concurring.
I concur separately to point out once again the weak precedential support for this Court’s decision in Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 850-51 (6th Cir.1997), and express my hope that our Court will revisit this critical First Amendment issue en banc.
I.
As I have noted in previous decisions, see Murphy v. Cockrell, 505 F.3d 446, 450 (6th Cir.2007), the holding in Carver was based on two decisions that do not support its final conclusion. See 104 F.3d at 850-51 (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972), and Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982)). In Bullock, the Supreme Court held simply that states have no obligation to permit a person’s name to appear on the ballot. See 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). While Clements v. Fashing did uphold a law prohibiting certain elected officials from running for the state legislature, that decision expressly distinguished cases where a civil servant is the candidate. 457 U.S. 957, 972, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982). Whether out of hostility to the First Amendment or a mere misreading of the precedent, the Carver decision expands these cases to find that a public employee may be terminated simply because of the fact of that employee’s candidacy. This decision puts us in opposition with as many as six other circuits, which have held that firings based on one’s political candidacy do violate the First Amendment.1 In addition, Carver continues to be criticized and distinguished in our own circuit, see Murphy, 505 F.3d at 450; Myers v. Dean, 216 Fed.Appx. 552, 553-54 (6th Cir. Feb.9, 2007); Becton v. Thomas, 48 F.Supp.2d 747, 756 (W.D.Tenn.1999) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit clearly had no intention of using the Carver case to resolve the broader question of whether the First Amendment ever provides any protection for an individual’s right to run for political office.”). Clearly, the time to revisit Carver has come.
Still, like a stray cat that hangs around the door and infests the house with fleas, this decision continues to plague this Court’s jurisprudence.2 As such, we are *406bound by its conclusion, and I concur in the judgment of the Court.
. See Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 502 U.S. 818, 112 S.Ct 75, 116 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991). See also Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260, 265 (8th Cir.1990) (recognizing "the right to run for public office”), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919, 111 S.Ct. 1307, 113 L.Ed.2d 241 (1991); Flinn v. Gordon, 775 F.2d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir.1985) (“[H]e certainly had a constitutional right to run for office and to hold office once elected ....”), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116, 106 S.Ct. 1972, 90 L.Ed.2d 656 (1986); Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 927-28 (4th Cir. 1981) (recognizing "[t]he [FJirst [Ajmendment's protection of the freedom of association and of the rights to run for office, have one’s name on the ballot, and present one's views to the electorate"), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120, 102 S.Ct. 2933, 73 L.Ed.2d 1333 (1982); Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 829 (7th Cir.) (holding that the "plaintiff's interest in running for Congress and thereby expressing his political views without interference from state officials ... lies at the core of the values protected by the First Amendment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968, 98 S.Ct. 513, 54 L.Ed.2d 455 (1977); Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir.1977) ("It appears that the government may place limits on campaigning by public employees if the limits substantially serve government interests that are important enough to outweigh the employees’ First Amendment rights.”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063, 98 S.Ct. 1236, 55 L.Ed.2d 763 (1978).
. But the cat came back the very next day / The cat came back; we thought he was a goner / But the cat came back — it just wouldn’t stay away. The Cat Came Back, Harry S. Miller (1893).