Sahli v. Woodbine Board of Education

*324Justice ALBIN,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

School board attorneys will be surprised to learn from today’s majority opinion that they do not hold a “position” in local government. As a result of that crabbed interpretation of N.J.S.A 18A:16-6, when a lawsuit — however frivolous — is filed against the members of a school board, its administrators, and its solicitor arising from the performance of their duties, the school board will indemnify everyone but its appointed attorney. Because that interpretation is at odds with the plain and commonsense meaning of the statutory text, I respectfully dissent.

Plaintiff Ronald W. Sahli, Esq., was appointed by the Woodbine Board of Education to be its Solicitor. As a consequence of performing his duties as Solicitor, Sahli, along with the Board, its superintendent, and others, was sued by an employee of the Board. The Board in no way questions the quality of Sahli’s service as Solicitor in the matter involving that employee — a matter in which he was looking after the best interests of the Board. But when trouble arrived in the form of a lawsuit, the Board cut loose its Solicitor, refusing to defend or indemnify him. To reach that seemingly discordant result, the Board relied on N.J.SA 18A:16-6. That statute requires that in the case of a “civil or administrative action or other legal proceeding ... arising out of and in the course of the performance of [one’s] duties,” a school board indemnify “any person holding any office, position or employment under the jurisdiction of’ the board. Ibid, (emphasis added).

The Board took the approach that because Sahli was paid as an independent contractor, he did not hold an office, position, or employment with the Board for purposes of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6. Admittedly, Sahli was not an employee of the Board; he was an independent contractor. But just as clearly, the statute provides coverage to more than employees doing the Board’s business; otherwise, there would be no reason for language protecting office- and position-holders. Stated differently, the statute provides indemnification to office- and position-holders regardless of *325whether they are employees of the school district. In interpreting N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6, we are obliged to give meaning to each word of the statute and to avoid any construction that renders language useless. See Green v. Auerbach Chevrolet Corp., 127 N.J. 591, 598, 606 A.2d 1093 (1992) (quoting Med. Soc’y of N.J. v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 120 N.J. 18, 26, 575 A.2d 1348 (1990)) (“[A] court ‘should try to give effect to every word of the statute, and should not assume that the Legislature used meaningless language.’ ”). If we presume, as we must, that the Legislature intended every word to carry meaning, then it follows that an independent contractor, performing duties on behalf of the Board, is not precluded from holding an office or position within the purview of the statute.

To determine whether Sahli held an office or position, we must first understand what the Legislature contemplated when it used those terms in N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6. Because the statute nowhere defines the terms “office” or “position,” we must also presume that the Legislature was familiar with how those terms were generally understood in the common law:

An office is a place in a governmental system created or recognized by the law of the state which, either directly or by delegated authority, assigns to the incumbent thereof the continuous performance of certain permanent public duties.
A position is analogous to an office, in that the duties that pertain to it are permanent and certain, but it differs from an office, in that its duties may be nongovernmental and not assigned to it by any public law of the state. [Fredericks v. Bd. of Health of W. Hoboken, 82 N.J.L. 200, 201, 82 A. 528 (Sup.Ct.1912) (citations omitted).]

Thus, the essential duties attaching to a position, under the common law, must be “permanent and certain.” Ibid. With that in mind, we turn to the duties assigned to a Solicitor of the Woodbine Board of Education.

According to his contract with the Board, Sahli “agree[d] to perform the professional services ordinarily provided by a school district Solicitor within the State of New Jersey.” That language clearly indicates that there was a common understanding of the general duties of a Solicitor that did not have to be detailed in the *326contract. The very notion that the Solicitor’s responsibilities were well-recognized suggests that his duties were of a permanent and certain nature. In addition, the contract’s job description required that Sahli attend Board meetings, represent the Board in collective negotiations with its employees, and serve as its “chief spokesperson at all bargaining sessions.”

Despite those permanent and certain duties that the Board gave to Sahli, it now claims that it gave him the empty title of Solicitor, which applied to no position within the school board hierarchy. The Board’s uncharitable interpretation of the scope of N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 strips the attorney who did its bidding of the statute’s protections. That interpretation cannot be squared with a plain reading of the statute.

Moreover, the Appellate Division’s discourse on the statute’s legislative history, adopted by the majority, ante at 319, 938 A.2d at 928-29, is far from enlightening. The Legislature’s expansion of the classes of people covered by the statute reinforces the statute’s plain meaning. See Sahli v. Woodbine Bd. of Educ., 386 N.J.Super. 533, 539-40, 902 A.2d 296 (App.Div.2006) (quoting L. 1937, c. 125 (listing specific jobs entitled to indemnification); L. 1938, c. 311 (extending indemnification to “all teachers and members of supervisory and administrative staff’); and L. 1955, c. 85 (expanding indemnification to every “person holding any office, position or employment”)). The Appellate Division concluded that “the Legislature intended the term ‘position’ to refer to an expanded class of board employees....” Id. at 541, 902 A.2d 296. As indicated earlier, if office- and position-holders have to be employees, then the terms office and position are rendered extraneous for the purpose of determining who is entitled to indemnification under the statute.

The majority also relies on the Appellate Division’s embrace of the dicta in Gilborges v. Wallace, 78 N.J. 342, 396 A.2d 338 (1978). Ante at 319, 938 A.2d at 928-29 (citing Sahli, supra, 386 N.J.Super. at 542, 902 A.2d 296). In Gilborges, a truck collided with a vehicle driven by a student returning from a school activity. Gilborges v. Wallace, 153 N.J.Super. 121, 126-27, 379 A.2d 269 *327(App.Div.1977), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 78 N.J. 342, 396 A.2d 338 (1978). A passenger in the student’s vehicle was injured and sued the truck driver, the student driver, and the student’s school board. Ibid. This Court determined that the student was not entitled to indemnification under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6. Gilborges, supra, 78 N.J. at 352, 396 A.2d 338. That the student was not an employee, officer, or position-holder in the school district should have ended the analysis. However, the Court gratuitously remarked that it “[did] not understand the legislative intent as expressed in the statute to provide indemnification to non-employees of a board of education even though some agency relationship may exist.” Ibid. That dicta runs afoul of the plain meaning of the statute and finds no support in its legislative history.

I agree with the majority that, to the extent that the lawsuit targeted Sahli because of his activities as the Board’s secretary pro tem, he is qualified for indemnification under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 and for coverage under the Board’s liability insurance. I also agree that Sahli is not covered in his position as Solicitor by the Board’s liability insurance policy. But as stated earlier, I cannot agree that Sahli, who was appointed by the Board as Solicitor, who served it faithfully, and who was sued as a result, did not hold a position under the Board.

For those reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

Justice LONG joins in this opinion.