concurring.
Kocman complains that the order and judgment revoking his community supervi*568sion-probation are void. He says they stem from his conviction on January 26, 1993, a proceeding which he now contends violated his right against double jeopardy. He did not appeal his conviction in 1993, but now, almost ten years later, he tries to do so. We do not have jurisdiction to review the issue.
The majority addresses the merits of Kocmaris double jeopardy issue without even mentioning whether or not Kocman can raise this issue on appeal of his revocation. He cannot. Ordinarily, the validity of the original conviction, from which no appeal is taken, cannot be raised on appeal from a revocation order. Whetstone v. State, 786 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). There is an exception: a void judgment. Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). But void judgments are rare. Id. There are only four recognized ways for a judgment to be void: (1) when the document purporting to be a charging instrument (i.e. indictment, information, or complaint) does not satisfy the constitutional requisites of a charging instrument; (2) when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the offense charged, such as when a misdemeanor involving official misconduct is tried in a county court at law; (3) when the record reflects that there is no evidence to support the conviction; or (4) when an indigent defendant is required to face criminal trial proceedings without appointed counsel. Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). This list is “very nearly” exclusive, and double jeopardy is not on it. Id.
Thus, Kocman cannot, through an appeal of his revocation, raise a double jeopardy claim to defeat his underlying conviction. Because he cannot raise the issue, we should not address its merits. This issue should be dismissed.
I concur in the majority’s analysis and result of Kocmaris remaining issue regarding cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, I concur in affirming the trial court’s judgment.