concurring.
I join the plurality opinion as to Parts 1(A), I(B)(ii & iii), IV, VI, VII and VIII. I agree with the ultimate result reached in the opinion, but I concur in result only as to Parts I(B)(i) (because Brooks raised no objection to the inadmissible habit evidence), III, and V. I write separately to express in more depth my views as to (1) Part II, which I do not join — and would dissent from if it were a holding instead of merely analysis ancillary to the opinion’s Part III holding — because I disagree with the plurality opinion’s interpretation of KRS 344.280(1), and (2) Part V, because I would squarely address Appellant’s argument that the trial court erroneously dismissed her retaliation claims against the individual defendants, Appellees Simms, Burch, and DeSpain.
In my view, the plurality opinion’s conclusion that “as part of her prima facie case of retaliation, Brooks had to show that she suffered an ‘adverse employment action’ as that term is defined under federal law”1 erroneously construes Kentucky’s anti-retaliation statute in lockstep with its federal counterpart despite substantive differences between the statutes. By ignoring these differences, today’s opinion unnecessarily dilutes the scope of KRS 344.280(1), by which the General Assembly intended to provide greater civil rights protection than is available under federal law. In Part 11(B), the plurality opinion states that the scope of retaliation liability under KRS 344.280(1) is coextensive with liability for acts of discrimination prohibited by Title VIPs anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. As I wrote when this Court last considered an interpretive issue relating to KRS 344.280(1), any “policy considerations” that would favor harmonizing KRS 344.280(1) with federal law are eclipsed by the fact that Kentucky’s anti-retaliation provision addresses itself to a broader class of potential actors and prohibits a broader range of conduct than federal law does:
[Although this Court has stated that, because of the overlapping policy goals, federal authority “offers some guidance” to Kentucky Courts faced with interpretive questions, ... reliance upon federal authority in this instance ignores substantive differences between the Kentucky and federal statutes. Kentucky’s anti-retaliation provision, KRS 344.280(1), explicitly makes it unlawful for any person “[t]o retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person ... because he has made a charge under this chapter.” The Kentucky provision is thus broader than the one contained in Title VII of the 1963 Civil Rights Act because: (1) the Kentucky provision applies to all persons instead of merely employers and labor organizations; and (2) the Kentucky provision condemns any retaliatory act instead of merely acts of discrimination.2
A close examination of the plurality opinion’s analysis on this issue reveals that it overlooks critical prohibitory language in KRS 344.280(1). The opinion reasons:
Brooks’ argument on interpretation depends with the difference between the *811federal statute and the state statute. While KRS 344.280 makes it unlawful for one or more persons to “discriminate in any manner against a person” (emphasis added), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 makes it unlawful for an “employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment.” Thus, the question arises whether to “discriminate in any manner” is broader in scope than “discriminate against.” We conclude that there are no meaningful distinctions between the two standards.3
This analysis either overlooks or ignores the fact that KRS 344.280(1) contains prohibitory language other than “discriminate,” namely the verb “to retaliate,” which is separated from “discriminate” by the disjunctive “or.” Thus, the appropriate question is not whether “discriminate in any manner” is broader than “discriminate against,” but whether, by making it unlawful for persons to “retaliate or discriminate in any manner,” KRS 344.280(1) prohibits retaliatory acts in addition to “discriminating] against” an employee.
In my view, KRS 344.280(1) is unquestionably broader in scope than Title VU’s anti-retaliation provision. Perhaps the clearest reason to interpret “to retaliate” as having significance distinct from “discriminate” is the fact that the Kentucky General Assembly utilized two (2) verbs rather than one (1) when it wrote the statute.4 The fact that KRS 344.280 “plainly permits the imposition of liability on individuals,”5 however, helps to explain further the purpose for the “to retaliate” language. By making unlawful any act of retaliation or discrimination committed by “a person ... or two or more persons” acting as part of a conspiracy,6 KRS 344.280(1) diverges from federal law7 and offers protection from retaliation over and above both Title VII and KRS 344.040, which “afford[] protection from discrimination only to those in an employer-employee relationship.”8 As such, KRS 344.280(1) encompasses all acts of vengeance taken in response to KRS Chapter 344 claims — even when the act taken would not constitute a prohibited act of discrimination.
Accordingly, Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Handley9 correctly recognized the significance of KRS 344.280(l)’s “to retaliate or discriminate in any manner” language when it outlined the elements of a retaliation plaintiffs prima facie case.10 And, I vote to reverse the Court of Ap*812peals and to reinstate the jury’s verdict in favor of Brooks on her retaliation claim, because the trial court correctly denied the Housing Authority’s motion for a directed verdict after Brooks sufficiently proved that she had suffered “disadvantageous acts” in retaliation for her Kentucky Civil Rights (“KCRA”) claim.
By adopting Title VU’s “adverse employment action” requirement, today’s opinion accomplishes its objective of interpreting KRS 344.280(1) in accordance with federal law. By doing so, however, the plurality opinion ignores significant statutory differences and, by importing a requirement developed in connection with a narrower retaliation statute, “waters down” KRS 344.280(1) and sows the seeds of future headaches. For instance, how will the federal “adverse employment action” requirement affect retaliation claims brought under KRS 344.280(1) against individual non-employer/non-coworker persons, i.e., persons who, under Kentucky’s anti-retaliation statute, are prohibited from retaliating or discriminating “in any manner,” but are unlikely to be in a position to take “adverse employment actions” against a plaintiff? I fear that today’s opinion constitutes a “judicial rollback” of the strong position that Kentucky has taken in support of the free exercise of rights guaranteed by the KCRA through its enactment of KRS 344.280(1), which is designed to prohibit any act in retaliation for the exercise of a person’s rights under the Act.
Additionally, I write separately as to Part TV because the plurality opinion does not adequately address the issue presented, ie., whether individuals can be held liable for unlawful retaliation. Although it characterizes Brooks’s allegation as “a persuasive argument” and references the unequivocal KRS 344.010(1) definition of “person,” the plurality opinion bypasses the issue of individual liability by holding that Brooks’s judgment against the Housing Authority renders moot the question of whether the trial court properly dismissed her claims against Appellees Simms, Burch, and DeSpain. While I would agree that the issue is essentially moot because, as long as the Housing Authority satisfies the judgment, Appellant will have been fully compensated for her injuries,111 find Brooks’s argument more than merely “persuasive,” and I would hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed her claims against the individual defendants.12 Although the Housing Authority could be — and was, by the jury’s verdict — held vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees,13 it is long-standing, black-let*813ter law that a principal and an agent are, under normal circumstances, jointly liable for the agent’s actions.14 Accordingly, the fact that the Housing Authority could have been vicariously liable was irrelevant to the separate question of whether Appel-lees Simms, Burch, and DeSpain were individually liable for acts of retaliation prohibited by KRS 344.280(1). In my view, the trial court should have permitted Brooks to pursue her retaliation claims against the defendants collectively.
STUMBO, J., joins in part as to the analysis of Parts II, III, and IV.
. Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority, Ky., 132 S.W.3d 802 (2004).
. Bank One, Kentucky, N.A. v. Murphy, Ky., 52 S.W.3d 540, 552 (2001) (Keller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
. Brooks, 132 S.W.3d at 801 (emphasis in original).
. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 S.Ct. 441, 449, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001) ("It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction' that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ”).
. Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir.2000).
. KRS 344.280.
. Morris, 201 F.3d at 794 ("This section does not ‘mirror’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), the analogous retaliation provision of Title VII, which forbids retaliation by ‘an employer.’ Rather, § 344.280 forbids retaliation by ‘a person.’ ").
. Bank One, 52 S.W.3d at 547 n. 2 (Keller, J„ concurring in part and dissenting in part).
. Ky.App., 827 S.W.2d 697 (1991).
. I would note that, although today's plurality opinion disregards Handley’s articulation of a prima facie case for retaliation, this Court evaluated a sufficiency of the evidence issue pursuant to Handley in our most recent opinion in an employment discrimination case, which was rendered in August of 2003. See Kentucky Department of Corrections v. McCullough, Ky., 123 S.W.3d 130, 133-34 (2003).
. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 50(2) (1980) ("Any consideration received by the judgment creditor in payment of the judgment debtor's obligation discharges, to the extent of the amount of value received, the liability to the judgment creditor of all other persons liable for the loss.”). Id. cmt. d.
. See Palmer v. Intern. Ass’n of Machinists, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 117, 120 (1994) (reversing summary judgment and remanding KRS 344.280 retaliation claim against two individual, non-employer defendants).
. Cf. American General Life & Acc. Ins. v. Hall, Ky., 74 S.W.3d 688, 692 (2002) (observing that statutory civil rights actions represent an exception to the general rule that "an employer is not vicariously liable for an intentional tort of an employee not actuated by a purpose to serve the employer]?]”). But see Degener v. Hall Contracting Corp., Ky., 27 S.W.3d 775, 788-89 (2000) (Keller, J., dissenting) (opining that KRS 344.040 "hold[s] employers, and only employers, directly liable for sexual discrimination in the workplace.” (emphasis added)). In the context of KRS 344.280, which extends liability to "any person,” however, an employer may be held either directly liable for its own acts of retaliation, see Mountain Clay v. Com’n on Human Rights, Ky.App., 830 S.W.2d 395 (1992) or vicariously liable for the retaliatory acts of employees, as occurred in this case.
. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Roper, 243 Ky., 811, 50 S.W.2d 8, 9 (1932) (“[A] master and servant may be jointly liable to a third party for a negligent act of the servant[.]”); New Ellerslie Fishing Club v. Stewart, 123 Ky. 8, 93 S.W. 598, 599 (1906) ("[I]t is now well settled that a joint action may be prosecuted against the servant and master, or the corporation and its employé, for a tort of the servant or agent whilst acting within the scope of his employment.”); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Coley, 121 Ky. 385, 89 S.W. 234, 237 (1905) ("[W]e see no reason why the principal and the agent may not be sued jointly for the wrong done by the agent in the course of his agency. Any other rule would do injustice, as it would require the plaintiff to prosecute two actions, or force him to elect between wrongdoers as to which he would sue.”).