Defendant filed a notice of appeal from a district court decision on appeal entered on December 11,1978. Such a decision generally would be appealable to this Court under I.A.R. 11(c)(1). However, in this case, a deficient record precludes complete review as a matter of right and we decline to exercise our grant of plenary jurisdiction under article 5, § 9 of the Idaho Constitution to review the merits. We consider it essential to an orderly appellate system not to lightly invoke our plenary power where compliance with the mechanism for appeal as of right would adequately provide for review. This case began in the magistrates division and was appealed from there to the district court. The appellate record does not contain any judgments in the magistrates division which were entered prior to the decision by the district court. Without such judgments, the appellate jurisdiction of the district court is not established.1
*867We hold that in a criminal case such as this to establish appellate jurisdiction in the district court that the clerk’s record must include the final judgments of conviction.2 Cf. State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 581 P.2d 319 (1978) (the Court found a de facto judgment of conviction was appealable). This jurisdictional issue was raised by this Court sua sponte prior to and again at oral argument. Neither counsel for the appellant nor the State provided an adequate explanation for the deficient record.
Related to this question of the district court’s jurisdiction is that of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. I.A.R. 28(a)(2) lists those documents and pleadings which are automatically included in the clerk’s record in criminal cases and proceedings. Among them is to be “[t]he judgment or order withholding judgment.” I.A.R. 28(a)(2)(E). This record as certified by the clerk of the district court does not contain any judgments entered prior to the district court decision. I.A.R. 28(g). Since the record does not establish the appellate jurisdiction of the district court, the district court decision on appeal must be vacated. In so ruling, it necessarily follows that the appeal as a matter of right on the merits does not exist to this Court.
We, therefore, vacate and remand to the district court for a determination in accordance with this opinion of the issue of its jurisdiction.
SHEPARD, J., and McQUADE, J., Pro Tern, concur.. I.C. § 1-2213(1) provides that “[a]ppeals from final judgments of the magistrate’s division shall be taken and heard in the manner prescribed by law or rule.” The rules which govern appeals from the magistrates division to the district court and ultimately to this Court *867must therefore be examined. Up until July 1, 1980, the Criminal Appellate Rules applied to criminal appeals from the magistrates divisions to the district courts and to this appellant’s appeal to the district court. Rule 3(1) permits an appeal “[f]rom a final judgment of conviction.” Rule 9 relates to the record on appeal and requires that “[cjivil rules of appeal of district court shall be applicable____” I.R.C.P. 83(n) states that “[t]he official court file of any court proceeding appealed to the district court, including any minute entries or orders together with the exhibits offered or admitted shall constitute the clerk’s record in such appeal.” Rule 32(b) of the Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure (rescinded effective July 1, 1980) and I.C.R. 33(b) (effective July 1, 1980) both mandate that a “judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk." (Emphasis added.)
. This Court has previously provided guidance with respect to what constitutes a final judgment of conviction.
“The language in Criminal Appellate Rule 3, listing orders appealable from the magistrates division to the district court is identical to the language in I.C. § 19-2803 (repealed 1977) listing the orders appealable from the district court to this Court. Therefore, we hold that their meanings are identical and that our construction of the term ‘final judgment of conviction’ found in I.C. § 19-2803 (repealed 1977) is also applicable to that same term in Criminal Appellate Rule 3.” State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 275, 581 P.2d 319, 321 (1978).
Under I.C. § 19-2803, a minute entry reciting an order of the district court was not a judgment appealable to this Court. State v. Barnard, 13 Idaho 439, 90 P. 1 (1907).
“In the absence of an express statute or rule, no appeal will lie from anything other than a formal written order or judgment signed by the judge and filed in the case or entered upon the records of. the court and signed by the judge thereof.... [Citations omitted.] An oral ruling by the trial judge is not a final judgment. It is merely evidence of what the court had decided to do but he can change such ruling at any time before the entry of a final judgment.” State v. Morris, 69 N.M. 89, 364 P.2d 348, 349 (1961).