dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority’s ruling on all issues, except the holding that evidence of a guilty plea entered pursuant to § 16-7-403, C.R.S.1973, may properly be admitted to impeach a defendant who has elected to testify. In my view, both the language of the statute and the policy underlying it militate against the result here reached. See People v. Widhalm, Colo., 642 P.2d 498 (1982); People v. Jacquez, 196 Colo. 569, 588 P.2d 871 (1979); People v. Goff, 187 Colo. 57, 530 P.2d 512 (1974).
The resolution of this issue is of particular significance here, since the defendant’s revocation proceedings had been continued pending the outcome of this criminal case, as permitted by § 16-11-206(3), C.R.S.1973. See People v. Ray, 192 Colo. 391, 560 P.2d 74 (1977). Under the majority’s ruling, the People can’t lose for winning: They are permitted to use the prior guilty plea against the defendant in this prosecution, thus making more likely his conviction here and making a certainty of his revocation in the prior case. See Campbell v. United States, 176 F.2d 45 (D.C.Cir.1949); Comment, Impeachment of Witnesses by Prior Convictions Pending Appeal, 46 U.Chi.L. Rev. 499 (1979). Under these circumstances, I think a defendant should be permitted to testify with impunity from this kind of impeachment.
Since, in my view, the trial court’s ruling has impermissibly chilled the defendant’s constitutional right to testify, I would reverse the conviction and remand for new trial. I would, however, direct the trial court, on remand, to give the jury an instruction limiting the purpose of the evidence of the victim’s “seductive behavior” to the question of the witness’ credibility, such evidence not being admissible as an affirmative defense to this charge.