L.F. 405, 409-410 [anecdotal and other evidence uncovered after a year of observation that officers’ perjury is not uncommon to save a case].)
Given the reality that a warrant and affidavit may be facially consistent and factually correct yet still harbor material falsity about the confidential informant on whom the warrant is assertedly based, the defendant is placed in an untenable position. This is especially true when, as here, the affidavit asserts the informant’s reliability in a conclusory fashion.
Nor are any of the majority’s justifications for the “reasonable doubt” standard persuasive. The majority is concerned with preserving the court’s discretion to protect the confidentiality of the informant, but a Rims procedure (supra, 170 Cal.App.3d 312) already does this. If the trial court believes that disclosure of the informant’s identity is likely to occur despite prescreening, it is within the court’s discretion to limit or deny the discovery request. In short, the majority seek to make disclosure of the informant’s identity through discovery a rarer event by making discovery itself less frequent. But given the prescreening and additional discretion that exists at the trial level, this kind of broad prophylactic measure is unnecessary.
The majority also make the point that a warrant under Franks, supra, 438 U.S. 154, is presumed to be truthful, but Franks does not hold that the *29presumption of truthfulness should go untested by denying discovery. The “substantial showing” requirement in Franks is designed to filter out unmeritorious challenges to a warrant’s veracity. To place yet another filter at the discovery stage may disallow a number of meritorious claims as well, making it nearly impossible for some defendants to amass evidence sufficient to make a Franks showing.
Moreover, in terms of judicial efficiency the majority’s proposed standard turns Franks on its head. Franks sought to prevent the unnecessary use of a costly procedure—the evidentiary hearing—by substituting when possible a less costly proceeding—the requirement of a substantial showing. On the other hand the majority seek to substitute a less costly procedure—the grant of discovery on a minimal showing—with a more costly procedure—a hearing to determine whether reasonable doubt and materiality standards have been satisfied. Concern for the trial court’s burden is not addressed by imposing rigorous standards for discovery which may themselves become the subject of additional litigation.
Finally, the majority’s unspecified concerns about a “fishing expedition” hardly seem warranted. Here the defendant requested in camera review of “any information disclosed or discoverable ... as to the informant’s past experiences with dangerous drugs, any police reports of incidents [filed] against [informant], pay vouchers, if there were any, for [informant’s] services to the police department, any [promises or] representations . . . that were made to him.” The requests were specifically described and narrow in scope. As long as materiality and specificity are required of discovery requests, as here, a defendant can be prevented from engaging in the over-broad discovery that might give him access to everything in the prosecutor’s file. (See Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 167 [49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838, 18 A.L.R.3d 1416] [defendant’s discovery request must be made with “some degree of specificity” and with “plausible justification”].)
In sum, the proposed new “reasonable doubt” standard for the discovery showing should be rejected, in favor of the widely accepted test based on “‘general allegations which give some cause for discovery ....’” (Broome, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d 1479, 1489, italics deleted, quoting Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, 537), or a standard based on information and belief (City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d 74, 94). As long as the discovery requests are adequately specific and material to the issue of probable cause, the defendant should be permitted to discover information on police informants. Rivas screening will adequately balance the needs of law enforcement and prosecutors to maintain the identity of confidential informants with the needs of defendants to obtain information that will enable them to *30mount an effective defense and vindicate their Fourth Amendment rights. We should encourage every effort to ascertain the whole truth, rather than to approve efforts to conceal part of the truth.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Broussard, J., concurred.