CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I agree with the majority that: (1) Michael Kulp’s (Licensee) guilty plea with a civil reservation in New Jersey does not prevent the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) from suspending Licensee’s driver’s license in Pennsylvania; (2) the trial court did not err in considering the electronic report *479transmitted by New Jersey to DOT; and (3) New Jersey’s electronic report contains sufficient information about the conduct underlying Licensee’s conviction to justify a license suspension in Pennsylvania.
However, for the reasons that follow, I do not agree that the conduct proscribed by New Jersey’s driving while intoxicated (DWI) statute, N.J. Stat. § 39:4-50(a), is substantially similar to the conduct proscribed in Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact.
Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact proscribes driving a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol to a degree that renders the driver incapable of safe driving. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581. New Jersey’s DWI statute prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle “with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood.”1 N.J. Stat. § 39:4-50(a). On its face, then, New Jersey’s DWI statute appears to be substantially similar to Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact. However, in determining substantial similarity, the relevant inquiry is not only what the out-of-state statute says, but also how it is interpreted and applied. Hunt v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 750 A.2d 922, 924 (Pa.Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 564 Pa. 718, 764 A.2d 1073 (2000).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that N.J. Stat. § 39:4-50(a) applies to all licensees who drive after drinking enough alcohol to ultimately result in a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.10%. State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. 504, 527 A.2d 388 (1987), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 1038, 108 S.Ct. 768, 98 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). Licensees can be prosecuted under N.J. Stat. § 39:4~50(a) even when their BAC was below 0.10% at the time of driving. Id. In fact, under New Jersey law, licensees are not permitted to introduce extrapolation evidence at trial to establish a lower BAC at the time of driving. Id. In New Jersey, it is a per se violation of N.J. Stat. § 39:4-50(a) if the licensee’s BAC is 0.10% at the time of chemical testing.2 Id.
The science of toxicology teaches us that alcohol does not have intoxicating effects until it is absorbed into the bloodstream. Commonwealth v. MacPherson, 561 Pa. 571, 752 A.2d 384 (2000). Once an individual consumes alcohol, the body does not absorb it immediately. Id. Absorption occurs somewhere between thirty to ninety minutes later. Id. Then, the individual’s blood alcohol level gradually rises until a peak is reached roughly sixty to ninety minutes later; thereafter, the individual’s blood alcohol level slowly declines.3 See *480Commonwealth v. Jarman, 529 Pa. 92, 601 A.2d 1229 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in Commonwealth v. Loeper, 541 Pa. 393, 663 A.2d 669 (1995).
The implication of the science of toxicology here is that a licensee may be convicted under N.J. Stat. § 39:4-50(a) for driving while not impaired by alcohol at all.4 In other words, N.J. Stat. § 39:4-50(a), as interpreted and applied in New Jersey, may criminalize conduct that is not proscribed by Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact.5 On that basis, I conclude that the conduct proscribed by N.J. Stat. § 39:4-50(a), as applied to Licensee here, is not substantially similar to the conduct proscribed by Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact.
Accordingly, I would reverse.
. New Jersey has accepted the view that virtually everyone experiences reduced driving ability at and above 0.10% blood-alcohol concentration. State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. 504, 527 A.2d 388 (1987), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 1038, 108 S.Ct. 768, 98 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988).
. I note that chemical testing must occur within "a reasonable time” of a traffic stop. Tischio, 107 N.J. at 519, 527 A.2d at 395-96. However, it is not clear what constitutes "a reasonable time” under New Jersey law. In 1983, the New Jersey legislature considered an amendment to N.J. Stat. 39:4-50(a) requiring chemical testing within four hours of a traffic stop; however, the legislature rejected the imposition of a particular time period for the administration of chemical testing. Tis-chio.
. The majority correctly states that there is always a gap between the operation of a motor vehicle and a chemical test for BAC, i.e., it is impossible to have a BAC test coincide with the operation of a vehicle. (Majority op. at 474.) However, an expert can determine inferentially from the results of a chemical test a person’s BAC at the time of driving; the process is referred to as relation-back or retrograde extrapolation. Commonwealth v. Zugay, 745 A.2d 639 (Pa.Super.), appeal denied, - Pa. -, 795 A.2d 976 (2000) (citing Robert J. Schefter, Under the Influence of Alcohol Three Hours After Driving: The Con*480stitutionality of the (a)(5) Amendment to Pennsylvania’s DUI Statute, 100 Dick. L.Rev. 441 (Winter 1996)). This process involves consideration of various factors, including the licensee’s metabolic rate and weight, the time and specifics of the most recent food eaten, the licensee’s tolerance to alcohol, the rate of alcohol absorption and evaporation, the lapse of time between the testing and the operation of the vehicle and the lapse of time between the last drink and the operation of the vehicle. Id.
. Suppose a Pennsylvania licensee consumes enough alcohol on a trip to New Jersey to ultimately result in a BAC of 0.10%. The licensee leaves the bar or restaurant to return to his or her hotel, a short five-minute drive. Unfamiliar with the area, the licensee commits a minor traffic violation and is stopped by a police officer. The licensee is not intoxicated because the licensee’s blood has not yet begun to absorb the alcohol; however, the officer detects an odor of alcoholic beverages. Sixty minutes later, during chemical testing, the licensee reaches the peak BAC of 0.10%. Based solely on the chemical test results, New Jersey courts will convict the licensee of operating a vehicle with a BAC of 0.10% even though, while driving, the licensee was not impaired.
. Here, the New Jersey court denied Licensee the opportunity to present extrapolation evidence to prove that his BAC was below 0.10% at the time he actually was driving his motor vehicle. Thus, Licensee argues that N.J. Stat. 39:4 — 50(a), as applied in his case, cannot be substantially similar to Article IV(a)(2).